L.H. v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 10 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:13–0788.
• Citation: 130 F.Supp.3d 918
• Parties: L.H. and C.H., as legal guardians of their minor child, A.H., and L.H. and C.H., Plaintiffs v. PITTSTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Superintendent Michael Garzella, Individually, and Kelli Diaz a/k/a Kelli Pavalonis, Individually and Officially, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

130 F.Supp.3d 918

L.H. and C.H., as legal guardians of their minor child, A.H., and L.H. and C.H., Plaintiffs

v.PITTSTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Superintendent Michael Garzella, Individually, and Kelli Diaz a/k/a Kelli Pavalonis¹ , Individually and Officially, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:13–0788.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed Sept. 10, 2015.

Cynthia L. Pollick, The Employment Law Firm, Pittston, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Mark Joseph Kozlowski, Robin B. Snyder, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Scranton, PA, Richard A. Polachek, Polachek & Associates, P.C., Wilkes–Barre, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION

, District Judge.

"Shut up." "It's day 13 and I can't stand you already." "I'm not the only teacher who can't stand you." "You're going to have the [worst] year ever." Do you have "a problem" or "Tourette's² ?"

These are words one would not expect a school teacher to speak to a student, let alone in front of a classroom of his peers. They are unprofessional and unacceptable to say the least. There is no real dispute in this case that a teacher in the Pittston Area School District said these words to an eighth grade student in front of his classmates. The incident was recorded on the student's cell phone. The question which the court is now called upon to determine is whether the school teacher's or the School District's conduct in relation to this incident violated the student's federal constitutional or state law rights.

Pending before the court are a motion for summary judgment brought on behalf of defendants Pittston Area School District and Michael Garzella, ("School District defendants"), (Doc. 71), and a motion for summary judgment brought on behalf of defendant Kelli Diaz a/k/a Kelli Pavalonis, ("defendant Diaz"), (Doc. 72). Based upon the court's review of the record presented in this case, the School District's motion for summary judgment will be granted, and defendant Diaz's motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By way of relevant procedural background, the plaintiffs initiated the instant action by filing a complaint on March 26, 2013. (Doc. 1). The next day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 3). Following the filing of a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint by the School District defendants, (Doc. 8), the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, (Doc. 37), and later to file a "corrected" second amended complaint, (Doc. 40). Although unusual for plaintiffs' to require so many attempt to produce even a minimally adequate complaint, by order dated March 24, 2014, the court allowed the plaintiffs to file what was to be titled a "third amended complaint." (Doc. 42).³ The plaintiffs, in fact, filed their third amended complaint on March 28, 2014. (Doc. 44). In turn, the School District defendants and defendant Diaz filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' third amended complaint, (Doc. 47, Doc. 61, respectively). Prior to the court considering the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' third amended complaint, the School District defendants and defendant Diaz filed motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 71, Doc. 72, respectively). As a result, the defendants' motions to dismiss were deemed moot. (Doc. 83).

With respect to the pending motions for summary judgment, the School District defendants filed their motion on October 15, 2014. (Doc. 71). On October 29, 2014, a statement of material facts accompanied by exhibits, (Doc. 76), and a brief, (Doc. 77), were filed in support of the motion. A brief in opposition to the School District defendants' motion was filed by the plaintiffs on November 12, 2014, (Doc. 84), along with an answer to the statement of material facts, (Doc. 85). A reply brief was filed on November 26, 2014. (Doc. 88).

Defendant Diaz's motion for summary judgment was also filed on October 15, 2014, (Doc. 72), along with a supporting brief, (Doc. 73), and statement of material facts, (Doc. 74). The plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to defendant Diaz's motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 78), and a responsive statement of material facts, (Doc. 79), on November 5, 2014.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)

; see alsoCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Turner v. Schering–Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir.1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ericksen, 903 F.Supp. 836, 838 (M.D.Pa.1995). At the summary judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see alsoMarino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations). Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir.2007).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548

. The moving party can discharge the burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.2003)

; see alsoCelotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). However, if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Jakimas v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir.2007).

III. DISCUSSION

In their third amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege that, in or around September 2012, defendant Diaz, a Pittston Area School District teacher, verbally abused plaintiff A.H., a minor child, in front of other students by saying 5 the following to him:

• "Shut up."

• "It's day 13 and I can't stand you already."

• "You're going to have the worse (sic) year ever."

• "I'm not the only teacher who can't stand you."

The plaintiffs further allege that defendant Diaz asked plaintiff A.H. if he had "a problem" and whether he had "Tourette's." Prior to defendant Diaz making these comments, the plaintiffs claim that the School District defendants knew or should have known that defendant Diaz had another run-in with a minor student in which she acted inappropriately and that she had prior legal issues.

Plaintiffs L.H. and C.H. allege that they informed the School District defendants about the comments made by defendant Diaz to A.H. after learning of them in or around October 2012. Instead of remedying the situation and terminating defendant Diaz, the plaintiffs allege that the School District defendants retaliated against them by protecting defendant Diaz and forcing A.H. to be home schooled for more than five months, refusing to respond to inquiries about the status of the investigation into defendant Diaz's behavior, and failing to disclose what discipline, if any, was imposed upon defendant Diaz. Based upon these allegations, in Count I of the third amended complaint, the plaintiffs set forth a claim of First Amendment retaliation against the School District defendants.

As alluded to above, the plaintiffs allege in Count II that defendant Diaz 6 had legal troubles, in that she had previously entered a plea of guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct. The plaintiffs allege that the School District defendants knew or should have known about defendant Diaz's prior legal troubles and had a duty to check her background and references. In fact, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants should never have hired Ms. Diaz in the first place because she lied on her employment application that she had never been convicted of a crime as defined within the application material.

Moreover, after defendant Diaz was hired, the plaintiffs allege that another student had alerted the School District defendants at a School Board meeting of other misconduct engaged in by defendant Diaz. According to the plaintiffs, this matter was never investigated.

The plaintiffs allege that the School District defendants failed to take steps to guard against the misconduct which occurred in this case. Specifically, they allege that the School District defendants hired defendant Diaz knowing of her troubled background, never monitored her, and failed to properly train her. In Count II of the plaintiffs' third amended complaint, they allege inadequate supervision, hiring, screening, and training under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the School District defendants.

As a result of...