Gonsewski v. Gonsewski

• Decision Date: 02 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. M2009–00894–SC–R11–CV.,M2009–00894–SC–R11–CV.
• Citation: 350 S.W.3d 99
• Parties: Johanna L. GONSEWSKIv.Craig W. GONSEWSKI.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

350 S.W.3d 99

Johanna L. GONSEWSKI

v.Craig W. GONSEWSKI.

No. M2009–00894–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

June 2, 2011 Session Heard at Girls' State at Lipscomb University.1Sept. 16, 2011.

Jeffrey L. Levy (on appeal), Derek K. Burks (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, and William L. Moore, Jr. (on appeal), Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Craig W. Gonsewski.Edward J. Gross, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Johanna L. Gonsewski.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J.

We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether alimony in futuro should be awarded to a spouse who has a college degree, good health, a stable work history in a relatively high paying job, and a lack of demonstrated need for such long-term alimony. The trial court divided the parties' real and personal property, declined to award spousal support of any type to either party, and denied a request made by both parties that they be awarded their attorney's fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's division of the marital estate, but reversed the trial court's judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the husband to pay the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,250 per month until her death or remarriage. The Court of Appeals also awarded the wife, in the form of alimony in solido, her attorney's fees and expenses, both at trial and on appeal. We conclude that the award of alimony in futuro and the award of attorney's fees and expenses is inappropriate in this case. Additionally, the wife has failed to demonstrate that transitional alimony is appropriate. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment.

Facts

Johanna Gonsewski (“Wife”) and Craig Gonsewski (“Husband”) were married in Alabama on May 9, 1987, when they were both twenty-one years old. Their marriage lasted twenty-one years. The parties have two daughters, both of whom are now adults.

At the time of the marriage, Wife had recently graduated from Athens State College and was employed at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. Husband was attending college at the University of Alabama. He graduated the following year, and shortly thereafter the couple moved to Tennessee because Husband had taken a job in Lewisburg as an accountant. They subsequently moved to Hendersonville, Tennessee, where they were living when these divorce proceedings began in 2007.

Both spouses worked throughout the marriage. At the time of the divorce in 2009, Wife was employed by the State of Tennessee, where she had worked for over sixteen years, in an information technology position. Husband, an accountant, had worked for a number of different employers since graduating from college, but has never been without a job for more than six weeks at a time. At the time of the divorce, he was employed as the comptroller of a manufacturer of stainless steel restaurant equipment where he had worked since 2004.

In 2008—the year before the divorce—Wife's base salary with the State of Tennessee was $72,000.² She also received a longevity bonus of $1,500. ³ Husband's gross income in 2008 was $137,418 including a bonus of $33,115. He also received a bonus of $34,726 the year before in 2007. Husband testified that his 2007 and 2008 bonuses were unusually large due to exceptional business performance. He testified that if he hit his performance targets, he would expect approximately $120,000 in total compensation in 2009, but he stated that his employer was lagging far behind its projected numbers due to the state of the economy. His testimony was unclear as to what amount he expected to receive as a bonus in 2009.

On September 5, 2007, Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband stipulated that Wife was entitled to a divorce based on his inappropriate marital conduct. Both parties were forty-three years old at the time of trial on March 19, 2009. The couple's two daughters were living with Husband. Their younger daughter was to graduate from high school two months after the trial. Husband had taken out a loan to pay college expenses for their older daughter and planned to do the same for their younger daughter. He asked the trial court to award him his attorney's fees and expenses as a form of alimony, maintaining that Wife's actions had unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the case. Wife likewise sought an award of attorney's fees, along with spousal support, both temporary and permanent.

While the divorce was pending, each party filed papers with the trial court accusing the other of harassing behavior; they litigated numerous disputes concerning their children and assets; they accused each other of criminal contempt and perjury; and they sought restraining orders against each other. Both parties raised and pursued these matters vigorously, and it became necessary for the trial court to become involved in most of them before the case was even tried.

Against this backdrop, the trial court granted Wife's petition for divorce at the final hearing on the grounds of Husband's inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court classified certain personal property as separate property and divided equally between the parties the equity in the marital home, having a fair market value of approximately $400,000 and a mortgage of approximately $222,000. The trial court ordered the parties to each pay one half of the mortgage, taxes and insurance on the marital home pending its sale. The trial court divided the remaining marital property such that the total net value of the marital assets awarded to Husband was $189,198 and to Wife was $201,747. See Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, M2009–00894–COA–R3–CV, 2010 WL 565649, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 17, 2010). The trial court determined that Wife was “not entitled to Alimony in Futuro or alimony for rehabilitative purposes,” explaining that she had a stable job with the State, earned a good income, and that her share of the equity in the marital home was sufficient to find another residence. The trial court also declined to award attorney's fees to either party because much of the expense they incurred in litigating the case was due to numerous, unnecessary filings resulting in numerous, unnecessary court hearings. Competing petitions for contempt were denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's classification and division of the marital estate.⁴ The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court on the issue of spousal support and ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,250 per month until her death or remarriage. The court reasoned that, although there was no need for economic rehabilitation given that Wife was a college graduate and had a steady career, alimony in futuro was “necessary to mitigate the harsh economic realities of divorce” due to the disparity in the parties' incomes. Id. at *5. The Court of Appeals also awarded Wife her attorney's fees and expenses, both in the trial court and on appeal, as a form of alimony in solido. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney's fees and expenses to award.

Husband filed an application for permission to appeal challenging the awards of alimony in futuro and in solido. We granted review and, for the reasons explained below, reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Standard of Review

For well over a century, Tennessee law has recognized that trial courts should be accorded wide discretion in determining matters of spousal support. See Robinson v. Robinson, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 440, 443 (1846) (“Upon a divorce ... the wife is entitled to a fair portion of her husband's estate for her support, and the amount thus to be appropriated is a matter within the legal discretion of the chancellor....”). This well-established principle still holds true today, with this Court repeatedly and recently observing that trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is needed and, if so, the nature, amount, and duration of the award. See, e.g., Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 605 (Tenn.2004); Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn.2001); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn.2000).

Equally well-established is the proposition that a trial court's decision regarding spousal support is factually driven ⁵ and involves the careful balancing of many factors. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 235 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); see also Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 470; Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 340–41 (Tenn.2002). As a result, “[a]ppellate courts are generally disinclined to second-guess a trial judge's spousal support decision.” Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. Rather, “[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn.2006). Appellate courts decline to second-guess a trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 343. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn.2011); Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn.2010). This standard does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but “ ‘reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions a less rigorous review of the lower court's decision and a decreased likelihood that the...