Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1922
• Docket Number: No. 23004.,23004.
• Parties: GONEAU v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

154 Minn. 1

191 N.W. 279

GONEAU

v.MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO.

No. 23004.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 15, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Beltrami County; C. W. Stanton, Judge.

Action by Ernest J. Goneau against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. From an order denying its blended motion for judgment or a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Syllabus by the Court

The protection of the federal Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.) extends to a brakeman injured while engaged in repairing a defective coupler, which has caused an interstate train to break apart; the repair being made on the road in order that the train may be coupled together again and proceed on its way.

A recovery by a brakeman so engaged, who was injured by falling from a bridge upon which the break in the train occurred, cannot be defeated on the ground that there was no causal relation between the failure to comply with the statute and the ensuing injury, or on the ground that such an accident was so improbable that it could not reasonably be foreseen.

To sustain a recovery on the sole ground that a railway company has violated the Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.), there must be a causal relation between the fact of delinquency and the fact of injury. The act has not changed the rules of law as to proximate cause, or broken down all distinctions between the occasion and the cause of the injury.

If plaintiff fell from the bridge after the train had been coupled, and not while he was attempting to repair the defective coupler or pull the carrier iron into place, his injury was not proximately caused by defendant's nonobservance of the requirements of the Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.), and the jury should have been instructed accordingly, as requested by defendant.

Rule applied that the refusal to give a requested instruction correctly stating the law applicable to the issues, but not covered by the general charge, is ordinarily a ground for a new trial. Marshall A. Spooner, of Bemidji, and John E. Palmer, of Minneapolis, for appellant.

S. A. Anderson, of St. Paul, for respondent.

LEES, C.

Action for damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff in the course of his employment as rear brakeman on a freight train operated by defendant in interstate commerce. There was a verdict for $15,000, and defendant has appealed from an order denying its blended motion for judgment or a new trial.

The complaint charged that the drawbar on one of the cars in the train was defective, and the car was being used in violation of the federal Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.); that because of the defect the coupling parted and the train broke in two; that it was plaintiff's duty to couple the cars again, and, while endeavoring to readjust the carrier iron under the drawbar, so the coupling could be made, he lost his balance and fell from a bridge over the St. Croix river, upon which the car was standing, and was severely injured.

The accident happened on October 27, 1920, while the train was on its way to Superior, Wis., and at a short distance from a station called Gordon. When the train broke in two, plaintiff, in the performance of his duties, went from the caboose to the bridge to ascertain what had happened. It was after dark and snow was falling. He found one of the carrier irons on a Lehigh Valley car out of place. The iron was designed to hold up the drawbar and was bolted to the framework of the car. The burr on one of the bolts had come off, and the iron bad broken loose and worked under the shank of the drawbar, allowing it to sag. As a result the car was no longer coupled to the one behind it. At this point a conflict in the testimony appears.

Plaintiff testified that he got the carrier iron back in position and blocked up the drawbar. Then, in response to his signal, the forward section of the train was backed until the coupling was made automatically. He connected the air hose and gave a backup signal, intending to have the train run back to Gordon to permit a passenger train to go by. The train moved back about 20 feet, parted again in the same place, and came to a stop, with the Lehigh Valley car still on the bridge and separated by about 4 feet from the car behind it. Thereupon he descended from the car from which he had given the signals, placed his left knee under the drawbar to raise it, and attempted to pull the carrier iron back into place. It stuck, and he braced himself and gave a harder pull, the iron came around suddenly, and he lost his balance. In endeavoring to regain it, he fell over the edge of the bridge and was injured.

The other members of the train crew tell a different story. If plaintiff's version was correct, the cars were not coupled when he fell, and he gave all the signals from the top of one of the cars. But the conductor testified that when he came forward, after the accident happened, he walked on top of the cars which stood on the bridge, and that they were together. The head brakeman testified that he started to go back after the train stopped the first time; that before he got to the bridge he got a number of lantern signals from plaintiff, all given from the ground; that he relayed the signals to the engineer, who moved the train in response to them; that the last signal was a stop signal; that when the train stopped plaintiff went between the cars with his lantern, and came out a moment later, and then the light disappeared near the edge of the bridge. The witness went back over the cars to see what had happened. He testified positively that there was no break in the train, and that the coupling in question had been made and the air hose connected. He also testified that, when he asked plaintiff how he had fallen, he replied: ‘I stepped off.’ The engineer testified that, when he asked a similar question, the plaintiff answered: ‘I slipped and fell.’

The court charged that plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, if there was a violation of the Safety Appliance Act and such violation caused the accident and injuries, in whole or in part, or contributed to the same; also that if plaintiff, in the performance of his duties, necessarily went in between the cars to repair the coupling, and, while engaged in that work, stepped or fell from the bridge, and was thereby injured, the defendant was liable. The court refused to give defendant's requested instructions as follows:

‘If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff fell from the bridge when the train was coupled together, and not in motion, then your verdict must be for defendant.’

‘If you find from the evidence that the injuries of which plaintiff complains were occasioned in any other manner than by the slipping of the carrier iron when he was pulling upon the same, your verdict must be for defendant.’

1. Defendant insists that its motion for judgment should have been granted, because the automatic coupler provisions of the federal Safety Appliance Act apply only where a car is moved for the purpose of coupling or uncoupling it, and that they do not apply if the injury results from an attempt to repair a defective coupler on a motionless car. We do not stop to inquire whether this is a correct interpretation of the act. The conditions were such that a coupling could not be made automatically by impact. If plaintiff was attempting to bring the drawbar back to its proper position, so the coupling could be made, we think the protection of the act extended to him while he was so engaged. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 37 Sup. Ct. 456, ...