Goodnow v. Stryker

• Decision Date: 15 December 1882
• Citation: 62 Iowa 221,14 N.W. 345
• Parties: GOODNOW v. STRYKER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

62 Iowa 221

14 N.W. 345

GOODNOW

v.STRYKER.^a1

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed December 15, 1882.

Appeal from Webster circuit court.

This action was brought by the plaintiff, as assignee of the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Company, to recover for taxes paid by that company on certain land in Webster county belonging to the defendant, Stryker. The Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Company claimed to be the owner of the land at the time the taxes were levied, and which land it conveyed by a deed of warranty. The circumstances under which the taxes were paid were for the most part substantially the same as those under which the taxes were paid in Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555; [S. C. 2 N. W. REP. 395.] The several matters of defense will be set out in the opinion. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and he appeals.George Crane, for appellant.

Theodore Hawley and C. H. Gatch for appellee.

ADAMS, J.

1. In Goodnow v. Moulton the taxes were paid by the Iowa Homestead Company, and at a time when that company claimed to be the owner of the land, and it was found that the claim was made in good faith, though its validity was disputed by the defendant. Mr. Justice SEEVERS, in his opinion in that case, said: “When the taxes were paid it was believed by said company that it was the owner of the lands under the act of congress known as the railroad grant.”

The defendant contends that the case at bar differs from that case because the certification of the lands under which the plaintiff claims was suspended until April, 1863, and the taxes paid being for the years 1861, 1862, and 1863, the plaintiff should not be heard to say that his assignor paid the taxes in good faith. The taxes, however, it appears were not paid until after April, 1863. Possibly the defendant had in mind that the assessment of the taxes for 1861 and 1862, being made within the time the certification was suspended, were invalid; but he does not raise such point in his argument, and we do not, therefore, consider it. So far, then, as the circumstances are concerned under which the taxes were paid, we have to say that we see nothing in them to distinguish the case from Goodnow v. Moulton, and it follows that we are justified in holding that there was an implied promise on the part of the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff's assignor.

2. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff is barred by a prior adjudication in an action in which the Iowa Homestead Company was plaintiff, and the Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Company and the present defendant, Stryker, and others were defendants, the decision in which case is reported in 17 Wall. 153. It appears that the lands on which the taxes were paid were a part of the lands in controversy in that case, having been conveyed before the commencement of the action by the plaintiff's assignor by deed of warranty to the Iowa Homestead Company, the plaintiff in that action. It appears also that the Iowa Homestead Company, having paid certain taxes on the same land, prayed that the defendant, Stryker, be decreed to reimburse it for such payments if it should be decreed that he was the owner of the land. The defendant, Stryker, was decreed to be the owner of the land, but no recovery was allowed against him for the taxes paid. Now, while the taxes sought to be recovered in the case at bar were no part of the taxes sought to be recovered in that case, and neither the plaintiff nor his assignor was a party to that action, yet it is said that the adjudication is sufficient to bar a recovery in this case.

It is, perhaps, not to be denied that if the court correctly held in that case that the Iowa Homestead Company was not entitled to recover for taxes paid, it would follow as a matter of law that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to recover; but since the decision in Goodnow v. Moulton we cannot follow the decision in Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. as authority, nor, so far as the point is concerned which we are now considering, is it claimed that we should. The claim is that the taxes in question were actually covered by the adjudication in that case. In our opinion this claim cannot be sustained. The taxes in question were not only no part of the taxes sought to be recovered in that action, but they were not paid by the plaintiff in that action, as in Goodnow v. Litchfield, 13 N. W. REP. 86. They were paid by the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Company, and neither it nor its assignee, the present plaintiff, was a party to that...