Goodlove v. Logan

• Decision Date: 14 November 1933
• Docket Number: No. 41912.,41912.
• Citation: 217 Iowa 98,251 N.W. 39
• Parties: GOODLOVE v. LOGAN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

217 Iowa 98

251 N.W. 39

GOODLOVE

v.LOGAN.

No. 41912.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 14, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Delaware County; A. B. Lovejoy, Judge.

This is an action at law to recover damages on account of the death of plaintiff's decedent, which, it is alleged, was caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by defendant. Defendant pleaded, in addition to a general denial, violation of a rule made by the Iowa State Highway Commission covering the stopping of an automobile on the paved highway. At the close of the evidence defendant made a motion for directed verdict, which the court sustained. Opinion states the facts.

Reversed.

Donnelly, Lynch, Anderson & Lynch, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Bronson, Charlton & Kehoe, of Manchester, for appellee.

MITCHELL, Justice.

Wallace Harold Goodlove lived on a farm east and south of primary road No. 13 about 4 miles from Central City. On the evening of December 21, 1931, he started to town. Riding with him in his automobile were his wife and his only son. It was after dark, and the headlights and rear light on his car were burning. In order to reach primary highway No. 13, which is a paved road, they drove along three-fourths of a mile on a very muddy dirt road. When they reached primary highway No. 13, they turned north and drove about 120 rods, at which point Goodlove stopped his car to remove the muddy chains. The east wheels of his car were right at the easterly edge of the paved portion of the road. The pavement was 18 feet wide, and there was no curbing. The shoulder to the right of the pavement was a dirt shoulder. It had been raining, and the ground at the side of the pavement was soft and muddy. Goodlove got out on the left side of the automobile and went to the left rear wheel and removed the chain. Then he stepped onto the east shoulder, off the pavement, and was standing to the east of his car, on the shoulder, between the door and the rear of the car, when the car driven by the appellee came up from the south on the pavement, struck the car driven by Goodlove a glancing blow on the rear right fender, and then struck Goodlove and dragged him for a distance of about 90 feet. Goodlove received injuries which caused his death within a few hours. The appellee's car, after striking Goodlove, traveled a distance of approximately 90 feet along the dirt shoulder of the road. After the accident, the appellee, the driver of the car, walked back to the Goodlove car and said to Mrs. Goodlove: “Was there a man standing by your car?” She told him her husband was there. They then walked down to where the appellee's car was standing and found Goodlove under the car. He was taken to a nearby hospital, where he died a few hours later. Mrs. Goodlove was appointed administratrixof his estate and commenced this action to recover damages in the amount of $15,000. The appellee filed answer to the petition of the appellant, denied that he was negligent, claimed that the injuries were due to the said negligence of the said Goodlove, and also pleaded in his answer the following:

“That the said Wallace Harold Goodlove was negligent in that he did not comply with Rule No. 7 of the ‘Rules, Regulations and Instructions Relative to Primary Roads and Traffic on Primary Roads' issued and adopted under the direction and authority of Section 5066 of the 1931 Code of Iowa by the Iowa State Highway Commission on June 10, 1931, and effective since said date, which rule and regulation reads as follows:

‘VII. Stopping on Traveled Portion of Road. No vehicle shall stop on the traveled portion of any primary road except when such vehicle is disabled and unable to proceed without emergency repairs or change of tires.”D’

The case proceeded to trial. The appellant offered her testimony, and the appellee offered in evidence, over objection of the appellant, the rules, regulations, and instructions relative to traffic on primary roads, of the Iowa state highway commission, said offer being known as Exhibit No. 5, and offered separately that part of Exhibit No. 5 known as No. VII, which is as follows: ““VII. Stopping on Traveled Portion of Road. No vehicle shall stop on the traveled portion of primary road except when such vehicle is disabled and unable to proceed without emergency repairs or change of tires.”

This was admitted by the court over the objection of the appellant. The appellee offered no evidence other than Exhibit No. 5, and, at the close of the evidence, both sides having rested, the appellee moved the court for a directed verdict on the grounds that the appellant's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence; that the record failed to show the appellee was guilty of negligence, and showed that the appellant's decedent was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in stopping upon the paved highway. The court sustained the appellee's motion for directed verdict in the following language: “The motion for directed verdict on the part of defendant is sustained upon the ground that the rule of the Highway Commission pleaded in an amendment to the answer makes it clear under the record that plaintiff's decedent was violating this rule of the road established by the Highway Commission and, therefore, guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and because it appears from the record that that negligence contributed in a substantial degree to the accident, injury and death of decedent.”

And from the ruling of the court sustaining the motion for directed verdict, the appellant has appealed to this court.

There can be no question, from a careful examination of the record, but that there was sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the appellee shown by the appellant to submit the case to a jury. Witnesses testified to statements made by the appellee as to the speed and manner in which he was driving. These are uncontradicted in the record. The question is raised whether or not the rear light on appellant's decedent's car was burning. The testimony of appellant and others, the record discloses, shows that it was burning. This testimony is also uncontradicted.

The real question in this case is whether or not the Legislature of the state of Iowa had a right, under Code § 5066, to confer upon the highway commission the power and authority to pass and establish rules and regulations set out in Exhibit 5 and especially No. VII of said rules and regulations. The material part of section No. 5066, chapter 251 of the 1931 Code of Iowa, is as follows:

“ General Regulations-Violations. The state highway commission shall, for the protection of the highways and the safety of the traffic thereon, establish rules and regulations and issue orders relative to the use of the primary roads or any part thereof and of those portions of extensions of primary roads built and maintained by the state within cities and towns. Such rules and regulations may, where the matter is not otherwise covered by statute, relate to

1. * * *

2. * * *

3. The stopping of vehicles on the paved portion of the roadway, and the stopping of vehicles on any portion of primary roads for service at wayside markets or filling stations.

4. * * *

Failure to comply with such rules, regulations or orders shall be deemed a misdemeanor and shall be punishable accordingly.”

It is the claim of the appellant that the Legislature by Code § 5066 conferred upon the highway commission the right to establish rules and regulations regarding the stopping of vehicles on the paved portion of a highway; that this was an attempt on the part of the Legislature to confer legislative functions upon the highway commission, and therefore was in violation of the state Constitution. Thus, we are confronted with the question of drawing the line between what is “administrative” as distinguished from ““legislative” power. The distinction is not easily made, and we must look to the authorities for assistance.

In Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (5th Ed.) on page 139, the rule is expressed as follows: “One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.”

A very similar question was before the New Jersey court in State v. Larson, reported in 160 A. 556, 557, 10 N. J. Misc. 384. In that case the court sustained the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which the commission enacted the rules and regulations alleged to have been violated, and in that connection said:

“The substantial question therefore is whether the New Jersey Legislature is permitted by the Constitution of this state and that of the United States to convict a person of a crime, when it has fixed no standard of conduct to be conformed to by the citizen, but has left that standard to be fixed by the regulations of a subordinate administrative authority, either in its untrammeled discretion, or to conform substantially to the legislation of another sovereignty, such legislation being referred to in the act, but not incorporated therein.

Our form of government, both federal and state, is based upon the fundamental concept of the separation of the powers, legislative, executive, and judicial. Each of these three branches can exercise its own power only. This is expressly set forth in our state Constitution, which provides that ‘the legislative power shall be vested in...