Gonzalez v. Graham
| Docket Number | 13-23-00091-CV |
| Decision Date | 18 January 2024 |
| Parties | REYNALDO GONZALEZ JR., Appellant, v. MORGAN GRAHAM, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
Appellant Reynaldo Gonzalez Jr. appeals from the trial court's denial of his Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss appellee Morgan Graham's claim brought under § 253.131 of the Texas Election Code. See Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003; Tex. Elec Code Ann. § 253.131. By three issues that we have reorganized, Gonzalez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because: (1) Graham lacks standing to bring her claim; (2) the TCPA applies to his claim and Graham failed to demonstrate a prima facie case with clear and specific evidence; and (3) permitting Graham to bring her claim against Gonzalez violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. We affirm.
On December 13, 2021, Gonzalez filed an application to oppose Graham for the office of County Chair for the Cameron County Republican Party. Graham, as the incumbent County Chair, rejected Gonzalez's application for incompleteness. Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, seeking review of Graham's decision. In re Gonzalez, No. 13-21-00452-CV, 2022 WL 37769, at *3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi- Edinburg Jan. 4, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). We concluded that "Gonzalez's application failed to comply with the express requirements of the election code," and therefore, "Graham had a ministerial duty to reject Gonzalez's application." Id. Gonzalez was ultimately prevented from appearing on the March 2022 Republican primary ballot, and Graham won reelection.
On August 2, 2022, Graham filed her original petition in the underlying case. According to her petition, Gonzalez "failed to abide by the requirements of Title 15 of the Texas Election Code" because he "failed to appoint a campaign treasurer with the Texas Ethics Commission upon becoming a candidate." See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 252.001 (entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer Required"). In addition, Graham alleged that Gonzalez "accepted political contributions and made and/or authorized campaign expenditures at a time when he did not have a campaign treasurer appointment in effect." See id. § 253.031 (entitled "Contribution and Expenditure Without Campaign Treasurer Prohibited"). Therefore, Graham sought to recover damages under § 253.131 of the Texas Election Code. See id. § 253.131 ().
On November 21, 2022, Gonzalez filed his TCPA motion to dismiss, alleging that Graham's claim was based on or brought in response to his exercise of his First Amendment rights to free speech, to petition, and to freely associate. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a). He also alleged that the suit was brought in response to conduct protected by § 27.010(b)(1) of the civil practice and remedies code. Id. § 27.010(b)(1) ().
Additionally, Gonzalez argued that Graham lacked standing to bring her claim, as she suffered no injury. Gonzalez specifically alleged that "Graham ran for county chair[] uncontested and spent $0 to defeat her non-exist[ent] political opponent." He further asserted that, to the extent Graham did suffer an injury, it was a "sovereign injury" rather than a "proprietary injury," "[a]nd neither the Texas Election Code, nor the Texas Constitution, authorize private citizens to assert sovereign injuries." Lastly, Gonzalez argued that even if § 253.131 provided standing for politicians to sue their opponents, "then it should hold those sections unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Gonzalez," as "[a] statute purporting to vest individuals with the authority to recover civil damages for violations of campaign finance law cannot override the basic constitutional principle[] of standing."
Attached to Gonzalez's motion to dismiss was his unsworn declaration in which he detailed that he paid a law firm "$6,217.50 to pursue the mandamus action," and "accepted $700 from five friends to help pay [his] attorneys' fees" during a time when no campaign treasurer appointment was in effect. Gonzalez explained that he "relied on the Texas Ethics Commission's [TEC] website, which states 'If you are on an upcoming ballot . . . ., then Texas state law requires all candidates . . . to file a campaign treasurer appointment . . . .'" As he would not be on the upcoming ballot, Gonzalez did not believe he was required to file a campaign treasurer appointment.
Gonzalez also represented that, after Graham filed a sworn complaint on January 19, 2022, "with the [TEC] alleging that [he] had violated the [Texas] Election Code," he returned the $700 he received from friends and filed a campaign treasurer appointment "out of an abundance of caution." According to Gonzalez, Graham's sworn complaint with the TEC was resolved on April 19, 2022, when he signed an "Assurance of Voluntary Compliance." The TEC "amicably settled the issues complained of in this case, assessing no penalties against [Gonzalez] for [his] allegedly belated filings."
Gonzalez also attached to his motion to dismiss: (1) the campaign treasurer appointment filing that was received by the TEC on February 1, 2022; (2) campaign finance reports which itemized the campaign funds accepted and expended by Gonzalez; and (3) campaign finance reports which demonstrated that Graham accepted and expended no campaign funds in furtherance of her own candidacy.
On December 6, 2022, Graham amended her petition to specify that, in addition to the statutory damages allowed by § 253.131, she also "suffered damages for lost wages and additional unreimbursed fees for legal costs associated with the campaign activities for the Cameron County Primary against Mr. Gonzalez." That same day, Graham filed her response to Gonzalez's TCPA motion to dismiss, in which she argued that the TCPA did not apply to her claim, but even if it did, she had clear and specific evidence to support a prima facie case. Graham further asserted that "if potential candidates fail to follow state [election] law and any opponents are not allowed to seek redress from the judicial branch[,] such prohibition would be chilling on" the exercise of First Amendment rights. Attached to her response were: (1) Gonzalez's campaign finance reports; and (2) Graham's affidavit, in which she averred that Gonzalez's political campaign caused her to miss "40 hours" of work and be personally liable for an undetermined amount of attorneys' fees stemming from the mandamus litigation.
Gonzalez subsequently filed a reply to Graham's response, reiterating much of the same arguments as were raised in his initial motion to dismiss. However, he also addressed Graham's assertion that she suffered injuries in the form of lost wages and potential attorneys' fees, arguing that Graham did not provide clear and specific evidence of these injuries and that her injuries were neither concrete and particularized nor traceable to his conduct.
The trial court denied Gonzalez's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
Gonzalez challenges Graham's standing to bring a claim under the election code "because she did not incur any damages." "Because standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that 'is essential to a court's power to decide a case,' we address that issue before turning to the substance of the TCPA motion." McLane Champions, LLC v. Hous. Baseball Partners, 671 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000)).
"Standing requires an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by a decision in the plaintiff's favor." Abbott v. Harris County, 672 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2023). An "injury-in-fact" is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. 2022) (citing Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154-55 (Tex. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review the issue of standing de novo. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). "In evaluating standing, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor, but we also consider relevant evidence offered by the parties." In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. "A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008).
First we must resolve an ancillary issue. Gonzalez contends that "Graham has no clear and specific evidence of an actual, concrete and particularized, non-conjectural, non-hypothetical injury." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005 ...
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