Goodman v. Magnavox Co.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1982
• Parties: Margaret GOODMAN v. MAGNAVOX COMPANY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 945

443 A.2d 945

Margaret GOODMAN v. MAGNAVOX COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 10, 1981.

Decided April 5, 1982.

McEachern & Thornhill, Dan W. Thornhill, (orally), Kittery, for plaintiff.

Richardson, Tyler & Troubh, John S. Whitman, (orally), Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

The Superior Court, York County, has reported this case to the Law Court pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72(c). The underlying facts are not in dispute.

On June 26, 1970, the plaintiff, Margaret Goodman, purchased a television manufactured by the defendant, Magnavox Company, from Central Furniture and Appliance, Inc. in Sanford. ¹ The plaintiff has alleged that on August 11, 1974, the television manufactured by the defendant caused a fire which resulted in substantial damage to her home in North Berwick. On October 1, 1976, the plaintiff commenced this action by service of a summons and complaint upon the defendant. The complaint, which seeks damages incurred as a result of the fire, consists of two counts against the defendant. Count One alleges the defendant negligently manufactured the television set with the result that the television "burst into flames causing the plaintiff's home to catch fire." Count Two alleges a cause of action sounding in strict liability. 14 M.R.S.A. § 221.

The defendant answered raising the affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and the statute of limitations. The Court later allowed Magnavox to amend its answer to add a third affirmative defense, viz., that Count Two, the strict liability count, did not lie as the sale of the television set occurred before the effective date of Maine's strict liability statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 221. The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the entire action on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the action as the sale occurred more than six years before suit was commenced. A month after the initial motion the defendant brought a second motion pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count Two, arguing that the plaintiff was barred from suing on strict liability grounds as no cause of action for strict liability existed at the time she purchased the television.

The Superior Court entered two orders relating to the defendant's motions to dismiss. The first order, dated January 16, 1981, concerns the defendant's motions to dismiss Count Two. The order states that plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable in Count Two (strict liability) under 14 M.R.S.A. § 221. The Superior Court reasoned that the product was purchased prior to the effective date of 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 and that Section 221 must be considered to operate prospectively. The Court then construed Burke v. Hamilton Beach Division, Me., 424 A.2d 145 (1981) as authority for the proposition that the Legislature did not intend Section 221 to apply to products sold prior to its effective date. The Court granted Magnavox's motion to dismiss Count Two noting that "Section 221 of Title 14, M.R.S.A. has no applicability to this case."

On March 23, 1981, the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One (negligence) on the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the date of the fire, not the date of the sale of the television, and therefore was not barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant moved the Court for a Rule 72(c) report to the Law Court from the denial of its motion to dismiss Count One. The plaintiff thereafter also made the same motion, being aggrieved by the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss Count Two.

We determine today in Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., Me., 443 A.2d 932, at 939, that "(t)he fact that a sale of a negligently manufactured product may have occurred at some time in the past does not compel the application of contract principles to an action which sounds in tort." When it decided that the plaintiff's negligence claim (Count One) accrued on the date of the fire, rather than the date of the sale, the Superior Court correctly refused to apply contract principles to this tort action. The plaintiff's negligence claim accrued on the date the harm occurred for which she now seeks damages. See Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978). On that date this plaintiff had a judicially recognizable claim against this defendant. See Williams v. Ford Motor Co Me., 342 A.2d 712, 718 (1975). Here, that date is the date of the fire, August 11, 1974. The Superior Court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One was correct. ²

The Superior Court erred, however, when it ruled that 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 has no application to this case. In Adams, we hold that Section 221 applies to a cause of action alleging harm suffered after October 3, 1973, the legislation's effective date, notwithstanding the fact that a sale transaction has occurred prior to October 3, 1973. 443 A.2d at 944. On the authority of Adams, therefore, we hold that 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 applies to this plaintiff's strict liability claim. We accordingly affirm the Superior Court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One of the complaint and reverse the order of the Superior Court which dismissed Count Two of the complaint.

The entry is:

Order of the Superior Court denying the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One of the complaint affirmed.

Order of the Superior Court dismissing Count Two of the complaint vacated.

Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.

GODFREY, NICHOLS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ., concurring.

McKUSICK, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I would affirm the orders of the Superior Court. Thus, I concur with the majority's treatment of Count I based on negligence and dissent from its treatment of Count II based on strict liability.

I concur with affirming the Superior Court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint pleading a cause of action in negligence in the manufacture of a television set sold in 1970 that allegedly caused injury in 1974. I agree that for purposes of the statute of limitations, plaintiff's negligence cause of action accrued only when she had a judicially recognizable claim against the manufacturer, and that occurred only when she suffered injury. See Williams v. Ford Motor Co., Me., 342 A.2d 712, 718 (1975).

I dissent, however, from the court's reversal of the order of the Superior Court dismissing the strict liability count. I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court justice that "section 221 of Title 14, M.R.S.A., has no applicability to this case." I agree with the Superior Court justice that, in creating strict liability for product manufacturers by enacting section 221 in 1973, the legislature never intended to impose that strict liability as to products that had previously been put into the...