Gonzalez v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D09-2490.,1D09-2490. |
| Citation | 50 So.3d 633 |
| Parties | Jose GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
We affirm but address one issue: whether appellant's sentence of life in prison for first-degree premeditated murder, which he committed as a juvenile, violates federal and state prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
"[C]ases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications." Graham v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Id. at 2021-22.
Appellant's life sentence for first-degree premeditated murder is not categorically barred because he was a juvenile. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-579, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Supreme Court found categorically the "imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed" was unconstitutional, but affirmed a life sentence for the juvenile offender. Recently in Graham, the Supreme Court found categorically "[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." 130 S.Ct. at 2034 (emphasis added).
However, appellant argues his sentence was grossly disproportionate given the circumstances in his particular case. He notes that in a post- Miranda statement to police, he stated he was intoxicated at the time he committed the murder. He also notes during sentencing, his counsel asserted generally that he "may" have a mental disorder which testing would "probably" reveal.
The State presented evidence that appellant, who was 16 years old at the time, killed the victim by stabbing him 12 times. The victim was a 49-year-old man in poor health who weighed only 108 pounds. In a post- Miranda interview, appellant told police he decided to seek out and kill the victim because he wanted revenge for a racist comment the victim previously made towards him.
"[A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Courts "analyze [grossly disproportionate] claims with 'substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.' " Adaway v. State, 902 So.2d 746, 748 (Fla.2005) ( quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001).
The Supreme Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021 (citation omitted). In Adaway, 902 So.2d at 751, the Florida Supreme Court found a life sentence for capital sexual battery of a child less than 12 years of age was not cruel and unusual punishment, noting the United States Supreme Court "has upheld a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 grams (about 1.5 pounds) of cocaine ... and a sentence of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three golf clubs." (Internal citations omitted). The court concluded, "[t]o classify Adaway's life sentence without parole as grossly disproportionate, we would have to conclude that an adult's oral union with the vagina of an eleven-year-old girl is an objectively lesser offense ... Adaway's sexual abuse arguably constitutes a substantially greater offense." Id.
Therefore, to find appellant's sentence is grossly disproportionate, this court would have to find the premeditated first-degree murder committed by appellant is an objectively lesser offense than possession of cocaine or shoplifting.Clearly, it is a substantially greater offense.
Courts have similarly found a life sentence for first-degree murder is not grossly disproportionate. In Phillips v. State, 807 So.2d 713, 717-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), a 14-year-old defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his 8-year-old neighbor and sentenced to life in prison. The Second District found "the penalty of life imprisonment is not grossly disproportionate to the crime of first-degree murder," reasoning, "[i]f, as Justice Kennedy's opinion noted, 'the crime of...
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Jones v. State, 2009-CA-02033-COA
... ... Id. Several other jurisdictions have also taken this approach. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 2011 WL 478600 (Ark. 2011); Miller v. State, 2010 WL 3377692, * 4-9 (Ala. Crim. Page 27 App. 2010); Gonzalez v. State, 50 So. 3d 633, 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Because Jones was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing murder—as opposed to a nonhomicide crime— Graham is inapplicable. ¶64. To the extent Jones contends the trial court should have on its own initiative ... ...
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...murder"). Courts already have begun to rely on this aspect of Graham to uphold JLWOP for homicide offenses. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 50 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 2010) (upholding JLWOP for a sixteen-year-old convicted of first-degree (104) See Miller v. State, No. CR-06-0741, 201......