Goree v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-7121,91-7121
• Citation: 958 F.2d 1537
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,150 Gregory S. GOREE, Plaintiff-Appellant, Renee Goree, Plaintiff, v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee, General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, a corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1537

958 F.2d 1537

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,150

Gregory S. GOREE, Plaintiff-Appellant Renee Goree, Plaintiff, v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, a corporation, Defendants.

No. 91-7121.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 22, 1992.

David McCall Andres, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Samuel H. Franklin, Mac M. Moorer, Lightfoot, Franklin, White & Lucas, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and HENDERSON and CLARK ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The plaintiff-appellant, Gregory S. Goree, filed this action for damages pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD") against Winnebago Industries, Inc. ("Winnebago") for burns suffered to his feet while driving his Winnebago motor home. Following the close of discovery, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of Winnebago and entered final judgment on its behalf. On appeal, Goree contends that the court erred by concluding that (1) he could not establish liability under the AEMLD without first presenting expert testimony to prove the existence of a defect in the product, (2) because he was a paraplegic and had no feeling in his feet, he was not an "ordinary consumer" of the motor home within the meaning of Alabama law, and (3) the installation of hand controls to the motor home constituted a substantial modification of the vehicle so as to remove Goree's injury from the scope of Winnebago's liability. We conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by a jury, and therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.

An order granting summary judgment is subject to independent review on appeal. Thrasher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 734 F.2d 637 (11th Cir.1984). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of "identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any ...' " which show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Summary judgment is then appropriate as a matter of law against the nonmoving party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met his burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. (citing

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-9, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-9, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).

I.

The motor home that is the subject matter of this litigation is a 1988 Winnebago Chieftain. General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") manufactured the Chieftain's chassis, which includes the frame rails, engine, transmission, wheels, tires and steering column, and sold the chassis to Winnebago. Winnebago completed the motor home by installing the body of the vehicle, including a steel floorboard underneath the driver's seat and carpeting on top of the floorboard. General Motors was not responsible for the design, manufacture or installation of the Chieftain's body.

Goree purchased the Chieftain as a used vehicle from the original purchaser in early 1989. Being a paraplegic, Goree installed hand controls to enable him to operate the motor home. On July 29, 1989, he drove the Chieftain, without wearing shoes, on a six hour trip from Memphis to Nashville, Tennessee. The floorboard became so hot that he suffered second and third degree burns to his right heel during the trip. He underwent successful skin graft surgery to treat the burns two weeks later.

Goree filed suit against General Motors and Winnebago on February 7, 1990. His complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Chieftain was defective under the AEMLD. During discovery, he identified two expert witnesses expected to testify on his behalf at trial. Both defendants deposed each witness. The first witness, Dr. Walter Schaetzle, an engineering expert, testified that his measurements of the floorboard temperatures of Goree's Chieftain were as high as one hundred and seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit above the carpeting on the driver's side. In his opinion, the installation of a heat shield between the exhaust manifold and the floorboard would lower the floorboard temperature between twenty and forty degrees, and that the cost of such a heat shield would be less than twenty-five dollars. The second expert witness, Dr. Blair Behringer, is an orthopaedic surgeon. He stated that temperatures between one hundred and eight and one hundred and ten degrees Fahrenheit will cause burn injuries to a person's foot if it is exposed to sustained heat radiation of that magnitude for a sufficient period of time. Dr. Behringer noted that a person with normal sensation to heat would probably not maintain contact with such an uncomfortably hot object long enough to incur a serious burn injury. However, he went on to state that the requisite length of exposure sufficient to sustain a burn injury decreases as the subject temperature rises. A long exposure to a relatively low temperature can cause a burn injury just as can a short exposure to a high temperature. Additionally, Dr. Behringer explained that an injury can occur at a low temperature even though the victim is not initially aware of it. In his judgment, the time it takes for a person with normal sensation to heat to incur a burn is the same as for a person, such as a paraplegic, with no sensibility to heat.

After discovery, General Motors and Winnebago each moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motions on three grounds. First, the court held that Goree had failed to produce any expert testimony that the Chieftain was defective, and therefore could not establish a prima facie case under the AEMLD. Second, it found as a matter of law that the Chieftain was not defective because it was safe for its intended use by an ordinary consumer who could sense heat. The court held that the Chieftain was never intended to be used by a paraplegic who was not wearing shoes. Finally, the court held as a matter of law that the motor home had been substantially modified by the installation of the hand controls, and that his injuries would not have occurred but for this modification. Goree appeals only the district court judgment in favor of Winnebago. Consequently, General Motors is not a party to this appeal.

II.

The AEMLD is a judicially developed products liability doctrine. See Sears,

                Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So.2d 991 (Ala.1981);  Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976).   It is a modified version of strict liability that premises liability upon the sale by a manufacturer of a defective product.   To establish a prima facie case against a manufacturer under the AEMLD, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant manufacturer sold a defective product, (2) the defect was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury and is traceable to the defendant, and (3) the product reached the plaintiff without substantial modification to the condition in which it was sold.  Sears, Roebuck, 395 So.2d at 994
                

A.

Under the first element of the prima facie case, a defect in a product is defined as "that which renders a product 'unreasonably dangerous,' i.e., not fit for its intended purpose...." Casrell, 335 So.2d at 133. "Defective" means that "the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to its safety." Id. A plaintiff does not have to establish the specific defect that caused his injury, only that the product was unreasonably dangerous. Sears, Roebuck, 395 So.2d at 995.

After reviewing the record, and drawing all factual inferences in favor of Goree, we conclude that he has made a sufficient showing that the Chieftain was unreasonably dangerous to an ordinary consumer when sold by Winnebago. The testimony discloses that the temperatures generated above the carpeting of the floorboard on the driver's side were more than sixty-five degrees above that which would normally cause burn injuries. In light of Dr. Behringer's opinion that higher temperatures require a shorter period of exposure to result in harm, and that a person can be burned at lower temperatures without being aware of the injury initially, the district court improperly decided as a matter of law that the Winnebago was not defective. Goree produced sufficient evidence to present a question of fact for the jury, which is ordinarily charged with the duty to decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. See Entrekin v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 519 So.2d 447, 449 (Ala.1987); Casrell, 335 So.2d at 133.

We also conclude that the district court overstated its case when it held that expert testimony is always required to establish a defect under the AEMLD. While such testimony may be necessary when the product alleged to be defective is complex and technical in nature, expert testimony is not required when a jury could reasonably infer from the product's failure "under all the attendant circumstances" that its defective condition caused the plaintiff's injury. Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala.1991); Sears, Roebuck, 395 So.2d at 995. The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case as long as he...