Stevenson v. People
| Decision Date | 11 December 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 19892,19892 |
| Citation | 148 Colo. 538,367 P.2d 339 |
| Parties | Robert Louis STEVENSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Robert Louis Stevenson, pro se.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Robert Louis Stevenson and George Whitesel were jointly charged by direct information with the burglary on September 28, 1960 of the home of George and Esther Homedew, and in a second count with conspiracy to commit this burglary. Stevenson pled not guilty and was tried separately from whitesel. Upon trial, at the conclusion of the People's evidence, Stevenson moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on both counts of the information. This motion was denied; whereupon Stevenson announced he 'would not put on any evidence' and renewed his motion for a directed verdict. This time the trial court granted the motion as to the second count of the information charging conspiracy, but denied the motion as to the burglary charge. The jury thereupon found Stevenson guilty of burglary and on this verdict the court entered a judgment and sentence of three to five years in the state penitentiary.
In his motion for a new trial Stevenson urged that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. By writ of error he now seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence entered on this verdict.
Careful examination of the record convinces us that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and that the judgment must be reversed. To demonstrate this insufficiency it becomes necessary to at least briefly review the evidence relied upon by the People.
At the outset it should be noted that there is no direct evidence which ties Stevenson into the burglary of the Homedews' residence. No one saw Stevenson commit the burglary and upon interrogation after his arrest he did not confess nor in any wise admit commission of the offense. Rather, the evidence is wholly circumstantial in nature, and in this regard it is the contention of the People that Stevenson 'possessed' certain articles which were stolen in the burglary, and that his 'possession' being recent, exclusive, and unexplained is a circumstance sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
What are these circumstances which the People contend not only unerringly point the finger of suspicion at Stevenson but clearly establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt? In the burglary of the Homedews' residence numerous household articles were stolen, including such divers things as an electric refrigerator, a T.V. set, several Japanese rifles, a 410 shotgun and a Zippo cigarette lighter. Most of these articles were subsequently located in two houses located side by side on a 40 acre tract some three miles east of Fruita. These two houses were owned by one Smith, who resided in Fruita.
Although Smith owned these two houses, he testified that on August 11, 1960 he rented both to George Whitesel. On this occasion Stevenson accompanied Whitesel to the Smith residence, although he did not in any manner personally participate in the transaction. It was undisputed that while Whitesel and Smith conducted their negotiations on the front porch, Stevenson remained out in the yard and conversed with Smith's grandson. Also Whitesel, and not Stevenson, made all of the monthly rent payments.
In the trial court there was a suggestion that Stevenson and Whitesel were joint tenants of the two houses in which the stolen articles where recovered, and that Stevenson was therefore in joint 'possession' of the stolen household goods. The evidence, however, does not justify such a conclusion, and in this Court the Attorney General States that 'the houses apparently used as storage places were rented to one George Whitesel'. This evidence does not establish that Stevenson was a lessee or a joint lessee of these premises, but only that he was a friend of the lessee, George Whitesel.
It is next urged that even though Stevenson was not a lessee of either of the two houses, nonetheless he was a resident or occupant thereof and being such he was therefore in 'possession' of the stolen articles subsequently discovered therein. Again there is no evidence of any real substance to support such a conclusion. No witness testified that Stevenson lived there. In fact the People's evidence tends to show that no one lived in either of the two houses. Several witnesses did testify that on occasion they saw Stevenson in the company of Whitesel at and around the premises, one particular witness testifying that...
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...of chronic subdural hematomas. Defendant relies on Solis v. People, 175 Colo. 127, 485 P.2d 903 (1971), and Stevenson v. People, 148 Colo. 538, 367 P.2d 339 (1961), for the proposition that evidence equally consistent with a hypothesis of innocence as with that of guilt is insufficient to s......
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...Facts supporting only conjectural inferences have no probative value and should not be admitted in evidence. Cf., Stevenson v. People, 148 Colo. 538, 367 P.2d 339 (1961). See also Sorrell v. Scheuer, 209 Ala. 268, 96 So. 216 (1923); Taylor v. State, 31 Ala.App. 590, 20 So.2d 239 (1944); Bar......
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People v. Bueno, 26128
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...284, 236 P.2d 113; Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279; and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455.' Stevenson v. People, 148 Colo. 538, 367 P.2d 339. The court erred in failing to grant defendants' motions for judgment of In view of our conclusions concerning the failure o......