Gomez v. The Heights Sch.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 8:22-cv-03117-PX |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Parties | CARLOS AZNAREZ GOMEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE HEIGHTS SCHOOL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending in this personal injury action is Defendant The Heights Inc.'s[1] (the “Heights”) motion to dismiss the Complaint filed by parents Maria Paz Gomez Serrano and Carlos Aznarez Lumiber (hereinafter the “Parents”) and their son, Carlos Arnarez Gomez (hereinafter “Carlos”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 19. The matter has been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, however Plaintiffs shall be given leave to file an amended complaint to cure the pleading deficiencies identified.
The following facts are set forth in the Complaint and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). The Heights is a private, independent, day school for boys in third through twelfth grade. ECF No. 11 ¶ 7. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of Spain. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. On or about April 7, 2012, then nine-year-old Carlos traveled to the United States to participate in the El Redin School Student Exchange Program at the Heights. Id. ¶ 10. The Heights arranged for Carlos to stay with his host, co-Defendant, Theodore Nealson Smart, while in the program. Id. ¶ 11.
The Complaint avers, with no factual support, that the Heights assumed a “primary role” in protecting Carlos while he was in the program. Id. ¶ 29. The Complaint further alleges that the Parents and the Heights entered into an “implied-in-fact” contract where the Heights agreed to “ensure the safety and well-being” of Carlos by finding an “appropriate” host family and “supervising” that family in exchange for the Parents' permission for Carlos to participate in the program. Id. ¶ 41.
While living with Smart, Carlos slept in the same room as Smart's youngest son. Id. ¶ 12. One day while Carlos was alone in the bedroom, Smart sodomized Carlos. Id. ¶¶ 13-17. Carlos suffered significant physical and lasting psychological injuries as a result. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20. To this day, Carlos requires regular therapy. Id. ¶ 20. In August 2019, the State of Maryland-Child Protective Services learned that Smart had sexually abused Carlos. Id. ¶ 21. Smart was criminally prosecuted but was ultimately acquitted of all charges after a jury trial. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
On December 2, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this civil suit against Smart and the Heights. As to Smart, the Plaintiffs allege common law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium (presumably as to the Parents). Id. ¶¶ 48-59 (Counts V-VIII).[2] Smart has answered the Complaint. ECF No. 15.
As to the Heights, the Complaint alleges three claims sounding in negligence-negligent selection, placement, training, and supervision/monitoring of Smart (Count I); gross negligence (Count II); and breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV)-all based on the same theory that the Heights, as the school sponsoring the program, bears legal responsibility for Carlos' injuries. Id. ¶¶ 33-39, 44-47. The Parents also bring a breach of implied-in-fact contract claim against the Heights (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 40-43.
The Heights now moves to dismiss all claims as to it. ECF No. 19. Regarding those that sound in negligence, the Heights argues that no facts make plausible that it owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs. ECF No. 19-1 at 3-10, 11. Regarding the breach of implied contract claim, the Heights maintains that the Complaint is so barebones that this claim too must be dismissed. Id. at 10-11. For the following reasons, the Court agrees and will grant the motion.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court must “accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). However, the “Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009). Nor do courts need to “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (“. . . the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.”). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court must be able to deduce “more than the mere possibility of misconduct” and the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 126 F.Supp.3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679), aff'd as modified, 659 Fed.Appx. 744 (4th Cir. 2016).
With this standard in mind, the Court turns to the sufficiency of the claims.
The Plaintiffs bring three claims sounding in negligence. To survive dismissal, the Complaint must aver facts sufficient to make plausible four well-known elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) the breach proximately caused the injury. Jones v. Family Health Ctrs. of Baltimore, Inc., 135 F.Supp.3d 372, 381 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 18 (2012)); cf. Heward v. Bd. of Educ. of Anne Arundel Cnty., No. 1:23-00195-ELH, 2023 WL 6381498, at *61 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2023) (); Gandy v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. GLR-20-3436, 2021 WL 3911892, at *5 n. 4 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2021) ().
In this motion, the parties focus on whether sufficient facts make plausible that the Heights owed a duty of care to Carlos. See ECF No. 19-1 at 3-6; ECF No. 22-2 at 2-4. The Complaint pleads a vicarious duty, that is, a duty of care extended to the Heights through Smart as the “employee[], agent[], and servant[]” of the Heights. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 9. At its core, “agency” is “the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 503 (1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Whether an agency relationship exists depends on “the parties' intentions as manifested by their agreements or actions.” Id. at 503. Pertinent considerations include: (1) the agent's power to alter the principal's legal relations; (2) the agent's duty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal; and (3) the principal's right to control the agent. Id. When the agent acts within the scope of his employment and at the principal's behest, the principal may be vicariously liable for the agent's tortious acts. Globe Indem. Co. v. Victill Corp., 208 Md. 573, 581-82 (1956).
The Complaint avers few facts which make plausible such a relationship existed between Smart and the Heights. Viewing the few facts pleaded most favorably to the Plaintiffs, Carlos came to the United States as part of an exchange program at the Heights. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 10. The Heights “arranged” for Carlos to stay with Smart, but the Complaint is silent as to when, how, where, and under what conditions such “arrangement” was made. Id. ¶ 11. The Complaint, for example, does not describe whether Smart was a paid employee, an independent contractor, or volunteer; whether Smart was required to follow the Heights' directives; whether the Heights had any such directives or any ability to control how Smart executed his duties as a host; or any other facts that make plausible Smart was in fact acting at the behest of the Heights sufficient to establish an principal-agency relationship. See Green, 355 Md. at 503. Thus, as pleaded, the claim fails to make plausible the Heights had any such duty of care as to Carlos.
The Plaintiffs in response, broadly argue that they have asserted sufficient facts to establish agency, but they point only to bare legal allegations “devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted); ECF No. 22-2 at 2-4. The Complaint broadly asserts that the Heights “ratified” Smart's actions; that the Heights generally stands “in loco parentis”[3] for the students; that the Heights “assumed a primary role in the protection of Carlos,” and the Heights “should have known by the exercise of diligence and reasonable care that Smart was capable of inflicting harm on Carlos.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 25, 29, 30. But not one fact establishes, for example, the “ratification” of Smart's actions, or how the Heights “should have known” that Smart was “capable of inflicting harm.” See id. Mere “legal conclusion[s] couched as factual allegation[s]” will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286).
Perhaps the only averred fact of consequence is that the Heights had “arranged” for Carlos to live with Smart while in the Heights exchange program. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 11. Nonetheless, the Complaint...
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