Goode v. Union County, 4-3608.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 4-3608.,4-3608.
• Citation: 76 S.W.2d 100
• Parties: GOODE, Clerk of Court, v. UNION COUNTY.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 100

76 S.W.2d 100

GOODE, Clerk of Court, v. UNION COUNTY.

No. 4-3608.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 26, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Union County, Second Division; W. A. Speer, Judge.

Suit by H. R. F. Goode, Clerk of Court, against Union County, Arkansas. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Herbert V. Betts, of El Dorado, for appellant.

Alvin D. Stevens, of El Dorado, for appellee.

BAKER, Justice.

H. R. F. Goode, clerk of the chancery courts of Union county, filed this suit in the circuit court of Union county challenging, first, the legality of Union County Salary Act, and, second, praying for fees, emoluments, and commissions alleged to have been earned by him as clerk of the two chancery courts of Union county, which fees he claims accrued during the year of 1933. The case was presented to the court upon an agreed statement of facts and upon the testimony of the appellant.

The agreed statement of facts set out that Goode was the duly elected, qualified, and acting circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of the circuit courts of Union county, Ark., and had been since January 1, 1931.

Also that he was the duly elected, qualified, and acting chancery clerk of Union county and had been since January 1, 1931; that the claim involved in this action represents fees and commissions earned and received by the clerk of the two chancery courts of Union county, Ark., from January 1, 1933, to December 1, 1933, inclusive; that the sums were paid by the appellant to the treasurer of Union county monthly, under protest; and that the amount of such fees and commissions so paid was $2,591.

It is further agreed that the claim involves the construction and interpretation of what is known as Act No. 1 of Union County, Ark., which act was filed and made a part of the record, and it was stipulated that in a former cause testing the validity of said Initiative Act No. 1, styled Dozier v. Ragsdale, in which the opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered on December 5, 1932, as reported in volume 186 of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, page 654, 55 S.W.(2d) 779, in which said Initiative Act was held valid, that the question as to whether the said act affected the fees, commissions, and emoluments of the clerk of the chancery courts was not raised in the court below nor in the Supreme Court, and the purpose of this suit is to determine whether or not said Initiative Act No. 1 applies to the clerk of the chancery courts of Union county.

The parties agreed to waive the right of trial by jury, and also that other evidence might be offered in addition to the stipulation.

Goode testified that he is the chancery clerk; that during the year of 1933 he had collected $1,036.45 as such clerk of the Second division of the Union chancery court, and $755.55 from the First division of that court; that he had received as commissioner in chancery during the year 1933 the sum of $640; that he earned fees for making transcripts of records, in cases on appeal, the sum of $162; that this money was paid into the treasury of Union county. There were, perhaps, some other fees not necessary to include here. He was paid the salary of $2,700 according to Initiative Act No. 1, the salary act of Union county.

The trial court held that the duties of the chancery clerk, First and Second division of Union county, devolved upon the appellant by reason of the fact that he was the duly elected circuit clerk of that county; that the law imposed upon the circuit clerk of the county the duties of the chancery clerk; and that the salary fixed in the Union County Initiative Act No. 1 of $2,700 a year was full compensation that he had a right to receive for all of the duties he performed as circuit and chancery clerk. We think this decision was a correct announcement of the law.

Section 15 of article 7 of the Constitution of 1874 provides: "Until the General Assembly shall deem it expedient to establish courts of chancery, the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in matters of equity, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, in such manner as may be prescribed by law." The clerk of the circuit court, of course, performed all of the duties of what was then generally spoken of and called "the chancery side of the docket."

Section 10 of Act No. 166, p. 323, of the Acts of 1903 provides: "The clerks of the circuit courts in the several counties shall be clerks of the chancery courts and ex-officio masters and commissioners thereof in each of the said counties. * * *" This was not an imposition of new or additional duties imposed upon circuit clerks, for they had prior to that time, as circuit clerks, performed all of the duties devolving upon them in all equity cases that arose and were tried in chancery by the circuit judges.

Upon the establishment, however, of the separate chancery courts, the clerks continued, as under section 10 of said act, to perform the same duties and render the same services they had prior to that date rendered in the circuit court. There has been no change in that general...