Goins v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 66775
• Parties: Mitt Lee GOINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. 131 Mich.App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3231
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 184

347 N.W.2d 184

Mitt Lee GOINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Docket No. 66775.

131 Mich.App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3231

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 10, 1983.

Decided Dec. 19, 1983.

Released for Publication March 16, 1984.

[131 MICHAPP 189] Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson by George L. Downing, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.

Kermit G. Bailer, Arnold G. Shulman and Jill MacDonald, Dearborn, for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Before HOOD, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and DeWITT ^*, JJ.

HOOD, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from a December 9, 1981, jury verdict awarding damages to plaintiff for wrongful discharge from employment by defendant and from the trial court's August 31, 1982, order denying defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or remittitur. Plaintiff cross-appeals the jury's partial verdict for defendant on plaintiff's theory that he was wrongfully discharged because of a handicap and from the trial court's February 22, 1982, judgment reducing the jury's $450,000 award, stipulated to be future damages, to a present value of $270,439.50, SJI2d 53.03, and holding that statutory interest on the reduced award need only be paid from the date of the verdict, not from the day plaintiff filed his complaint. MCL Sec. 600.6013, MSA 27A.6013.

Defendant hired plaintiff as a labor relations employee beginning September 6, 1977, at its Woodhaven Plant. Defendant discharged plaintiff on February 2, 1978.

Plaintiff testified that prior to applying for employment at the Ford Woodhaven plant, he sought similar employment at Ford's world headquarters and Monroe, Ypsilanti, and Rouge plants. Plaintiff filled out applications and medical history forms at all but the Ypsilanti plant. The medical history forms asked the question, "Have you ever filed a [131 MICHAPP 190] state compensation claim due to industrial accident or disease?" Plaintiff said he answered the question affirmatively on all the forms but the one he completed at the Woodhaven plant. Plaintiff had sustained a work-related injury while employed for General Motors Corporation (G.M.) in 1971 and received worker's compensation benefits for that injury for nearly a year. Plaintiff said he did not disclose this fact at the Woodhaven plant because interviewers at the Ford Rouge plant and world headquarters had informed him that his affirmative response might cause the defendant to deny him employment.

Plaintiff said he told William Cottrell, his supervisor at Woodhaven, during his job interview that he had a speech impediment and also a disability due to a former knee injury sustained at G.M. Plaintiff also said he informed Cottrell that he had a pending third-party negligence suit related to the injury.

In October and November 1977, plaintiff took time off work to attend his third-party negligence trial. Immediately before that trial, plaintiff and another labor relations employee had prepared a computer program which erroneously caused Woodhaven employees to receive a shortage in their personal holiday pay.

Upon plaintiff's return to work after his trial, Cottrell advised plaintiff he was fired because of the computer error and because Cottrell had discovered that plaintiff had falsified his answer on the medical history form. Cottrell testified at trial that plaintiff would not have been discharged for only the computer error. The principal reason for plaintiff's discharge, according to Cottrell, was his falsification on his medical history form. Cottrell said plaintiff's leg injury and speech impediment had no bearing on plaintiff's discharge.

[131 MICHAPP 191] Before submitting his case to the jury, plaintiff withdrew the civil rights action he had pled. The jury was instructed that plaintiff's theory was that he was discharged because of his handicaps in violation of the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, MCL Sec. 37.1101 et seq., MSA 3.550(101) et seq., or that he was unlawfully discharged because he had filed a previous workers' compensation claim with a former employer. The jury returned its verdict of $450,000 damages on only the latter theory.

I

In its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial or remittitur, defendant raised several issues: (1) That there exists no cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim during previous employment; (2) that even if such a cause of action does exist, plaintiff did not adequately plead it and, thus, it should not have gone to the jury; (3) that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the workers' compensation theory and as to damages; (4) the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; and (5) the verdict was grossly excessive.

In an August 17, 1982, opinion, the trial court rejected all the above arguments. Defendant raises all of them again in this appeal.

Defendant's first two arguments regarding the validity of plaintiff's workers' compensation theory and plaintiff's failure to plead it adequately were raised in the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

"A judgment notwithstanding the verdict on defendants'[131 MICHAPP 192] motion is appropriate only if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for plaintiff. Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 695; 310 NW2d 26 (1981). In reaching a decision, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence. Isom v Farrugia, 63 Mich App 351, 354-355; 234 NW2d 520 (1975). If after viewing the evidence in this manner reasonable men could differ, the question is one for the jury and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper. Id." Drummey v. Henry, 115 Mich.App. 107, 110-111, 320 N.W.2d 309 (1982).

Defendant argues that its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted because plaintiff's workers' compensation theory is not legally recognized. However, the trial court found:

"In determining whether or not defendant is entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court is persuaded that Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, 412 Mich 692 [316 N.W.2d 710 (1982) ] is dispositive of this issue. From the syllabus of the case summarizing the court's opinion it is stated:

" '1. Courts have recognized that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable. Most often the proscription is found in explicit legislative statements protecting employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty. Occasionally a sufficient legislative policy has been found to imply a cause of action for wrongful discharge even in the absence of an explicit prohibition, as when the discharge is for failure or refusal to violate a law, or for the exercise of a right conferred by legislative enactment.'

"Certainly pursuing one's right under the workers' compensation statute is a right conferred by legislative enactment. Therefore, if the defendant discharged the plaintiff because plaintiff had filed a workers' compensation[131 MICHAPP 193] claim, clearly such discharge would be contrary to the public policy of this state.

"There can be no question that plaintiff was discharged shortly after defendant learned of the workers' compensation claim plaintiff had filed while employed with General Motors. It is also true that the defendant learned about the same time that plaintiff had lied on his application for employment with defendant concerning the workers' compensation matter. It was, therefore, a question of fact as to why plaintiff was discharged; and defendant had the full opportunity of presenting to the jury all facts supporting its claim that defendant was discharged because of poor work performance and because he had lied on his application for employment. The jury, however, did not accept defendant's theory of the case. Rather, it accepted plaintiff's claim that he was discharged because during previous employment he had filed a workers' compensation claim."

The trial court also found that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence at trial to enable the jury to draw the inference that defendant discharged plaintiff because plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer.

We agree, and affirm the trial court on this point. Although generally at-will, indefinite-term employment contracts, such as the one in this case, are terminable at will, Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315 (1937), exceptions are recognized where a discharge violates a recognized public policy or the worker's statutory rights. Suchodolski, supra, Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 619, 620, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981). One such statutory right is that of a worker to file workers' compensation claims. This Court holds that it is contrary to public policy for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Sventko v. The Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d [131 MICHAPP 194] 151 (1976); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich.App. 90, 94, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981). We find no reason, as defendant suggests, to limit this rule only to employers who fire employees who file claims against them rather than against previous employers. The public policy extends to situations such as this where the employee argues an unlawful or retaliatory discharge because he or she filed a workers' compensation claim against any employer, including a previous employer.

Moreover, we also agree with the trial court's opinion that plaintiff sufficiently pled the workers' compensation cause of action. The trial court found:

"In plaintiff's complaint he states:

"...