Goodell v. People, 18355

• Decision Date: 30 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 18355,18355
• Parties: Manford Penn GOODELL, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 279

327 P.2d 279

137 Colo. 507

Manford Penn GOODELL, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.

No. 18355.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 30, 1958.

Harrison & Long, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John B. Barnard, Jr., Asst Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

DAY, Justice.

Plaintiff in error was convicted in the district court in Denver of causing a death while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We will refer to him as he appeared in the trial court.

The defendant urges thirty-eight points of error, summarized under four main headings. Consideration of but two of the main points will suffice to dispose of the matter. Other alleged errors with reference to the admission of testimony of certain of the witnesses will not be commented upon.

Defendant contends: 1. The trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, and 2. The court erred in giving certain instructions and in refusing to give instructions tendered by defendant.

The fatal accident occurred in a three-car collision on a well-traveled four-lane highway in the 700 block on South Santa Fe Drive. Two of the cars--the defendant's and one driven by the witness Jimerson--were being driven parallel to each other in the two north-bound lanes. The defendant was in the outside lane nearest the east shoulder of the road, and the Jimerson car was in the middle lane closest to the double yellow line separating the north-bound from the south-bound lanes. The defendant and the Jimerson car were involved in a sideswiping accident in which the two cars became locked by the bumper of one catching on the fender skirt of the other car. As the drivers proceeded to extricate themselves, defendant turned to the right or to the east and came to a stop on the shoulder of the road closest to the lane in which he was traveling. The Jimerson car turned to the left and crossed the double yellow line into the path of the on-coming south-boung traffic and collided head on with the third car driven by Fred Parker, who was killed in the accident.

Question to be Determined

Did the Court err in refusing to direct a jury verdict of acquittal?

This question is answered in the affirmative.

The entire record establishes but three of the four necessary elements required to constitute the crime charged. They are: (1) That an accident occurred; (2) that there was some evidence that the defendant was intoxicated, and (3) that there was a death as a result of the accident. Proof of the all-important element, to wit, that the acts or conduct of the defendant were the sole proximate cause of the accident was entirely lacking.

There was only one witness to the accident, a taxicab driver following to the rear of the defendant's car and the Jimerson car. Although this witness was able to testify that the two cars came togetehr and became locked, he was not able to state who caused the accident, that is to say whether the defendant swerved into the Jimerson car or whether the Jimerson car swerved into the defendant's car. On this point there was considerable confusion. Jimerson testified that he was a stranger in the city and was searching for a business establishment which he had been unable to find. In this connection he admits he was looking at addresses on both sides of the street. Thus, with his attention being diverted from side to side, he might well have swerved into the side of the defendant's car. This is the defendant's version of the collision. It is, of course, possible, as the prosecution theorized, that the defendant swerved into the Jimerson car. On this point, however, the jury could only speculate. Speculation cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction. Proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The record here leaves nothing but doubt and complete confusion as to whether the defendant's driving while under the influence was the proximate cause of the accident. That proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt is so fundamental as to require no argument. One of the best statements we have found on this particular point is from Montana in State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 P.2d 1009, 1013, where the court said:

'The burden rested upon the state throughout the case and this burden it failed to meet for we are committed to the doctrine that 'a defendant may not be convicted on conjectures, however shrewd, on suspicions, however justified, on probabilities, however strong, but only upon evidence which establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt; * * *.'' (Emphasis supplied.)

Here the evidence is wholly insufficient to support a conviction and the judgment cannot be allowed to stand. In submitting the case to the jury the court erred in two points which we deem pertinent to comment upon lest trial courts fall into error in similar cases. These refer to the giving of an instruction and to the refusal to give one necessary instruction.

The information in this case charges, as it should, that defendant caused a death while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and 'with a reckless and wanton disregard of human life and safety.' Thus it will be seen that to support a conviction of felony under the statute (C.R.S. '53, 40-2-10) involved the negligence of a defendant, if he was in fact negligent, must be more than simple negligence. It must be criminal negligence amounting to wantonness...