Goolsby v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 19 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 55518,55518 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | GOOLSBY v. WILSON et al. |
G. Hughel Harrison, John F. Doran, Jr., Lawrenceville, for appellant.
Cheeley & Chandler, Joseph E. Cheeley, Buford, for appellees.
On three separate occasions, during the course of three town hall meetings, appellee (then mayor of the City of Duluth) made certain statements concerning appellant (then Chief of Police of the City of Duluth). These statements related to the unexplained absence of money posted for a traffic offense. The statements which appellee admitted making in reference to appellant were: "If I catch anybody else stealing, I'll do my dead level best to get rid of them, too." "I exposed J.B. (appellant) a while back for taking money." "I proved he took the money." Appellant filed suit to recover for the allegedly defamatory statements. This appeal follows the grant of appellee's motion for directed verdict at the close of appellant's case. We affirm.
1. McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga.App. 59, 61, 220 S.E.2d 63, 65. The privilege, then, is a qualified one and not absolute.
2. Appellant, Chief of Police of the City of Duluth, is a public official within the rule of new york times co. v. sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. See 19 A.L.R.3d 1361, 1375 § 5(d). Therefore, not only was it necessary for appellant to prove that the official (appellee-mayor herein) forfeited his privilege by acting "wilfully, corruptly, or maliciously"; it was encumbent upon appellant to make a prima facie showing that actual malice existed in the constitutional sense. Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 140 Ga.App. 49, 63, 230 S.E.2d 45.
" Defamed public officials . . . can recover only upon a showing of actual malice, i. e., 'only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.' " Williams, supra, p. 52, 230 S.E.2d p. 48.
"Constitutional malice does not involve the motives of the speaker or publisher, though they may be wrong, but rather it is his awareness of actual or probable falsity, or his reckless disregard for their falsity . . . So here (appellant), as was with Sullivan in New York Times, is prohibited 'from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his . . . conduct Unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at...
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