Goodwin v. York

• Decision Date: 05 February 1896
• Citation: 97 Iowa 226,66 N.W. 157
• Parties: GOODWIN v. PROVIDENT SAV. LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

97 Iowa 226

66 N.W. 157

GOODWIN

v.PROVIDENT SAV. LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF NEW YORK.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 5, 1896.

Appeal from superior court of Cedar Rapids; T. M. Giberson, Judge.

Action at law upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant company upon the life of Matthew Goodwin. Trial to a jury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Mills & Keeler and Hubbard & Dawley, for appellant.

Charles A. Clark, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

On the 16th day of November, 1887, the defendant, a corporation doing a life insurance business, organized and having its principal place in the state of New York, issued a policy of insurance to the plaintiff upon the life of her husband, Matthew Goodwin, agreeing to pay her, in the event of the death of the assured on or before noon of the 16th day of February, 1888, the sum of $5,000. The policy was issued on what is known as the “renewable term plan,” a method of insurance originated by the president of the defendant company, and first used in the year 1887. By the terms of the contract, the defendant agreed to renew and extend the insurance, during each successive quarter year from the date thereof, upon the payment, on or before the 16th of February, May, August, and November in each successive year during the life of the assured, of the premiums for the actual age attained, in accordance with a schedule of rates printed on the back of the policy, less the return premiums awarded thereon. Goodwin, the assured, died by his own hand on the 11th day of November, 1891, at the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois. His widow, the beneficiary in the policy, brought this suit, having first given notice, and made the proofs of death required by the terms of the policy. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition because there was no allegation therein that the policy had been renewed from time to time by the payment of premiums, and because the action was prematurely brought. The demurrer was sustained on the last ground, and overruled on the other; and thereupon plaintiff filed an amended and supplemental petition, avoiding the defect reached by the demurrer, and pleading some other matters not necessary to be here recited. The defendant, in answer, admitted the execution of the policy, and its renewal from time to time down to May 16, 1891; admitted the death of Goodwin, but denied that the policy was in force at the time of his death. Defendant further pleaded, as a second division of its answer, that the assured made a written application for insurance, in which he agreed that the representations therein contained should be construed as warranties, and made the basis for the issuance of the policy, and that any false answers or statements should avoid the policy. It further pleaded that Goodwin represented in this application that he was in sound health, and was not then, and had not been, intemperate in the use of stimulants, and that he stated that he drank occasionally, but never to excess; that these representations were false and untrue; that Goodwin used intoxicating liquors habitually, and to excess; and that he made the representations he did with intent to deceive the defendant, and procure the policy in suit. In the third division of the answer the defendant pleaded other false and untrue statements made by Goodwin, respecting the place of his birth and the condition of his health, which need not be more particularly set out. In the fourth division the defendant pleaded that plaintiff and the assured wholly failed and neglected to pay the premiums necessary to be paid on May 16, 1891, in order to renew and extend the insurance from and after that date, and that the policy expired at that date by the express terms thereof; that thereafter, and on May 21, 1891, Goodwin applied for reinstatement in the defendant company, and, as a basis thereof, presented a health certificate, in which, among other things, he stated that he was then in good health and had been since May 16, 1891; that, in truth and in fact, Goodwin was not in good health and free from disease, and was not temperate in his habits, when he made the certificate of health. The fifth division pleaded failure of Goodwin or plaintiff to pay the quarterly premium due August 16, 1891, in order to extend the policy, and alleges that written notice of the amount of such premium, and of the place where and person to whom payment might be made, was mailed the assured on July 15, 1891,--the letter being addressed to him at Fifteenth and Harney streets, Omaha, Neb.; that being his last known post-office address, and the one fixed by him, in the application for insurance, to which notice should be sent. The sixth division of the answer merely pleads the failure of Goodwin or plaintiff to pay the premium due August 16, 1891, and further alleges that the statutes of the state of New York, which, it is claimed, should govern and control the contract in suit, requiring notice, etc., did not apply to policies like the one in suit. In the seventh division the defendant averred that the application of Goodwin contained this statement: “It is agreed that death by my own hand or act (except when mentally unaccountable), or death in violation of, or attempt to violate, law, are risks not at any time assumed by the society under the policy applied for.” And defendant further averred that Goodwin took his own life while mentally accountable, and therefore there was no liability on the part of the company. The plaintiff demurred to the fourth division of the answer because the representations there pleaded were not made in the application for insurance, and for the further reason that, by the terms of the policy, it was incontestable, except for fraud in obtaining the policy in the first instance; to the fifth division, because of several alleged defects in the notice sent out by the defendant company; to the sixth, because no computation had been made by the company as to the amount of the quarterly premium Goodwin should pay, no deductions or allowances having been made on account of any surplus portion of preceding payments not needed for death or quarterly fund; to the seventh for the reason that the policy sued on became and was incontestable, except for fraud in obtaining it. This demurrer was sustained, as to the fourth and seventh divisions of defendant's answer, and overruled as to the fifth and sixth, each party excepting. Thereupon defendant amended the fourth division by pleading discovery of the falsity of the representations therein referred to on July 1, 1892, and offered to confess judgment for the amount of the premium paid May 21, 1891. Thereafter other pleadings were filed by each of the parties; the defendant, among other things, alleging that the contract of reinstatement in May, 1891, was a Nebraska contract, and that there was no law of that state requiring that a copy of the certificate of death be attached to, or made a part of, the policy. The defendant further pleaded that the original application for insurance was made in Nebraska, and the policy delivered in Omaha, in that state, and that there was no law in either the state of Nebraska or the state of New York requiring a copy or copies of the application to be attached to or incorporated in said policy. Such were the issues on which the cause was tried. The court, however, in its instructions to the jury, eliminated all questions made by the pleadings, save the issue as to the nonpayment of the quarterly premium claimed to have been due August 16, 1891. The jury found for the plaintiff on the questions of fact presented, and with their findings we are not called upon to interfere. The questions presented by this appeal arise upon the sustaining of plaintiff's demurrer to certain divisions of the answer, the rulings of the court during the trial, and the giving and refusing of instructions to the jury.

