Goodrich v. Superior Oil Co.

Decision Date07 March 1951
Docket NumberNo. A-2948,A-2948
Citation150 Tex. 159,237 S.W.2d 969
PartiesGOODRICH v. SUPERIOR OIL CO.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Maurice Cheek, Cantey, Hanger, Johnson, Scarborough & Gooch, J. Lee Johnson, III, Peveril O. Settle, Jr., and Gillis A. Johnson, all of Fort Worth, Cecil, Keith & Mehaffy and Quentin Keith, all of Beaumont, for appellant.

Pitts & Liles, Conroe, Williams, Lee & Kennerly, Jesse J. Lee, Murray Christian and Willard B. Wagner, all of Houston, for appellee.

GARWOOD, Justice.

The certificate concerns the right of appellee, The Superior Oil Company, as holder of a large number of oil and gas leases, to maintain an action in the form of interpleader in Montgomery County, where the leased land lies, against the appellant, Robert D. Goodrich (apparently an assignor) and some 238 other defendants, as against the plea of appellant Goodrich to be sued in Tarrant County, where he resides. Appellant's plea of privilege was overruled by the trial court, and this holding is approved by the tentative opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals.

The question certified is: 'Do the allegations in plaintiff's petition show venue in the Montgomery County District Court under subdivision 14 of Article 1995 as against the defendant Robert D. Goodrich?'

Subdivision 14 referred to reads: '14. Lands.-Suits for the recovery of lands or damages thereto, or to remove incumbrances upon the title to land, or to quiet the title to land, or to prevent or stay waste on lands, must be brought in the county in which the land, or a part thereof, may lie.'

The content of appellee's petition, which consists of seven sections and an 'Exhibit 'A", may be described as follows:

Section I identifies the plaintiff appellee, Superior, and is not otherwise material to the controversy.

Section II lists the defendants with their respective residences, giving no further data about them or their connection with the suit. A few of them are thus shown to reside in Montgomery County and the rest in other places within and without the state. As residing in Tarrant County, the list includes names identical with those of defendant P. C. Bundy and appellant Goodrich.

Section III describes a particular tract of some 1896 acres in Montgomery County by mere reference to the survey and two fairly old deeds. It says that appellee 'is now the owner and holder of valid and subsisting oil, gas and mineral leases covering the oil, gas and minerals in, on and under' the abovementioned tract, said leases being listed in 'Exhibit 'A"; that each lease 'is now in full force and effect'; and that appellee has completed and is producing two gas wells on the tract (their location not being otherwise indicated).

'Exhibit 'A" is divided into four consecutively numbered sub-lists. The numberous leases thus listed are respectively described but only to the extent of the date of execution, recordation data, name of the lessor or lessors and name of the lessee. The number of lessors is quite large, but there is only one lessee in each lease and only five lessees in the aggregate, to wit, 'Robert D. Goodrich', 'P. C. Bundy', 'Clayton N. Smith', 'W. E. O'Neall' and 'G. R. Garrett'. It may be noted here that, as to names, 'Exhibit 'A" is identical with the abovementioned list of the defendants, except that the defendants do not include a W. E. O'Neall or G. R. Garrett and that they do include some seventy-five names not appearing at all in 'Exhibit 'A ". The relation of these seventy-five defendants to the litigation is explained only to the extent of rather general allegations hereafter mentioned, and indeed it is hard to say that the position of any particular defendant, including appellant Goodrich, is ever clearly defined.

Section IV states 'that as a result of sales of production from said wells on said tract', three certain funds have accumulated in the possession of appellee and that similar funds are accruing and will accrue. The section consists of three parts, (a), (b), and (c) which respectively deal with the three distinct funds and corresponding sums accruing and to accrue, as follows:

Part (a) refers to a fund ($18,705.01 accrued) which it explains merely as being 'allocable to one-eighth (1/8th) royalty reserved under the terms and conditions of the leases listed in 'Exhibit 'A" attached hereto, and due and payable to the owner or owners thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions of said * * * leases'. The 'owner or owners' of these basic royalties are not further identified.

