Goins v. West Group

• Decision Date: 21 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. CX-00-706.,CX-00-706.
• Citation: 619 N.W.2d 424
• Parties: Julienne GOINS, Appellant, v. WEST GROUP Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

619 N.W.2d 424

Julienne GOINS, Appellant, v. WEST GROUP Respondent.

No. CX-00-706.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

November 21, 2000.

Joni M. Thome, Attorney at Law, Bloomington, for appellant.

Patricia A. Bloodgood, Susan E. Ellingstad, Lockridge, Grindal, Nauen, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge, FOLEY, Judge,¹ and MULALLY, Judge.²

OPINION

STONEBURNER, J.

Appellant Julienne Goins challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to her employer on her claims of intentional sexual orientation discrimination and hostile work environment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Because the district court erred in its application of the law to the sexual orientation discrimination claim and because material questions of fact exist with regard to the hostile work environment claim, we reverse. We also reverse the district court's order compelling Goins to answer questions regarding her anatomy because such discovery is not relevant to her claims.

FACTS

When appellant Goins was born on April 15, 1973 she was designated "male" on her birth certificate. Through childhood and adolescence Goins was considered male, but she was confused about her sexual identity. In 1994 after counseling, she began taking female hormones. By the summer of 1995 Goins began to consistently present herself as female. In October 1995 a Texas court granted her petition to legally change her name from Justin Travis Goins to Julienne Hannah Goins. The Texas court order states that it constitutes authority for a change of gender from "genetic male" to "reassigned female" on any and all documents, including but not limited to Goins's birth certificate and Texas driver's license.³ Although Goins has not had elective surgery to alter any part of her anatomy, the parties do not dispute that Goins sincerely and consistently identifies herself as female.

In May 1997 Goins began working for West Group in Rochester, New York, where she worked for five months without incident. During the summer of 1997 she visited West's Eagan facility on four occasions. She agreed to relocate to Minnesota and began working at the Eagan facility on October 6, 1997.

Before Goins started work at Eagan, a group of approximately four women told Lewis Freeman, Director of Shared Services Human Resources for the Eagan facility, that they were uncomfortable with Goins using the women's restroom because of their belief that Goins is biologically male. There is no evidence that any of the complainants have ever been in the women's restroom at the same time as Goins. No one has ever alleged any inappropriate conduct by Goins in the restroom or elsewhere.

In response to the expressed concerns and Freeman's own belief that Goins is biologically male, Freeman immediately told Goins that she could not use the women's restrooms. She was directed to use either of the facility's two single-occupancy restrooms, which are not designated as men's or women's restrooms. One of these restrooms is located in the lobby of the building where Goins worked and the other is in a nearby building.

Goins opposed the directive and voiced her disagreement. She proposed education and communication with co-workers to address their concerns. She refused to use the designated restrooms, partially in protest and partially because she found the restrooms inconvenient and dirty. Goins refrained from eating or drinking during the day to avoid having to use any restroom. Occasionally Goins used the women's restroom. In November 1997 Freeman warned Goins that if she continued to use the women's restroom she would be disciplined. Freeman also told supervisors that it was incumbent upon them to enforce the restroom policy.

Goins wrote to a West Human Resources representative in Rochester, New York that she felt harassed at the Eagan facility because of the restroom policy. The Rochester representative referred her back to the Eagan supervisors, who were already aware of the policy and to whom she had already expressed her complaints of discrimination and harassment.

West does not dispute that Goins was qualified to perform her work. In fact, on January 12, 1998 West offered Goins a promotion and a $4,000 raise. But Goins, who had received another job offer on the same day, declined and submitted her resignation. In her written resignation Goins stated that although she left her employment with West voluntarily, she resigned because of the unwelcome, stressful environment created by the restroom policy.

Goins brought this lawsuit against West alleging sexual orientation discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted West's motion to compel Goins to answer discovery regarding her genitals and later granted West's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination and hostile work environment claims. Goins appeals the grant of summary judgment to West and the order compelling discovery.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err in granting West's motion for summary judgment on Goins's intentional sexual orientation discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act?

2. Did the district court err in granting West's motion for summary judgment on Goins's hostile work environment claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act?

3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting West's motion to compel Goins to respond to discovery about her genitals?

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal from summary judgment, this court asks two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). This court will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground. Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn.App.1995).

I.

Goins contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her sexual orientation discrimination claim because it misapplied the relevant law. We agree. The Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee in terms, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment based on sexual orientation. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1998). The statute defines sexual orientation to include:

having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness.

Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 45 (1998). The parties agree that Goins is a member of this protected class.

The district court rejected an analysis of a direct claim of discrimination and used the McDonnell Douglas v. Green formula for establishing a prima facie case of indirect discrimination. The district court concluded that, in order to make a prima facie case of indirect discrimination, Goins had to show: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified to use the women's restroom; and (3) that adverse employment action was taken against her based on her status as a member of the protected class. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Diez v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 564 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn.App.1997), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997).

In applying McDonnell Douglas, the district court focused on whether Goins is "qualified" to use the women's restroom. After a thorough discussion of non-jurisdictional case law on same-sex marriage,⁴ the district court found that a person's sex remains as designated on the birth certificate, based on genital assessment at birth. See M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (Ct.App.Div.1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1971); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Prob.Ct.1987); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex.App. 1999). The district court reasoned that because Goins was designated male on her birth certificate and admits she has not undergone surgery, she must be biologically male, and therefore "unqualified" to use the women's restroom despite her undisputed female self-image. Finding her unqualified to use the women's restroom, the district court concluded West had not taken adverse action against Goins based on her status as a member of a protected class and that, therefore, Goins failed to make a prima facie case of indirect discrimination.⁵ The district court erred by applying the formula for indirect discrimination because Goins has established a direct claim of discrimination under the MHRA.

The MHRA is unique in prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. See Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 45. The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of the inconsistency between anatomy and self-image. West denied Goins use of the women's restroom in disregard of her undisputed female self-image. The district court agreed with West and held that, as a matter of law, anatomy alone makes Goins a man and that her self-image is irrelevant to the issue of restroom use. The district court held that Goins can only use the women's restroom by demonstrating anatomy consistent with self-image. The MHRA, however, does not require an employee to eliminate an inconsistency between self-image and anatomy; it protects the employee from discrimination based on such an inconsistency. Goins has made a prima facie case of direct discrimination under the MHRA by showing that she was...