United States Express Co. v. State

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FRAUENTHAL, J.
• Citation: United States Express Co. v. State, 139 S.W. 637, 99 Ark. 633 (Ark. 1911)
• Decision Date: 10 July 1911
• Parties: UNITED STATES EXPRESS COMPANY v. STATE

139 S.W. 637

99 Ark. 633

UNITED STATES EXPRESS COMPANY v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

July 10, 1911

Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court; J. V. Bourland, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

Frank H. Platt and C. E. & H. P. Warner, for appellant.

The acts with which appellant is charged do not constitute a public nuisance. 3 McCrary, 147; 117 U.S. 791; 44 F. 310; 10 S.E. 297; 45 N.Y. 13; 91 Am. Dec. 783: Kirby's Dig § 5118; 6 How. 344; 39 Miss. 822; 91 U.S. 343; 29 Conn 538; 63 Me. 269. The court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree against appellant. 14 Mo.App. 413; 2 Johns. Ch. 371; 78 Ill. 237; 99 Ill. 489; 102 Ill.App. 449; 158 U.S. 564; 81 Ark. 117; 155 Ind. 526; 2 Minn. 61; 7 Miss. 602; 124 U.S 200; 58 P. 604; 37 S.W. 478; 31 S.E. 745; 56 F. 654; 54 Pa.St. 401; 34 Ark. 375; Id. 554; 109 Mo. 496; 41 A. 914; 74 N.W. 798; 17 P. 365; 125 S.W. 643.

Hal. L. Norwood, Attorney General, and W. H. Rector, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Error is confessed on the authority of 81 Ark. 117; 93 Ark. 389.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This was a suit instituted in the Sebastian Chancery Court by the State of Arkansas on the relation of the prosecuting attorney of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, and also by certain individuals as citizens and residents of the Greenwood District of said county, seeking to restrain the United States Express Company, defendant below, from carrying and delivering shipments of intoxicating liquors consigned to points in said Greenwood District, except under certain restrictions.

The complaint in substance alleged that intoxicating liquors were being shipped from Fort Smith, and by the defendant as a common carrier transported to various points in said Greenwood District, and there delivered to persons to be sold and kept for sale contrary to law. It was further alleged that this constituted a nuisance in each of the communities where the intoxicating liquors were thus delivered, "from the fact that drunkenness and debauchery resulted from same, to the great inconvenience, discomfort and nuisance of said communities."

To this complaint defendant interposed a demurrer, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and because the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant, electing to stand thereon and refusing to plead further, the court entered a decree enjoining the defendant from making delivery of intoxicating liquors at any place except its regular depots and established offices in said Greenwood District, and from carrying intoxicating liquors under fictitious names of consignees for delivery in said district. The decree further enjoined defendant and its employees from delivering consignments of intoxicating liquors to any person in said district until within three hours after same had reached the depot or office of defendant, a notice in writing had been posted or delivered to the nearest mayor or justice of the peace, or sheriff, having jurisdiction in said district, giving a description of the package containing the liquor and stating the time of its receipt and designating the place where it was held and the names of the consignor and consignee; and from delivering the liquor or allowing access to same for a period of thirty-six hours from the time of its receipt.

The question involved in this case is whether or not the chancery court had jurisdiction of the matter set out in the complaint and authority to enter the decree which it made.

This was an action instituted in a court of equity seeking in effect to prevent a violation of the criminal laws of the State prohibiting the sale or keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors within a prohibited district, and to aid in the discovery of those violating such criminal statutes. Defendant was a common carrier of goods, and as such it violated no law when it carried to points in the Greenwood District intoxicating liquors or any other goods. But it is alleged that it aided in the violation of law by delivering intoxicating liquors to persons who then sold or kept said liquors for sale in said district in violation of the laws of the State making prohibition of said acts in said district. The purpose of the bill was to obtain the aid of a court of equity in the prevention of anticipated crime and the enforcement of the criminal laws. It is not alleged in the complaint that any property or civil right was injured by the act of the defendant, or that such act was an injury to the property or civil rights of the public at large. The complaint only alleged that drunkenness and debauchery would result from an act of the defendant and the infraction of the criminal laws of the State, thus resulting in a public nuisance. In the absence of an injury to property or civil rights, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain acts simply because they are criminal, nor to enforce moral obligations, nor to interfere in matters merely of an illegal or immoral character.

In High on Injunctions (4 ed.) section 20, the rule relating to the jurisdiction of a court of chancery in such matters is thus stated: "The subject-matter of the jurisdiction of equity being the protection of private property and civil rights, courts of equity will not interfere for the punishment or prevention of merely criminal or immoral acts, unconnected with violations of private right. Equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the commission of crimes or to enforce moral obligations and the performance of moral duties; nor will it interfere for the prevention of an illegal act merely because it is illegal. And, in the absence of any injury to property rights, it will not lend its aid by injunction to restrain the violation of public or penal statutes, or the commission of immoral or illegal acts."

In the case of World's Columbian Exposition v. United States, 56 F. 654, a bill was filed in a court of equity seeking to restrain the opening of the gates of the World's Columbian Exposition on Sunday in contravention of an act of Congress and in alleged violation of law. In speaking of the jurisdiction of the chancery court to grant relief in such case, Fuller, Circuit Justice, said:

"The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection

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