Goldwire v. City of Phila., CIVIL ACTION NO. 15–2856

• Decision Date: 10 September 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15–2856
• Citation: 130 F.Supp.3d 936
• Parties: Kelly Goldwire v. City of Philadelphia, Todd Landherr, Rosa Ricardo, Daniel Murawski, and John Doe City of Philadelphia Police Officers I–III
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

130 F.Supp.3d 936

Kelly Goldwire

v.City of Philadelphia, Todd Landherr, Rosa Ricardo, Daniel Murawski, and John Doe City of Philadelphia Police Officers I–III

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15–2856

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 10, 2015

Filed September 11, 2015

Brian S. Chacker, Steven A. Medina, Gay Chacker & Mittin PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Kelly Goldwire.

Michael R. Miller, City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for City of Philadelphia, Todd Landherr, Rosa Ricardo, Daniel Murawaski.

MEMORANDUM

DALZELL, District Judge.

I. Introduction

We consider here two motions to dismiss filed by Rosa Ricardo, Daniel Murawski, and the City of Philadelphia. Plaintiff Kelly Goldwire brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. Standard of Review

As is by now well-rehearsed, a defendant moving to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; see also, e.g.,Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a facially plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

As the Supreme Court has stressed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action ... do not suffice." Id. Courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, our Court of Appeals laid out a two-part test to apply when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) :

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, we may consider "the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record," and any "undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).

We recite the facts as they appear in the complaint.

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff Kelly Goldwire is a self-employed, certified Fugitive Recovery Agent. Compl. at ¶ 8. As such an Agent, Goldwire pursues individuals with open bench warrants and is licensed to carry a firearm. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 20.

On March 24, 2014, at around 1:30 a.m., Goldwire was driving near 11th and Cambria Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania while investigating the whereabouts of a fugitive he was pursuing. Id. at ¶ 9. Goldwire noticed that a police vehicle was following him and as Goldwire turned onto Germantown Avenue, the police vehicle engaged its emergency lights indicating that Goldwire should pull over. Id. at ¶ 10, 12. Goldwire complied. Id. at ¶ 13. Defendant Officer Todd Landherr was driving the police vehicle. Id. at ¶ 12. After Goldwire pulled over, defendant Officers Rosa Ricardo, Daniel Murawski, and John Does I–III arrived as backup for the stop. Id. at ¶ 14.

The officers, led by Officer Landherr, all approached Goldwire's vehicle. Id. at ¶ 16. Officer Landherr informed Goldwire that one of his taillights was out. Id. While requesting Goldwire's driver's license and insurance information, Officer Landherr "who knew Mr. Goldwire and knew his vehicle, asked whether Mr. Goldwire was armed and where his firearm was located." Id. at ¶ 17. Goldwire told Officer Landherr that his firearm was behind him on the floor of his vehicle. Id. at ¶ 18.

After Goldwire told Officer Landherr where his firearm was, Officer Landherr ordered him to get out of the car and immediately arrested him. Id. at ¶ 19. Goldwire reminded the police officers that he was licensed to carry a firearm and offered to produce all of the licensing paperwork in his wallet, including his Act 235 license. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21. None of the officers would look at or review his Act 235 license, and despite knowing that Goldwire was properly licensed to carry a firearm, the officers continued to detain and arrest him. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23. None of the officers made any effort to prevent his arrest. Id. at ¶ 24.

After detaining and arresting Goldwire, the officers "prepared and caused to be prepared police paperwork intentionally misrepresenting the events that led to" his arrest. Id. at ¶ 25. Goldwire was charged with carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm in public. Id. at ¶ 27. Goldwire remained incarcerated for at least five days while gathering sufficient funds to make bail. Id. at ¶¶ 28–29. When the officers arrested Goldwire, he advised them that he was receiving chemotherapy and could not afford to miss his next appointment, scheduled for later that morning. Id. at ¶ 30. Goldwire missed his appointment. Id. at ¶ 31. On December 30, 2014, Goldwire was found not guilty on all charges. Id. at ¶ 32. He was without his license to carry a firearm for approximately five months, his firearm has not been returned to him, and he has been unable to work as a Fugitive Recovery Agent. Id. at ¶¶ 33–36.

Goldwire asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. In Count I, he alleges that Officer Landherr subjected him to false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Id. at ¶¶ 39–44. In Count II, Goldwire alleges that Officers Ricardo, Murawski, and the three John Does are liable under a theory of bystander liability or failure to intervene regarding Officer Landherr's actions and conspired to conceal their unlawful conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 45– 50. In Count III, Goldwire brings a Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia. Id. at ¶¶ 51–61.

Officers Ricardo and Murawski move to dismiss Count II of the complaint, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The City of Philadelphia moves to dismiss Count III of the complaint as factually insufficient. Goldwire opposes both motions.

IV. Discussion

A cause of action under Section 1983 requires only two allegations: a person has deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, and that person acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) ; see alsoShuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.2005).

We consider the defendants' motions to dismiss.

A. Officers Ricardo And Murawski's Motion To Dismiss Count II

Officers Ricardo and Murawksi argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because "the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has never held that police officers have a duty to intervene" when they observe another officer making a false arrest. Officers' Mem. at 1.

An officer asserting an entitlement to qualified immunity must claim that his conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) ; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Officers bear the burden of demonstrating their entitlement to that affirmative defense. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir.2014). When evaluating whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity we must ask, in no particular order, (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (explaining the two steps in the context of a mandatory sequence); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding the sequence of the two steps to be optional). As Officers Ricardo and Murawski only make an argument as to the second prong, we will first consider whether the right was clearly established.

A right is clearly-established if its contours, in light of pre-existing law, are sufficiently clear that any reasonable officer would understand that his conduct violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ; George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 572 (3d Cir.2013). Qualified immunity offers no protection to an officer when existing precedent places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). The ultimate question is whether an officer had fair warning that his conduct deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional right. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir.2011).

But the law may be clearly established, and an officer may be found to have had fair warning, even if no court has previously held the specific conduct in question to be unlawful. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) ; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Sometimes, the very action in question will not have been previously held unlawful because some...