Gorman ex rel. Gorman v. Ravesi

• Decision Date: 31 December 1998
• Citation: 684 N.Y.S.2d 386,256 A.D.2d 1134
• Parties: 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 12,011 Shannon GORMAN, an Infant, by Her Father and Natural Guardian, Kevin GORMAN, and Kevin Gorman, Individually, Appellants, v. Peter RAVESI, et al., Defendants, and City of Fulton, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 386

684 N.Y.S.2d 386

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 12,011

Shannon GORMAN, an Infant, by Her Father and Natural Guardian, Kevin GORMAN, and Kevin Gorman, Individually, Appellants, v. Peter RAVESI, et al., Defendants, and City of Fulton, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Fourth Department.

Dec. 31, 1998.

Finkelstein, Levine, Gittelsohn by Julio Urrutia, George Kohl, Newburgh, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Woods, Oviatt, Gilman, Sturman & Clarke, L.L.P. by Bernadette Weaver-Catalana, Rochester, for Defendant-Respondent.

Present: DENMAN, P.J., HAYES, BALIO, BOEHM and FALLON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In this action for damages arising out of personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Shannon Gorman, plaintiffs allege that defendant City of Fulton (City) was negligent in failing to remove promptly a large accumulation of snow from a City sidewalk, forcing Shannon to walk onto the adjoining roadway, where she was struck by an automobile operated by defendant Peter Ravesi. Supreme Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the City had not been furnished with prior written notice of the sidewalk's condition, as required by section C230 (B) of the City Code.

There are limited exceptions to statutory prior notice requirements that obviate the necessity of pleading and proving prior written notice (see, Blake v. City of Albany, 63 A.D.2d 1075, 405 N.Y.S.2d 832, affd. on other grounds 48 N.Y.2d 875, 424 N.Y.S.2d 358, 400 N.E.2d 300; see also, Adam v. Town of Oneonta, 217 A.D.2d 894, 629 N.Y.S.2d 857; Klimek v. Town of Ghent, 114 A.D.2d 614, 494 N.Y.S.2d 453; cf., Lalley v. Adam, Meldrum & Anderson Co., 186 A.D.2d 1083, 588 N.Y.S.2d 500). In opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs asserted as an exception to the general rule that the City's affirmative acts of negligence created or caused the defective condition (see, Kiernan v. Thompson, 73 N.Y.2d 840, 537 N.Y.S.2d 122, 534 N.E.2d 39; Bisulco v City of New York, 186 A.D.2d 84, 588 N.Y.S.2d 26). The City's failure to remove snow and ice constitutes nonfeasance (see, Radicello v. Village of Spring Val., 115 A.D.2d 466, 495 N.Y.S.2d 702; see also, Piscione v. County of Oneida, 159 A.D.2d 982, 552 N.Y.S.2d 759), but a municipality's mere nonfeasance, as opposed to affirmative negligence, does not invoke the exception (see, Monteleone v. Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 74 N.Y.2d 917, 550 N.Y.S.2d 257, 549 N.E.2d 459; Pittel v. Town of Hempstead, 154 A.D.2d 581, 546...