Gore v. People's Sav. Bank, 15042

• Decision Date: 10 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15042,15042
• Citation: 665 A.2d 1341,235 Conn. 360
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Thomas GORE et al. v. PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK et al.

Page 1341

665 A.2d 1341

235 Conn. 360

Thomas GORE et al. v. PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK et al.

No. 15042.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 1, 1995.

Decided Oct. 10, 1995.

Peter J. Dauk, with whom was Lawrence F. Reilly, for appellants (defendants).

Dana P. Lonergan, for appellees (plaintiffs).

William H. Champlin III filed a brief for American Insurance Association as amicus curiae.

Kenneth G. Williams and Renee W. Dwyer filed a brief for Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Janet C. Spegele and Stephen Ostrach filed a brief for Connecticut Business and Industry Association as amicus curiae.

Kathryn Calibey and Joram Hirsch filed a brief for Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The primary question on this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that a landlord of a residential dwelling may be held strictly liable pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) §§ 47a-7, 47a-8 and 47a-54f(b) ¹ for personal injuries sustained by a minor tenant due to the minor's exposure to lead-based paint in the landlord's dwelling. The plaintiffs, Thomas Gore and Wanda Copeland, brought an action on behalf of their minor son, Kendall Copeland, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants, People's Savings Bank and M.S.B. Real Estate Corporation, were strictly liable for the damages caused by their son's exposure to lead-based paint in the defendants' dwelling. The trial court, Thim, J., granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability count and, after the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on the remaining counts, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that " §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8, when read together, and § 47a-54f provide for civil damages pursuant to a claim of strict liability" and, therefore, that the trial court should not have directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability count. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 35 Conn.App. 126, 644 A.2d 945 (1994). We granted the defendants' motion for certification to appeal; Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 231 Conn. 923, 648 A.2d 163 (1994); and now reverse and remand the case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 1984, the plaintiffs and Kendall Copeland moved into an apartment located at 400 Atlantic Street in Bridgeport. On May 22, 1985, Audrey Gaines, a program coordinator for the Bridgeport department of health, inspected the plaintiffs' apartment for the presence of lead. Gaines tested the surfaces of the apartment using a portable X-ray machine, which measured the amount of lead within the paint on the surfaces. This testing revealed that some surfaces contained more than five tenths of 1 percent lead by weight, the federal statutory standard then codified in 42 U.S.C. § 4841 ² and incorporated by § 47a-8. On the basis of the results of this inspection, Gaines sent notification to the landlord ³ and requested that it abate the lead in the plaintiffs' apartment. On August 26, 1985, Gaines reinspected the apartment and determined that all lead hazards had been abated.

By amended complaint dated October 1, 1992, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants for injuries that Kendall had suffered due to his exposure to the lead-based paint. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants negligently had failed to comply with certain state law pertaining to the health and safety of tenants. ⁴ The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had failed to comply with the terms of their lease agreement requiring the defendants to comply with certain state laws pertaining to the health and safety of tenants. ⁵ Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were strictly liable for the damages caused by the lead-based paint violations. On October 20, 1992, after the close of evidence, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability count against each defendant.

With regard to the negligence counts, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendants were liable if, inter alia: (1) there was a violation of a warranty of habitability or state statute; ⁶ (2) the landlord had constructive or actual notice of the violation; ⁷ (3) the landlord had failed to repair the condition constituting the violation within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the violation; ⁸ and (4) the landlord's failure to repair was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The trial court also instructed the jury that it would have in the jury room, and would be required to answer, interrogatories corresponding to these four issues, and, further, that a negative answer to any one of them would establish that the defendants were not liable. Following the jury charge, the plaintiffs excepted to, inter alia, the lack of a charge on negligence as a matter of law as had been set forth in their request to charge. At that time, the plaintiffs also renewed their objection to the granting of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability claim, and they excepted to the trial court's instruction regarding the notice requirement and the landlord's opportunity to repair within a reasonable period of time.

The jury found the defendants not liable, finding that there was a violation of a warranty or statute and that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the violation, but that the defendants had repaired the condition constituting the violation within a reasonable period of time. The plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the verdict, contending that the trial court had, inter alia, improperly: (1) directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability counts; (2) refused to give a negligence per se instruction regarding General Statutes §§ 47a-7(a)(2), 47a-8, 47a-54f(b) and § 19-13-B1(i) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies; (3) instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had the burden of proof with respect to actual or constructive notice; and (4) instructed the jury that the defendants had a reasonable time after notice to repair the conditions constituting the violation. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict, concluding that §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 do not modify the common law requirement of notice and, therefore, do not impose strict liability on landlords.

The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict, concluding that the trial court had improperly directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability counts. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn.App. at 128-29, 644 A.2d 945. In doing so, the Appellate Court first determined that violations of §§ 47a-7(a)(2), 47a-8 and 47a-54f(b) ⁹ constitute negligence per se for the purposes of a claim brought on behalf of a minor injured by lead-based paint in the landlord's apartment. Id. at 132-34, 644 A.2d 945. In particular, the Appellate Court determined, on the basis of the language of these statutory provisions and their legislative history, that the provisions satisfied the two-prong test for negligence per se: (1) that the plaintiffs were within the class of persons protected by the statute; and (2) that the injury suffered is of the type that the statute was intended to prevent. Id. at 130-34, 644 A.2d 945. ¹⁰ The Appellate Court then concluded that "[b]ecause we construe the statute as meeting the threshold dual criteria for imposition of statutory civil liability pursuant to negligence per se, but lacking any provision for an excuse for the violation, we conclude that the legislature intended that the statute provide for strict liability upon proof of a violation of the statute and proximate causation." Id. at 135-36, 644 A.2d 945.

The Appellate Court noted that its interpretation followed the analysis utilized in Housing Authority v. Olesen, 31 Conn.App. 359, 363-65, 624 A.2d 920 (1993), in which the Appellate Court had determined that § 47a-8 did not require notice to the landlord of the lead-based paint violation to trigger a defense to the landlord's summary process action for nonpayment of rent. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn.App. at 135, 644 A.2d 945. Moreover, the Appellate Court recognized that the same conclusion regarding strict liability had previously been reached in the case of Hardy v. Griffin, 41 Conn.Supp. 283, 569 A.2d 49 (1989), although the Hardy court had analyzed the issue differently. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, supra at 136 n. 11, 644 A.2d 945 ("our analysis is independent of that set forth in Hardy- "). As a result, it remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 137, 644 A.2d 945. ¹¹

After the Appellate Court heard oral argument, but before it released its decision in this case, the legislature repealed § 47a-8. See Public Acts 1994, No. 94-220, § 11. We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court, limited to the following two issues: "1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendants' violation of General Statutes §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 or § 47a-54f(b) imposed strict liability on the defendants for the minor plaintiff's injuries?" and "2. What is the effect of the enactment of Public Act No. 94-220(11) on the liability of the defendants in this case?" Gore v. People's Savings Bank, supra, 231 Conn. 923, 648 A.2d 163. ¹²

Before further framing the questions at issue in this case, we first emphasize what is not at issue. From the jury's answers to the interrogatories at trial following the trial court's instructions, it is clear that the jury found the condition of the plaintiffs' apartment to have been in violation of the defendants'...