Goodwin v. State

• Decision Date: 24 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 95-137,95-137
• Citation: 585 N.W.2d 749
• Parties: Jeff GOODWIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 749

585 N.W.2d 749

Jeff GOODWIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 95-137.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

June 24, 1998.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Firm, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by CADY, C.J., VOGEL, J., and HABHAB, S.J. ^*

VOGEL, Judge.

On appeal from a prison disciplinary proceeding, Applicant Jeff Goodwin claims the district court erred in remanding for rehearing rather than expunging a disciplinary report and alternatively claims his sanction was excessive and should be set aside. We find the expungement issue to be moot, but remand the matter for reconsideration of the appropriate sanction.

Background facts. On March 9, 1993, Goodwin, an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary, was given a disciplinary report which alleged he had made unauthorized phone calls to a female correctional officer, during which he had made sexual remarks. The officer played a recording of some of the calls for two staff members who identified Goodwin as the caller.

The disciplinary report charged Goodwin with violating several prison disciplinary rules, including Rule 15, sexual misconduct, and Rule 40, misuse of telephone communications. On March 12, 1993, the disciplinary committee found Goodwin guilty of violating Rule 15 and the lesser included rule violations.

Goodwin appealed to the warden, seeking to obtain witness statements from the two staff members who had purportedly identified Goodwin as the caller. The warden remanded to accommodate the request. On remand, statements were obtained from two staff members who were not in fact the identifying witnesses. Nonetheless, the committee again found Goodwin guilty of violating Rule 15.

Goodwin filed an application for postconviction relief asking the court to set aside the sanctions and expunge the report. The district court remanded the matter for rehearing to obtain the correct witness statements. Goodwin appealed.

While Goodwin's appeal was pending, the remanded case was heard by an administrative law judge, (ALJ), who finally found insufficient evidence that Goodwin had committed sexual misconduct and dismissed that charge. However, the ALJ found that Goodwin had, by his own admission, misused a phone in violation of Rule 40 and imposed 30 days of disciplinary detention and 270 days in lockup. The district court affirmed the sanction and Goodwin appeals.

The supreme court combined Goodwin's two appeals so that the questions before us are: 1) Was the district court correct in remanding the case over Goodwin's assertions that his record should be expunged; and 2) did the ALJ abuse his discretion in considering the dismissed sexual misconduct charge in imposing sanctions for misuse of the telephone.

I. Remand vs. Expungement. Goodwin contends that prison policy requires expungement where the district court finds there was a procedural error in a disciplinary case. The State contends expungement is optional, particularly when the deficiency was cured.

Ordinarily, our review of postconviction relief proceedings is for errors at law. Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa1980). However, when a postconviction petitioner asserts violation of constitutional safeguards, we make our own evaluation based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. This is the equivalent of a de novo review. Id.

The expungement provision of the Disciplinary Policy and Procedures for the Government of the Iowa State Penitentiary Inmates Rule III(G) (2)(b) states:

If an alleged rule violation is not adjudicated in accordance with the procedure contained in this manual of Disciplinary Policy and Procedures, no punishment may be imposed for such rule violation, and all records of the alleged violation, including the reporting officer's incident report, shall be expunged from the inmate's treatment and legal files and from any other records which may be subject to review by the Board of Parole. PROVIDED HOWEVER: (1) that insubstantial and nonprejudicial deviation from these procedures shall not preclude punishment or require expungement; (2) that this rule shall not apply to any deviation from these procedures which is fully corrected during the disciplinary process or on remand following an appeal to the Warden; (3) that the rule shall not apply to any deviation from these procedures which the inmate fails to raise as an issue in an appeal to the Warden within seven days after receiving written notice of the disciplinary committee's decision.

The expungement rule originated in an unreported federal court consent decree in the case of Kane v. Brewer, Civil No. 73-153-1(S.D.Iowa 1974), and has been interpreted in two Iowa Supreme Court cases. In Kelly v. Nix, 329 N.W.2d 287 (Iowa 1983), the court held that the expungement rule did not apply to insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors. Kelly, 329 N.W.2d at 293 (citing Kane v.Brewer, Civ. No. 73-153-1 (S.D.Iowa, September 30, 1982)).

In Hrbek v. State, 478 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1991), the court further defined a substantial departure from the procedural rules as follows: "The distinction between substantial and insubstantial deviations turns on whether the applicable rule (1) directly protects the integrity of the adjudication of guilt or innocence or (2) prevents the inmate from gaining access to evidence." Hrbek, 478 N.W.2d at 619 (citing Kelly, 329 N.W.2d at 293).

In Hrbek, the due process violation stemmed from the denial of the applicant's right to call a witness at his initial hearing before the prison disciplinary committee which he claimed would have absolved him of the violation charged. Id. at 618. The district court, finding that the institutional rules had not been followed, remanded the case for rehearing to allow the witness to be called. Id. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, stating the proper remedy for a due process violation was not to remand for new hearing but to expunge the record as required when a rule violation is not adjudicated in accordance with the procedure contained in the Disciplinary Policy and Procedures manual. Id. at 619-20.

Here, we do not have a denial of Goodwin's due process rights at his initial hearing before the prison disciplinary committee. Instead, for the first time on appeal to the warden, Goodwin requested the names of the two witnesses who were referred to in the complaining officer's report as "two additional staff members." The warden agreed to...