Gomez v. Arkema, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 09 C 5353,09 C 5353 |
| Parties | RICHARD GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. ARKEMA, INC., f/k/a Atofina Chemicals, Inc.. f/k/a Elf Atochem North America, Inc., f/k/a Atochem North America, f/k/a Pennwalt Corporation, f/k/a Pennsalt Corporation STOKES, F.J. CORPORATION, a/k/a F.J. Stokes Corporation, STOKES, F.J. MACHINE COMPANY, a/ka F.J. Stokes Machine Company, F.J.S. CORPORATION, STOKES EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., STOKES EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ricardo Gomez sued defendants Arkema, Inc., F.J. Stokes Corporation, and F.J. Stokes Machine Company, alleging negligence and strict products liability. Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment, arguing in part that plaintiff's claims are barred by the products liability statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13-213, and the construction statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13-214. Plaintiff subsequently also moved for summary judgment, arguing that both statutes of repose are unconstitutional. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
On August 7, 2007, plaintiff, an employee of Georgia Nut, was cleaning a vacuum tunnel machine that Georgia Nut uses in the production of malted milk balls. Plaintiff reached his handinto the vacuum tunnel to push down accumulated debris, but the machine had not been turned off. The airlock paddle caught plaintiff's hand, and his index and middle fingers were amputated. Defendants were either involved in the manufacture of this vacuum tunnel or have retained liability for the injuries that it causes.
Between roughly 1955 and 1960, FJ Stokes manufactured the vacuum tunnel and then sold it to an unknown buyer. In 1963, Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation bought the assets and liabilities of FJ Stokes. Pennsalt changed its name to Pennwalt Corporation and sold the assets of the Stokes Division to Stokes Vacuum, Inc. Pennwalt retained the liabilities for machines shipped before September 1, 1988. Through a series of name changes, Pennwalt became Arkema.
After the initial sale, the vacuum tunnel passed through a series of owners. Then, in about 1993, Georgia Nut purchased the machine from Candy USA. The vacuum tunnel facilitates the puffing and hardening of the malted milk ball centers by sending them along a conveyor in a controlled atmosphere. The vacuum tunnel is connected to the malted milk ball production system by a bucket conveyor that feeds the ball centers to the vacuum tunnel and a rotating regulating conveyor that discharges them. The vacuum tunnel is eighty-feet-long and has not been moved since Georgia Nut purchased and installed it.
Plaintiff sued defendants in 2008, alleging both negligence and strict liability claims against each defendant. All of plaintiff's claims are based on the vacuum tunnel's alleged defects. These include: the absence of an interlock or automatic shutoff; the inadequacy of the guarding; and the insufficiency of the warnings and the instructions. Defendants filed a thirdparty complaint against Georgia Nut. Georgia Nut settled with plaintiff for $125,000 and was dismissed.
Plaintiff and defendants have both moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The movant bears the burden of establishing both elements, Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Associates, Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990), and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-movant, Jones v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 2013 WL 5781814, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992)). If the movant satisfies the burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Nitz v. Craig, 2013 WL 593851, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2013). In doing so, the movant cannot simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Pignato v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 2013 WL 995157, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2013) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue in part that plaintiff's claims are barred by the products liability statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13-213, and the construction statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13-214. Plaintiff argues in support of his motion for summary judgment that both statutes of repose are unconstitutional.1 Plaintiff's motion will be addressed first.
Statutes of repose are substantive statutes that extinguish a right to bring a cause of action regardless of whether it has accrued. Cornet v. Gromann Service Company-Retail, 590 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Highland v. Bracken, 560 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). The products liability statute of repose bars strict liability claims that arise more than twelve years "from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a seller or [ten] years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession to its initial user, consumer, or other non-seller." 735 ILCS 5/13-213 (b); Landry v. Keene Corp., 811 F. Supp. 367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The construction statute of repose, which covers improvements to real property, bars all claims that arise more than ten years after the installation of an improvement. 735 ILCS 5/13-214 (b).
Plaintiff argues that the two statutes of repose are special legislation that violate both the Illinois Constitution's and the United States Constitution's "guarantees of due process, equal protection, access to the courts, complete and certain remedy, and the right to trial by jury." Plaintiff is incorrect.
"[A] strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to legislative enactments." Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 2006 WL 566451, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2006) (quoting Rose v. Pucinski, 746 N.E.2d 800, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)). A party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute "bears the heavy burden of clearly establishing the violation alleged." Id. (quoting Rose, 746 N.E.2d at 804).
Plaintiff relies on two arguments to overcome this burden. Plaintiff first argues that the insurance crisis that motivated the adoption of the statutes of repose has ended. Plaintiff attempts to prove this fact by citing several sources, including a 1983 New Hampshire case, anarticle from the Asian Journal, and a 2001 Department of Justice study of 75 counties, only two of which are in Illinois.
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to conclude much of anything about the insurance market in Illinois. Even if plaintiff's evidence were sufficient to raise a question about whether the statutes of repose still represent the best policy choice, that would be insufficient to support his position because all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of the validity of a statute. Adcock v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 654 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citing People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. 1986)). Further, the court will not "substitute its judgment for that of the state legislature as to matters within the realm of the legislature's discretion." Kline v. J. I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (quoting Wall & Ochs, Inc. v. Grasso, 469 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (D. Conn. 1979)). Where the legislature is exercising its discretion, the courts will interfere only if a chosen classification "is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary." Adcock, 654 N.E.2d at 635 (citing Skinner, 500 N.E.2d 34). Plaintiff's evidence is wholly insufficient to meet such a demanding standard.
Plaintiff next argues that the court should strike down the statutes of repose because "[n]umerous courts from around the country have struck down similar statutes[.]" In support, plaintiff cites one Illinois Supreme Court opinion and roughly a half-dozen cases from foreign jurisdictions.
Plaintiff's cases are insufficient to overturn the extensive body of jurisprudence upholding the constitutionality of the two statutes of repose at issue. All of the opinions cited by plaintiff dealt with different statutes of repose. All of the cases except for the one Illinoisopinion dealt with different state constitutions. The lone Illinois case held that a prior version of the construction statute of repose was unconstitutional because it unreasonably distinguished between parties based on their professional status, not their activity. Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ill. 1967). Subsequently, the legislature re-drafted the construction statute of repose specifically to avoid the problem identified by Skinner. Ryan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 885 N.E.2d 544, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). The protections of the current version of the statute are now based on activity. Id. at 550. For these reasons, plaintiff's reliance on those cases is misplaced.
Further, Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of both statutes of repose at issue. The products liability statute of repose has survived both federal and state constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Batory v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 1993 WL 532418, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1993) (); Delnick v. Outboard Marine Corp., 555 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (); Costello v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 96, 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) rev'd on other grounds, 490 N.E.2d 675 (1986) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial