Goodnow v. Sullivan
Decision Date | 26 February 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 990805.,990805. |
Citation | 44 P.3d 704,2002 UT 21 |
Parties | Betty GOODNOW, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Marie SULLIVAN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
L. Edward Robbins, Knab, for plaintiff.
Frank A. Allen, Barry E. Clarkson, St. George, for defendant.
¶ 1 Defendant Marie Sullivan appeals from a summary judgment entered against her in this action brought by plaintiff Betty Goodnow to declare the removal of defendant as a successor trustee under the Fern Hansen Morrison Jensen Inter Vivos Trust.
¶ 2 On November 1, 1977, the mother of plaintiff and defendant, Fern Hansen Morrison Jensen (hereinafter Mrs. Morrison) executed as settlor the Fern Hansen Morrison Jensen Inter Vivos Trust Agreement. She named herself as trustee and plaintiff and defendant as successor trustees. She reserved the right as settlor in paragraph 4.2 to "amend this trust in any manner whatsoever by delivering to the Trustee then serving a signed and acknowledged statement, such amendment not being effective until such conditions are fulfilled."
¶ 3 Mrs. Morrison died on December 4, 1998. Subsequently, plaintiff brought this action against defendant to declare that Mrs. Morrison in the months prior to her death had removed defendant as a successor trustee by virtue of a series of letters that she signed and delivered to herself as trustee. Those letters are as follows:
¶ 4 Thereafter, Winterton prepared and presented to Mrs. Morrison for her signature (1) a document entitled Full Power of Attorney, giving plaintiff general power of attorney for Mrs. Morrison and superseding a prior power of attorney in favor of defendant; (2) an amendment to the trust reversing a prior amendment that gave defendant the first right of refusal on the Thunderbird Resort and now giving that right to plaintiff; (3) a codicil to the will of Mrs. Morrison changing the personal representative from plaintiff and defendant jointly to plaintiff alone. Mrs. Morrison executed all three documents on September 22, 1998.
¶ 5 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion was supported by her affidavits that at her mother's direction, she had typed the letters previously mentioned dated August 6, 1998, September 1, 1998, and September 18, 1998, that her mother signed them in plaintiff's presence, and that it was her mother's intention in signing the letters to remove defendant as a successor trustee. No counter affidavit was filed by defendant, and none was filed in support of her motion for summary judgment.
¶ 6 At the hearing on the cross-motions, defendant objected to the admission of the letters into evidence on the grounds that they were not authentic and that they constituted hearsay. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court indicated its inclination to deny both motions for summary judgment and set the case for an evidentiary trial. At that point, counsel for defendant waived his objections to the admission of the letters and requested that the court "accept" the letters and determine "do they or do they not qualify as an amendment? and that's a matter of law." In response, the trial court ruled that taken together, the letter dated August 6, 1998, addressed "To Whom It May Concern," the letter to Mrs. Morrison's bank dated September 1, 1998, and the letter of instructions to Neil Winterton dated September 18, 1998, as a matter of law amended the trust to remove defendant as a successor trustee. Consequently, the court granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals.
¶ 7 Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989).
¶ 8 The sole issue for our determination is whether as a matter of law the letter dated August 6, 1998, was intended by Mrs. Morrison to be an amendment to her trust removing defendant as a successor trustee. See Leggroan v. Zion's Savs. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93, 98, 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951)
(. ) Because defendant waived her objections to the admission of the letters into evidence, they were properly before the trial court and now before us.
¶ 9 In support of the trial court's judgment, plaintiff argues that the August 6 letter standing alone is sufficiently clear to constitute an amendment to the trust agreement. She asserts that the language of that document is reasonably susceptible of only one meaning—that defendant not act as a successor trustee. She emphasizes that Mrs. Morrison was attempting to "assure" that defendant have no control over her property after she died. Finally, she argues that if the August 6 letter is not sufficiently clear as to Mrs. Morrison's intent, the letter to her bank and the letter to Mr. Winterton wherein she directs him to "change Marie M. Sullivan as trustee to Betty Goodnow" provide supporting evidence of her intent.
¶ 10 Notably, the August 6 document upon which plaintiff primarily relies is not denominated or entitled an amendment to the trust agreement. In fact, no specific reference is made to the trust agreement at all. Reference is made to the Thunderbird Resort property that is held in the trust. However, the document is clear that Mrs. Morrison intended that defendant not have "control of my property after my death." The letter written to her bank to remove defendant as a signatory on her bank accounts again does not mention the trust agreement nor refer to defendant as a successor trustee. The letter dated September 18, 1998, to Mr. Winterton clearly directs him to "change Marie M. Sullivan as trustee to Betty Goodnow" and to "[c]hange the Right of First Refusal from Marie M. Sullivan to Betty Goodnow." Significantly, however, the amendment to the Fern Hansen Morrison Inter Vivos Trust signed by Mrs. Morrison on September 22, 1998, gives...
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