Goins v. West Group

• Decision Date: 29 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. CX-00-706.,CX-00-706.
• Parties: Julienne GOINS, Respondent, v. WEST GROUP, petitioner, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

635 N.W.2d 717

Julienne GOINS, Respondent, v. WEST GROUP, petitioner, Appellant.

No. CX-00-706.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 29, 2001.

Rehearing Denied December 31, 2001.

Susan E. Ellingstad, Patricia A. Bloodgood, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Joni M. Thome, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Robert R. Reinhart and Erik T. Nelson, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Minnesota Chamber of Commerce.

Philip A. Duran, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Outfront Minnesota and Minnesota Lavender Bar Association.

James H. Manahan, Mankato, for amicus curiae National Center Lesbian Rights et al.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

West Group (West) has obtained review of a decision of the court of appeals reversing summary judgment entered in its favor and remanding for trial respondent Julienne Goins' claims of discrimination. Goins claims that West discriminated against her based upon her sexual orientation by designating restrooms and restroom use on the basis of biological gender, in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (2000). Goins also claims that such discrimination created a hostile work environment. We hold that an employer's designation of employee restroom use based on biological gender is not sexual orientation discrimination in violation of the MHRA. We also conclude that Goins has not established a factual basis for the hostile work environment claim. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment entered by the district court dismissing Goins' claims.

Respondent Julienne Goins was designated male at birth and given the name Justin Travis Goins, but Goins was confused about that sexual identity throughout much of childhood and adolescence. Since 1994, Goins has taken female hormones and, with the exception of one occasion, has presented publicly as female since 1995. In October 1995, a Texas court granted Goins' petition for a name change as well as a request for a gender change "from genetic male to reassigned female." Goins identifies as transgender or "trans-identified."¹

In May 1997, Goins began full-time work with West in its Rochester, New York, office. Goins transferred to West's Minnesota facility in Eagan in October 1997. Prior to the actual relocation, Goins visited the Eagan facility and used the employee women's restrooms. A few of West's female employees observed Goins' use of the women's restrooms and, believing Goins to be biologically male, expressed concern to West supervisors about sharing a restroom with a male. This concern was brought to the attention of West's director of human resources who, in turn, discussed the concern with other human resources personnel and legal counsel. West's director of human resources considered the female employees' restroom use complaint as a hostile work environment concern and decided to enforce the policy of restroom use according to biological gender. After considering the options, the director decided that it would be more appropriate for Goins to use either a single-occupancy restroom in the building where she worked but on a different floor or another single-occupancy restroom in another building.

The decision on restroom use was conveyed to Goins by the director of human resources in the morning of her first day of work at the Eagan facility. The director explained that West was attempting to accommodate the conflicting concerns of Goins and the female employees who expressed uneasiness about sharing their restroom with a male. Goins objected, proposing instead education and training regarding transgender individuals so as to allay female coworker concerns. She also refused to comply with the restroom use policy, in protest in part, and continued to use the employee women's restroom closest to her workstation. In November 1997, Goins was threatened with disciplinary action if she continued to disregard the restroom use policy. In January 1998, Goins tendered her resignation, declining West's offer of a promotion and substantial salary increase, and accepted a job offer elsewhere. In her letter of resignation, Goins stated that West's human resources department had treated her in a manner that had caused undue stress and hostility.

Goins subsequently commenced an action in district court, alleging that West had engaged in discrimination based on sexual orientation in the enforcement of a policy that denied her access to the employee women's restroom. Goins further asserted that West's discriminatory treatment, as well as conduct of West employees, created a hostile work environment. The district court granted West's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Goins had failed to make a prima facie case on either claim. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Goins had established a prima facie showing of sexual orientation discrimination and that there were factual allegations with regard to the hostile work environment claim sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Goins v. West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424, 429-30 (Minn.App.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn.2001); Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 229, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974). On appeal from a summary judgment, the reviewing court determines whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 672.

I.

The MHRA prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2000). The definition of "sexual orientation" includes "having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness." Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41a (2000). The parties agree that Goins consistently presents herself as a woman. Her discrimination claim is predicated on her self-image as a woman that is or is perceived to be inconsistent with her biological gender. Accordingly, for purposes of Goins' discrimination claim, her self-image is inconsistent with her biological gender. Cf. Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F.Supp.2d 557, 560 (D.Minn.1998)

(insurance applicant perceived as being disabled has a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act).

Employment discrimination may be established under either a disparate impact or disparate treatment theory. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719 n. 1 (Minn.1986). Goins alleged disparate treatment. When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, liability "`depends on whether the protected trait * * * actually motivated the employer's decision.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993)). The plaintiff's protected trait must have "`actually played a role in the [employer's decision-making] process.'" Id. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical in a disparate treatment claim. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Of course, proof of a discriminatory motive may be established by direct evidence. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982).

Direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive shows that the employer's discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt. Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1369 n. 16; Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir.1980) (distinguishing between discrimination which is "relatively open and easy to recognize" and discrimination which must be demonstrated by inference). Courts have found direct evidence of discriminatory motive where a statement or a policy is discriminatory on its face. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985)

(finding that a collective bargaining agreement constituted direct evidence of discrimination because the agreement allowed airline captains displaced for any reason other than age to bump a less senior flight engineer); Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir.2000) (finding direct evidence of discriminatory motive where manager admitted that age was one of three criteria used to determine which employees would be retained and which would not); Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1369 n. 16 (finding direct evidence of discrimination where a sheriff stated that he would not consider hiring women for seven open deputy positions). Cf. Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Systems, Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 451-52 (7th Cir.1998) (finding no direct evidence of discriminatory motive where the employer did not state that termination was based on age and where employer's statements did not relate to his motivation as the decisionmaker in terminating employee).

The court of appeals concluded that Goins "made a prima facie case of direct discrimination under the MHRA by showing that she was denied the use of a workplace facility based on the inconsistency between her self-image and her anatomy." Goins, 619 N.W.2d at 429. The evidence, however, was that West's policy of restroom designation and use was based on gender. In that Goins sought and was denied access only to those restrooms designated for women, West's enforcement of that policy was likewise grounded on gender.

Goins does not argue that an employer engages in impermissible discrimination by designating the use of restrooms according to gender. Rather, her claim is that the MHRA prohibits West's policy of designating restroom use according to biological gender, and requires instead that such designation be...