1. The first question presented in argument relates to the sufficiency of the seventh divisionof the defendant's answer. The application which Goodwin made for his insurance contained a statement which, if standing alone, would avoid the plaintiff's cause of action, for it is conceded that Goodwin committed suicide. But the policy contained this provision: “Subject to the stipulations regarding payment of premiums, and extrahazardous occupations, claim under this policy by death occurring two or more years after its date will be incontestable, except for fraud in obtaining this policy.” If there were nothing more to the case than this provision of the policy, there would be no doubt that plaintiff's claim could not be defeated because her husband took his own life; for a claim under the policy by death occurring two or more years after its date was incontestable, except for fraud. We have a case, then, for construction of these seemingly ambiguous and conflicting provisions. The tenets established for the guidance of courts in such matters are well understood, and no one is better established than that in all cases the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the assured, so as not to defeat, without a plain necessity, his claim for indemnity. And when the words used may, without violence, be given two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss should be adopted. Thompson v. Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 297, 10 Sup. Ct. 1019;National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673;Moulor v. Insurance Co., 111 U. S. 342, 4 Sup. Ct. 466;Wadsworth v. Tradesmen's Co., 132 N. Y. 543, 29 N. E. 1104;Fitch v. Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 572;Garretson v. Association (Iowa) 38 N. W. 127;Meyer v. Casualty Co. (Iowa) 65 N. W. 328;Collins v. Insurance Co. (Iowa) 64 N. W. 602. Now, by the terms of the policy, it was incontestable, after two years from its date, except for fraud in procuring it,--subject, however, to the stipulations regarding payment of premiums, and extrahazardous occupations....