Gorum v. Calderwood
| Decision Date | 20 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-00065-APG-GWF |
| Parties | ANTOINE GORUM, Plaintiff, v. CCII MS. CALDERWOOD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (#3), filed on January 23, 2015.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Calderwood violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by bringing false charges against him. The charges resulted in Plaintiff being unjustly placed in solitary confinement.
Plaintiff filed this instant action and attached a financial affidavit to his application and complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Reviewing Plaintiff's financial affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pre-pay the filing fee. As a result, Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court is granted.
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims thatare frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the PLRA, a federal court must dismiss a prisoner's claims, "if the allegation of poverty is untrue," or if the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint.
Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-1965 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id., See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g. claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g. fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the 1st, 8th, and 14th Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a path for the private enforcement of substantive rights created by the Constitution and Federal statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). A person acts under "color of law" if he "exercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49. A prison official acts under the color of state law when acting in their official capacity. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his First Amendment rights by falsifying charges against him that resulted in Plaintiff's stay in "the Hold." Plaintiff reports that he was locked in solitary confinement for 23 hours per day for 42 days. During this time, he was bitten by a poisonous spider. He alleges that the Defendant created the false disciplinary report to retaliate against Plaintiff for Plaintiff's pending lawsuit. He claims that Defendant told Plaintiff that "you'll know next time not to file no law suits on people's (sic)." (#13), p. 10.
In order to properly plead a retaliation claim under § 1983, a prisoner "must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The prisoner must also submit evidence to establish a link between the retaliatory action and the prisoner's exercise of his or her constitutional rights. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, the prisoner must establish that his First Amendment rights were actually chilled by the retaliatory action. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff pleads in his Second Amended Complaint that he was retaliated against for the filing of a lawsuit. The falsifying of disciplinary charges and the placement of Plaintiff in solitary confinement constitute retaliatory actions. Plaintiff established the link between the retaliatory action and the lawsuit through his quoting of Defendant saying "you'll know next time not to file no law suits on people's (sic)." However, Plaintiff does not establish that this retaliatory impact has chilled his First Amendment rights. He does not describe any interruption in his ability to carry on his lawsuit or in his willingness to continue with the case. In his Eighth Amendment complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to visit the law library or use the phone during his time in solitary confinement, but does not allege that these deprivations prevented him from exercising his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation claim with leave to amend.
Plaintiff argues that the falsifying of the disciplinary report and the 42 days he spent in solitary confinement "for nothing at all" constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff claims that he was unable to go to the law library, vocational class, church, or the chow-hall. He also claims he was bitten by a poisonous spider and was not given proper medical attention. Prison officials may only be held liable for injuries due to unsafe conditions of confinement "if they acted with 'deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm.'" Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp. 2d 1201, 1208 (D. Nev. 2010) quoting Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). There is a subjective and an objective element to the deliberate indifference standard. Antonetti, 748 F.Supp. 2d at 1208. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Id. quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994). Second, the prison official "must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and safety." Id. at 1209 quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Plaintiff, in his First Amendment complaint, described the Defendant as displaying "deliberate indifference" to the Plaintiff's safety. He specifically cites the poisonous spider bite that he suffered while in solitary confinement that he alleges was not treated for one and a half months. "[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under §1983." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). "Denial of medical attention to prisoners constitutes an eighth amendment violation if the denial amounts to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of the prisoners." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.23d 1090, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). When a prisoner alleges that his medical treatment was delayed, he must also allege that the delay in treatment led to further injury. Antonetti, 748 F.Supp. 2d at 1209 citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead a claim for an 8th Amendment violation under § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he was "throwing up and in pain." (#13), p. 9. He does not make any claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs: there is no information in the complaint to indicate that the Defendant specifically knew that he had been poisoned, or that the Defendant declined to provide him with medical treatment.
Plaint...
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