Goins v. State
| Decision Date | 09 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | CR 02-972. |
| Parties | JESSIE GOINS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
In 1994, Jessie Goins was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. We affirmed. Goins v. State, 318 Ark. 689, 890 S.W.2d 602 (1995).
Goins subsequently filed in the trial court an untimely petition pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1 seeking to vacate the judgment. The petition was denied, and no appeal was taken from that order.
In 2002, Goins filed in the trial court a pro se petition to correct sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.§ 16-90-111 (Supp. 1995), contending that sentence was illegal. The court dismissed the petition, and Goins appealed to this court. We granted the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal because we found that the trial court did not err when it denied relief. Goins v. State, CR 02-972 (Ark. April 24, 2003) (per curiam). Appellant asks that we reconsider that decision.
As we said when the appeal was dismissed, this court has consistently held that an appeal of the denial of postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996); Harris v. State, 318 Ark. 599, 887 S.W.2d 514 (1994); Reed v. State, 317 Ark. 286, 878 S.W.2d 376 (1994); see Chambers v. State, 304 Ark. 663, 803 S.W.2d 932 (1991); Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 560, 798 S.W.2d 108 (1990); Williams v. State, 293 Ark. 73, 732 S.W.2d 456 (1987).
Appellant was procedurally barred from proceeding under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 in that the petition filed in the trial court was untimely. Criminal Procedure Rule 37.2 (b) has superseded Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (Supp. 1995); Reed v. State, 317 Ark. 286, 878 S.W.2d 378 (1994), citing Hickson v. State, 316 Ark. 783, 875 S.W.2d 492
(1994). Rule 37.2(b) provides that all grounds for postconviction relief, including the assertion that a sentence is illegal, must be raised in a petition under the rule filed within sixty days of the date that the mandate of the appellate court affirming the judgment was issued. Appellant filed his petition more than seven years after the mandate was issued affirming the judgment in his case. The time limitations imposed in Rule 37.2(b) are jurisdictional in nature, and a circuit court may not grant relief on a untimely postconviction petition whether it be filed under Rule 37.1 or Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111. See Maxwell v. State, 298 Ark. 329, 767 S.W.2d 303 (1989).
Motion for reconsideration denied.
I write to emphasize that while Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2 prescribes time limits for post-conviction relief that superseded our state statute dealing with illegal sentences [Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (1987)], it does not and cannot supersede the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus guaranteed to our citizens under the Arkansas Constitution. Article 2, section 11, of the Arkansas Constitution provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except by the General Assembly, in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion when the public safety may require it." Rule 37 is a court-adopted rule that (1) was not enacted by the General Assembly, and (2) does not pertain to "rebellion, insurrection or invasion." Accordingly, Rule 37 does not suspend in any way a citizen's privilege to habeas corpus relief.
We said as much in Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). In addressing whether habeas corpus relief was subject to any time limits, we said:
The question then becomes whether there are time limits on when a petition must file a writ of habeas corpus based on an illegal sentence. Certainly, a petitioner cannot waive a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. And neither the Arkansas Constitution nor the state statutes
place a time limit on pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, to do so would contravene the proscription against suspending the right to habeas corpus.
337 Ark. at 499, 989 S.W.2d at 518. We further underscored in Renshaw that when the circuit court imposes an illegal sentence without authority to do so, that raises the question of whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter such a sentence.
That is precisely the issue before us in this case. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by Taylor beyond the time limits of post-conviction relief. Regardless of that fact, the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus is not subject to those time constraints. To hold otherwise would be to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus which the constitution specifically directs we cannot do.
For these reasons, I disagree with the concurring opinion that urges this court to subject the privilege of habeas corpus to the same time constraints this court placed on post-conviction relief under Rule 37.2. To do that would be to overrule Renshaw v. Norris, supra, and suspend the writ for all petitions filed after the Rule 37.2 limits. It is clear we cannot do this without an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution.
Moreover, to truncate the privilege of habeas corpus would be to perpetuate an injustice in cases where a circuit court sentenced a defendant to a term of years in excess of its statutory authority. Were we to hold that a defendant had no recourse after the Rule 37.2 times of 60 days (following an appeal) or 90 days (following a guilty plea or trial) had passed, the defendant would be left without a state remedy. That would be a horrendous state of affairs, especially when our state constitution guarantees and memorializes the time-honored remedy of habeas corpus for illegal detentions.
For these reasons, I concur with the majority opinion.
It is paramount to recognize that Article 2, Section 11 of the Constitution of Arkansas guarantees the efficacy of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and does not place a time limit on the exercise of the right of one who is being detained without lawful authority to apply for issuance of the writ. Indeed, the Arkansas Constitution expressly disallows suspension of the writ, "except by the General Assembly, in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion, when the public safety may require it." Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 11. Review under the doctrine of habeas corpus is limited to two claims: whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction or whether the petitioner's judgment and commitment order was invalid on its face. E.g., Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 437, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002).
We have consistently held that an illegal sentence is one which is illegal "on its face." E.g., Abdullah v. State, 290 Ark. 537, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986). An illegal sentence is a void sentence because the trial court lacked authority to impose it. See Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). A valid sentence may not be modified once executed, but an illegal sentence, even though partially executed, may be corrected. Lambert v. State, 286 Ark. 408, 692 S.W.2d 238 (1985). The remedy for an illegal sentence is not dismissal of all related proceedings and release from imprisonment; the general rule is that the original sentence, even though partially executed, may be corrected by the sentencing court. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992). An excessive sentence upon a lawful conviction is not absolutely void, so as to entitle the prisoner to be discharged on habeas corpus. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
Where an error has nothing to do with the issue of guilt or innocence and relates only to punishment, the appellate court may correct it in lieu of reversing and
remanding. Harness v. State , ___ Ark. ___, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003); State v. Fountain, 350 Ark. 437, 88 S.W.3d 411 (2002); Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002); Renshaw v. Norris, supra; Roberts v. State, 324 Ark. 68, 919 S.W.2d 192 (1996); Bangs, supra; Richards v. State, 309 Ark. 133, 827 S.W.2d 155 (1992); McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974).
Convicted defendants have three traditional avenues for the correction of an illegal sentence: a petition to correct sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111, a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is important to delineate among those remedies and to emphasize that only habeas corpus allows for the correction of an illegal sentence at any time.
In all three available remedies, we have consistently held that no objection was necessary at trial as the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief because a circuit court acting in excess of its authority in sentencing can be likened to a matter of subject matter jurisdiction; hence, the issue can be raised sua sponte. E.g., Harness v. State, supra; Mayes v. State, 351 Ark. 26, 89 S.W.3d 926 (2002); Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002); Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993); DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993); Bangs v. State, supra; Lambert v. State, supra. See also Timmons v. State, ___ Ark. App. ___, 100 S.W.3d 52, (2003); Palmer v. State, 31 Ark. App. 97, 788 S.W.2d 248 (1990); Jones v. State, 27 Ark. App. 24, 765 S.W.2d 15 (1989). This is not to say, however, that time limits cannot be placed on raising the issue of whether a sentence is illegal when the assertion of error is made under Rule 37.1 or under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(b) allows for the correction of an
illegal sentence by the trial court, including a...
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