Goodrich v. Moore

• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Citation: 2 Minn. 61
• Parties: E. S. GOODRICH vs. G. W. MOORE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

2 Minn. 61

E. S. GOODRICH vs. G. W. MOORE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from an order of the district court, Ramsey county, dissolving an injunction.

The plaintiff, as state printer, claimed the right to print the journals and proceedings of that branch of the constitutional convention presided over by Hon. St. A. D. Balcombe, as accruing during the recess of the legislative assembly, and for which printing, as he claimed, an appropriation had been made by the legislature of the state. The defendant claimed the right to do it under a contract with the president of that branch of the convention, and was proceeding to do it when this suit was brought to restrain him, and a temporary injunction issued, which was afterwards dissolved, and from the order dissolving it, this appeal was brought.

Points and authorities for appellant:

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1. The constitutional convention had no power, other than to make a constitution and provide for its submission to the people. It had no power to divert any of its printing from the state or territorial printer.

2. The printing being such as belongs of right to the state or territorial printer, neither the convention nor the legislature had any power by resolution or otherwise to take it from that officer, except in the manner provided by Rev. Stat. 88, § 2, sub. 6.

3. The territorial printer being entitled to do the incidental printing, of right, the legislature has no power to impair that right.

The points and authorities of counsel for respondent are not on file.

Van Etten & Officer, and Brisbin & Bigelow, for appellant.

Cooper & Jennison, and Smith & Gilman, for respondent.

ATWATER, J.

The motion in the court below was to vacate the order granting the injunction in this cause, and to dissolve the same. The motion was granted and we think properly. It is a well settled rule that an injunction ought not to be granted, unless the injury is pressing and the delay dangerous, or as stated by some authorities, where the injury might be irreparable. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 608; Odgen v. Kip, 6 Johns. Ch. 160; N. Y. Printing & Dyeing Establishment v. Fitch, 1 Paige, 97; 3 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1854; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315.

In this case it does not appear from the complaint but that the plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law, for any injury he may sustain by the publication complained of. And although courts will sometimes interfere to protect parties by writ of injunction, even where a legal action may be maintained, yet in such cases it is only where irreparable injury would be done, unless they were entitled to more immediate relief than that which they would obtain at law. The complaint entirely fails to show that such would be the case in the present instance. Indeed, it is questionable whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff would suffer any injury at all from the performance or continuance of the acts of the defendant which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin.

The complaint states that "the value of the printing and publication of said manuscript ordered by said convention, at and for the price fixed by law, to be paid to the state printer, is worth and of the value of about $7,000." This allegation is equivocal, and is far from being equivalent to a direct statement that the plaintiff would derive that amount of benefit from doing the printing and publication referred to, or would suffer that amount of injury by being deprived of it by the defendant. There is no allegation whatever that the plaintiff would derive a profit from the printing and publication of the manuscript he seeks to obtain, nor that he would suffer an actual loss or damage from being deprived of it. And even had there been such allegation, it does not appear but that the defendant is able to respond in law to any pecuniary damage that may be suffered by the plaintiff.

It is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, that this is an action to enforce a right and prevent a wrong, and not for damage, and that no averment for special damage is necessary. But courts of equity will not exercise their powers for the enforcement of right or the prevention of wrong, in the abstract, and where no actual benefit is to be derived by the party who seeks to exercise such right, nor injury suffered by the commission of the wrong complained of. And though such benefit or injury is not always or necessarily of a pecuniary nature, and to be estimated in dollars and cents, yet in the case at bar, it must be such, if any, as none other is attempted to be alleged. And the plaintiff having failed, for the reasons above stated, to show that he will suffer any pecuniary damage, or even if suffered, that he has not...