Part (b) refers to a further fund ($16,366.88 accrued) 'allocable to' an 'overriding royalty' of 'one-eighth (1/8th) of seven eighths (7/8ths)' which is 'reserved under the terms and conditions of' certain identified leases in 'Exhibit 'A" and 'payable to the owner or owners thereof' in accordance with the terms mentioned. The corresponding language of the specified leases is quoted, including the provision that the payments in question are to be made 'to Lessor in that proportion only which the interest owned by Lessor in said land bears to the entire fee simple estate in said land.'

It is noted that neither parts (a) or (b) of this § IV purport to connect any particular defendant with the funds or royalties, though by comparing the list of lessors with the list of defendants, one might conjecture from identity of names, that probably some at least of the 'owner or owners' are meant to be certain named defendants.

Part (c) refers to a third fund ($24,550.33 accrued). It recites that instruments of assignment were executed in favor of appellee Superior by 'Robert D. Goodrich' of all the listed leases except the six constituting the 4th group in the Exhibit, and by one Tulane Gordon of these latter six. As to these it is stated that previously a similar assignment had been made to Gordon by 'P. C. Bundy'. (This last name appears as lessee of the six leases in question. As to the leases figuring in the Goodrich assignments, only a minority of them ran to 'Robert D. Goodrich' as lessee, and there is no allegation of assignments to Goodrich by the other lessees Bundy, Smith, O'Neall and Garrett abovementioned, though appellee yet alleges itself to own the leases and says that Goodrich executed assignments of them to appellee).

Part (c) goes on to state that the assignments to appellee contained provision for an overriding royalty to the respective assignors, being three-sixteenths of seven-eighths 'of all the oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved from said land hereunder', and that the abovementioned sum of $24,550.33 on hand, and similar funds accruing and to accrue, are 'allocable to' such royalty and due in whole or part to 'the owner or owners thereof in accordance with the terms and provisions of said instruments of assignment.' Who may be, or claim to be, 'the owner or owners' is not further stated, though, no doubt, the assignor 'Robert D. Goodrich' is the indicated owner of the royalties reserved in his assignments, there being no statement that his apparent interest has been alienated or reduced. We may, presumably, take it that this Goodrich is also the defendant-appellant of the same name. The assignor, Tulane Gordon, as stated, is not a defendant, though 'P. C. Bundy', Gordon's assignor, may doubtless be taken as the defendant of the same name. In connection with the Bundy-Gordon-Superior chain of assignments, evidently but one royalty is involved, to wit, the three-sixteenths of seven-eighths reserved by Bundy.

Of conceivable significance is the provision of the Goodrich and Bundy assignments quoted as follows: 'If the lessors in the leases hereby assigned own an interest in said land less than the entire mineral estate, then the overriding royalties herein reserved shall be reduced proportionately.'

The final sentence of § IV states 'that a dispute exists between certain of the defendants herein as to the ownership of the oil, gas and minerals underlying the tract of land above described and that said defendants have heretofore and are now asserting (sic) adverse and conflicting claims thereto and to the royalties which have accrued and are accruing under said * * * leases owned by petitioner (appellee) including said monies now in the possession of petitioner.' (Emphasis supplied.) This is the only allegation in the petition concerning a dispute and obviously omits to identify the disputing defendants. As to the character of their antagoinistic claims, while the quoted language appears to contemplate (1) claims of ownership of the minerals generally, as well as (2) claims to ownership of the royalties reserved in the leases, it yet does not seem to include the idea that either type of claim is antagonistic to the asserted rights of appellee as owner of the leasehold estate in the tract. Moreover, the thought that some defendants might be claiming rights in the minerals apart from the leases, seems at variance with the allegations of § IV, that the three funds in question are 'allocable to' the royalties and 'due and payable to' the owners of the royalties. As to the alleged dispute over ownership of the royalties (as distinguished from general mineral ownership), such royalties are only said to be those 'under * * * said leases' and, by strong inference, not to be those reserved by Goodrich and Bundy under their assignments.

Section V states briefly that appellee 'has no interest in the funds' described in parts (a), (b) and (c) of § IV, 'unless and except the court should find' that the corresponding leases listed in the Exhibit 'cover less than the entire fee simple estate in said tract'. As to the fund described in part (c) as 'allocable to' the overriding royalties reserved by assignors Goodrich and Bundy, and as to the fund described in part (a) as 'allocable to' the ordinary royalties, it is expressly denied that the 'unless and except' condition exists in fact; appellee thus asserting again the...

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