Gorsky v. Guajardo
| Docket Number | 20-20084 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2023 |
| Parties | Jacob Gorsky; Olesya Gorsky, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Deputy Guajardo; Deputy Small; Deputy Berry; Deputy Rivaux, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:16-CV-2877
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Jacob and Olesya Gorsky lived next to the Koczman family in the Woodlands in Harris County, Texas. The two families did not get along, calling the police on one another many times. On the evening of February 20, 2016, Defendants-Appellants Deputy Guajardo, Deputy Small, Deputy Berry and Corporal Rivaux (the "officers") responded to complaints from the Koczman family regarding a rowdy pool party at the Gorsky residence and Mrs. Gorsky's alleged smashing of an egg on Mr. Koczman's car. Based on their ensuing interactions with the officers, the Gorskys brought claims against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Gorskys filed suit in the Southern District of Texas alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the officers' unlawful arrest of Mr. Gorsky, illegal entry and search of the Gorsky home, and use of excessive force against the Gorskys.
The district court partially denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and motion to strike certain summary judgment evidence, ultimately concluding that factual disputes affecting the reasonableness of the officers' conduct required denial of the officers' assertion of qualified immunity on certain claims. The officers timely appealed. At issue in this appeal are the Gorskys' claims for (1) unlawful arrest, (2) illegal entry, (3) illegal search, (4) excessive force concerning Mr. Gorsky, and (5) excessive force concerning Mrs. Gorsky. Because we lack jurisdiction to review certain claims at issue in this appeal as they turn on genuine disputes of material facts, we DISMISS the officers' appeal with regard to the unlawful search, unlawful entry and excessive force claims and otherwise AFFIRM the district court.
Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Jacob and Olesya Gorsky lived next door to the Koczman family for six years. Over these six years the two families placed at least 19 complaint calls about one another to the local police. The events surrounding this appeal arose in the late evening of February 20, 2016, when the Koczmans called the police to complain that the Gorskys were throwing a loud pool party. Two deputies-Berry and Guajardo-responded around midnight and, after issuing a warning to the Gorskys[1] to "quiet down," left the home.
Shortly thereafter, the Koczman family reported to the police that that Mrs. Gorsky had egged their car. Deputies Berry and Guajardo, this time accompanied by Deputy Small and Corporal Rivaux, arrived at the Koczman's home and, after viewing security camera footage of the egging, returned to the Gorsky residence.
The officers rang the doorbell and Mr. Gorsky opened the door. The police informed him of the egging complaint and that they needed to speak to his wife. Mr. Gorsky told the officers that he would get his wife but attempted to close the door on the police officers who, at that time, were standing outside. Rivaux and Berry refused to allow Mr. Gorsky to close the door by placing their feet in the threshold. After refusing to allow Mr. Gorsky to close the door multiple times, Rivaux told Mr. Gorsky that he was hindering an investigation and that they had "every legal right to enter [the] house put [Mr. Gorsky] in handcuffs, and take [him] to jail." Mr. Gorsky again agreed to go get his wife but asked the officers to leave his home, to which the officers replied "that is not an option." Guajardo handcuffed Mr. Gorsky and placed him in the police car where he remained for approximately one hour.[2] Mr. Gorsky testified that, when placing him in handcuffs, Guajardo grabbed him, pushed him around, and twisted his arm enough to cause him "a lot of pain."
Around this time, Mrs. Gorsky claims she "heard a commotion in [the] front foyer" and came to the front of the home where she found the officers standing inside her home. Mrs. Gorsky asserts that the officers then immediately put her in handcuffs and began aggressively accusing her of the egging. She stated that, while she was still in handcuffs, the officers pushed her into a chair, which caused bruising on her legs. Because Mrs. Gorsky had been sleeping, she was in some state of undress; and she testified that Rivaux pushed her as she attempted to cover herself and stuck "his fingers in [her] breasts." At some point during these events, Small went further into the house allegedly to check on Mrs. Gorsky's son. The parties dispute whether Mrs. Gorsky consented to the officers' entry into her home and whether she requested they check on her son. The officers then issued a criminal citation to Mrs. Gorsky, released Mr. Gorsky, and left the scene.
In their lawsuit, the Gorskys allege violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the officers' alleged unlawful arrest of Mr. Gorsky, illegal entry and search of the Gorsky home, and use of excessive force against the Gorskys. The officers moved for summary judgment rejecting these claims based, in part, on their assertions of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions[3] in their entirety, finding that factual disputes precluded it from granting the motions. The officers timely appealed.
An appellate court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion to strike for abuse of discretion. United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012). Our review is a "two-tiered" process when a party asks us to review both evidentiary rulings and a summary judgment decision. Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F2.d 822, 834 (5th Cir. 1993). We first "review the evidentiary rulings under the manifest error standard, then [we] review the trial court's summary judgment decision de novo." Id.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "[T]his court construes 'all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)). The denial of summary judgment is generally not appealable. Naylor v. State of La., Dep't of Corr., 123 F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Aldy v. Valmet Paper Mach., 74 F.3d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1996)). According to the collateral order doctrine, however, orders denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity are appealable when based on conclusions of law. Id.
While we have jurisdiction to review a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to the extent that it turns on conclusions of law, we do not have jurisdiction over a genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial of qualified immunity." Naylor, 123 F.3d at 857; Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2020). In other words, denials of qualified immunity on summary judgment are "not immediately appealable when based on sufficiency of evidence." Naylor, 123 F.3d at 857.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "[A] good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available." Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., Texas, 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020).
Once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that "(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was 'clearly established' at the time." Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Courts therefore evaluate claims of qualified immunity in a two-prong[4] analysis: first, a court must determine whether the "facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right." Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 401 (5th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Second, a court must determine whether "the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case." Id. To be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741.
The district court denied the officers' motion to strike certain statements in the Gorskys' affidavits attached to their response to the officers' motion for summary judgment. While the officers claimed that there were contradictions between the Gorskys' affidavits and their depositions, the district court found no inconsistency meriting exclusion of the affidavits.
Under the sham affidavit doctrine, a court may refuse to consider statements made in an affidavit that are "so markedly inconsistent" with a prior statement as to "constitute an obvious sham." Clark v Resistoflex Co., A Div. of Unidynamics Corp., 854...
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