Goodenow v. Litchfield

• Decision Date: 13 July 1882
• Citation: 9 N.W. 107,59 Iowa 226
• Parties: GOODENOW v. LITCHFIELD ET AL
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

9 N.W. 107

59 Iowa 226

GOODENOW v. LITCHFIELD ET AL

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

July 13, 1882

Appeal from Webster Circuit Court.

THIS is an action in equity for the recovery of certain sums of money paid by the Iowa Homestead Company, the plaintiff's assignor, on account of taxes upon certain lands. The ownership of the lands was in dispute between the Homestead Company and the defendant Litchfield, and the taxes in question were paid during said controversy. The title to the land was finally determined to be in the defendant Litchfield. It is now claimed by the plaintiff that he, as assignee of the Homestead Company, should be reimbursed for the taxes so paid, because the same were paid with knowledge upon part of the defendant, and in pursuance of a statutory obligation resting upon said company to pay them.

The defenses are: first, that the payments were voluntary and with knowledge of the facts. Second, that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations except as to the taxes of 1871. Third, that the right to recover said taxes has been finally adjudicated; and Fourth, that the defendant was under no obligation to pay said taxes at the time they were paid by the Homestead Company, because of the adverse claim to the land set up by the State of Iowa and the United States, and that by reason thereof there is no obligation on the part of the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff. There was a trial upon the merits in the court below, and a decree was entered dismissing the petition. Plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

George Crane, for appellant.

Wright Gatch & Wright, for appellees.

ROTHROCK J., SEEVERS, CH. J. ADAMS, J., Mr. Justice DAY, dissenting.

OPINION

ROTHROCK, J.

The lands upon which the taxes were paid are situated in Webster county, and the taxes in controversy were paid to the treasurer of that county. The county is made a party defendant, but as we understand the record, it is not claimed that the county is liable to the plaintiff. The relief prayed is that an account be taken of the amount of taxes that defendant should pay, and that a decree for the proper amount be entered up against the defendant in the name of the plaintiff, or in the name of Webster county, for the use and benefit of the plaintiff, and made a lien on the lands upon which the said taxes were paid. The actual controversy then is between the plaintiff and the defendant Litchfield, and the ultimate question to be determined is, should the defendant reimburse the plaintiff for the taxes so paid.

The case in its general features is similar to Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa 555, 2 N.W. 395. Both involve reimbursement for taxes paid upon lands held by the same title, and if it were not for the defense of former adjudication we are unable to see why the decision in that case is not conclusive of this. Believing, however, that this case must be determined upon the question of former adjudication, and upon that alone, we will proceed at once to a consideration of that question.

It is proper to state in the outset that the plaintiff claims the right to recover as the assignee of the Homestead Company. Being a mere assignee, if the claim was before the assignment settled by a final adjudication against the Homestead Company, the plaintiff cannot recover. It is claimed by the defendant that the claim now made was fully and finally adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Homestead Company v. Valley R. R., 17 Wall. 153. To determine this question an examination of the record made in that case is necessary.

That action was commenced in the Webster District Court, in this State, in October, 1868. The substance of the petition was that the plaintiff therein, the Homestead Company, was the owner of certain described lands and that the defendant made some claim thereto. It was prayed that the title of the plaintiff might be quieted. One paragraph of the petition was as follows: "The said plaintiffs have been in possession of the lands claimed by them, themselves or their vendees in contract since 1861. They have paid the taxes thereon to the State of Iowa since, in all amounting to $ 80,000, and if their title has failed they are entitled to have their taxes refunded since 1861 by the holder of the legal title who has not paid them." The following clause is in the prayer of the petition: "That in the event of the decree that the plaintiff's present title, or any part of it, has failed, that the said Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company and its assignees may be decreed to repay to the plaintiff all the taxes which he has paid on said lands and interest thereon."

The answer in that action, among other averments, contains the following: "And this defendant further averring says: that as to whether or not the said complainant and its vendees have been in possession of, and paid taxes on the lands claimed by them since 1861, to the amount of $ 80,000, this defendant is ignorant and uninformed, save by the said complainant's bill of complaint, but he expressly avers that the possession of the said lands by the said complainant and its vendees since 1861, is, and has been unauthorized and wrongful, and that the said complainant should be required to account for the use and rents and profits thereof, to the proper owners respectively, during the time they have been in such possession, and he expressly alleges and avers that all taxes whatever, paid by said complainant, have been paid by complainant voluntarily, with a knowledge of all the facts, and that the complainant is not entitled to have the same, or any part thereof refunded."

The cause having been transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States was submitted upon the evidence, among which was a stipulation in these words: "It is agreed that the only questions submitted on the hearing are:

"1st. In which of the parties is the paramount title in controversy?

"2d. If the title shall be adjudged to be in the defendant, the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, is the plaintiff entitled to be reimbursed for taxes which it has paid on the lands?

"The amount of taxes is admitted to be $ 2,000. If the court shall find that plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed, the question of the amount to be reimbursed shall be referred to a master, and the defendant shall have a right to show any counter-claim or other matter which should be considered as reducing the amount to be reimbursed."

The decree of said court after reciting that the cause was "heard upon the bill and amendments, answers, replications, agreements of counsel, exhibits and depositions," concludes as follows:

"And thereupon, it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the plaintiff's bill as to the lands in townships 86, 87 and 88, ranges 27, 28, 29 and 30, east and west of the Des Moines River and south of the second correction line, and townships 89, 90, 91 and 92, ranges 28 and 29, east of the Des Moines River, and the bill for relief for indemnity lands in lieu thereof, be dismissed. And the bill for relief as to the lands in townships 89 and 90, north, range 28 and 29, west, on west side of Des Moines River, be dismissed without prejudice, and that the plaintiffs pay the costs."

The decree of the Supreme Court of the United States upon appeal was as follows: "This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Iowa and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here adjudged and decreed by this court that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs."

The defendant, Litchfield, was made a party defendant in the suit. He was then the owner of all the lands, the taxes upon which are now in controversy, and all of said lands were embraced in that action. It will thus be seen that the controversy in this action is between the same parties as that in the former suit.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, it was distinctly held and determined that there could be no recovery by the plaintiff for the taxes paid. Counsel for appellant contends that the rights of the parties are to be determined by the decree, and as the decree is a simple affirmance of the decree of the Circuit Court, it follows that nothing was adjudicated but what was adjudicated by the Circuit Court. This position is not controverted by counsel for appellee, and we believe it to be well established that the judgment or decree of a court controls the written opinion, and if they are at variance the former controls and determines the rights of the parties. Cooley v. Smith, 17 Iowa 99.

There is no contention between counsel for the respective parties as to the test by which to determine whether the matter in controversy has been adjudicated. The rule, as appears to be well stated by all the authorities, is, that where a former judgment or decree is relied upon as a bar to an action it must appear either by the record or by extrinsic evidence that the particular matter in controversy and sought to be concluded was necessarily tried and determined in the former action. Packet Company v. Sickles, 72 U.S. 580, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L.Ed. 550; Wood v. Jackson, 5 Wend 10; Miles v. Caldwell, 69 U.S. 35, 2 Wall. 35, 17 L.Ed. 755. It is also conceded that the burden of establishing the plea of former adjudication is upon the defendant. Now, while there is no room for controversy as to the above rules of law, the difficulty in this case, as it is in many of the cases found in the books, consists in determining whether the facts bring the case in hand within these rules. To properly determine this we must not only consider the decree but the whole record in the...