Goulbourne v. Goulbourne
| Decision Date | 17 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2018-CA-001536-MR,2018-CA-001536-MR |
| Parties | SHAUN CHRISTOPHER GOULBOURNE APPELLANT v. AMY ANISSA GOULBOURNE APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM BARREN FAMILY COURT
Shaun and Anissa were married seven years and have one child together. An order containing interlocutory findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage was entered on August 23, 2017. On October 2, 2017, the parties entered a partial agreement concerning custody of, timesharing with, and support for their minor child, as well as the division of certain debts and property. A hearing concerning the division and characterization of the remaining debts and property, as well as a determination of maintenance, was held on May 4, 2018. Shaun and Anissa were the only witnesses to testify. Following the hearing, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The family court adopted Anissa's proposed findings and conclusions and incorporated them into its supplemental decree of dissolution of marriage entered on June 15, 2018. Thereafter, Shaun moved the family court to set aside and make additional findings, for a new trial, and to alter, amend, or vacate the order. The motion was denied on September 14, 2018, and this appeal followed.
The standard of an appellate court's review of a trial court's findings of fact is well-settled.
The trial court heard the evidence and saw the witnesses. It is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate the situation. Gates v. Gates, [412 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1967)]; McCormick v. Lewis, [328 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1959)]. The court below made findings of fact which may be set aside only if clearly erroneous. Hall v. Hall, [386 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1964)]; CR 52.01, 7 Kentucky Practice, Clay 103. We do not find that they are. They are not 'manifestly against the weight of evidence.' Ingram v. Ingram, [385 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1964)]; Craddock v. Kaiser, 280 Ky. 577, 133 S.W.2d 916 [(1939)]. A reversal may not be predicated on mere doubt as to the correctness of the decision. Buckner v. Buckner, 295 Ky. 410, 174 S.W.2d 695 [(1943)]. When the evidence is conflicting, as here, we cannot and will not substitute our decision for the judgment of the chancellor. Gates v. Gates, supra; Renfro v. Renfro, [291 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1956)].
Wells v. Wells, 412 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1967) (emphasis added). In the case herein, similar to the question presented in Wells, "[w]e do not doubt that the [family court] was correct, however, we recognize the very close question which was presented." Id.
And, the dispositive question that we must answer, therefore, is whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, i.e., whether or not those findings are supported by substantial evidence. "[S]ubstantial evidence" is "[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion" and evidence that, when "taken alone or in the light of all the evidence,. . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses" because judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court. Thus, "[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal," and appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the crux of this case is whether the family court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. On careful review, we hold that the family court's findings are indeed supported by substantial evidence; therefore, we must affirm.
On review, "we defer to the trial court's factual findings, upsetting them only if clearly erroneous or if unsupported by substantial evidence, but we review without deference the trial court's identification and application of legal principles." Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001). "[W]e review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts to determine whether its decision is correct as a matter of law." Maloney v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Ky. 2016).
On appeal, Shaun raises six arguments of error by the family court requiring reversal: (1) failure to follow CR2 52.01 was reversible error; (2) the award of maintenance was an abuse of discretion not supported by the evidence; (3) the erroneous determination of marital debt; (4) the erroneous finding that a portion of Anissa's increase in retirement benefits was nonmarital; (5) failure to divide property in just proportions; and (6) failure to require Anissa to comply with prior orders. We will address each argument, in turn.
Shaun's first argument concerns procedural error. He maintains that the family court failed to follow CR 52.01, constituting reversible error. CR 52.01 provides "the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment." Despite the fact the order was titled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree of Dissolution of Marriage," Shaun alleges the trial court failed to make any conclusions of law. Although the family court did not use the label "conclusions of law" in the body of its order to describe its legal analysis, it complied in substance with this requirement. See Lynch v. Dawson Collieries, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 494, 496-97 (Ky. 1972). While we strongly admonish that thebetter practice is to specifically and separately set out a court's conclusions of law, here, we agree with Anissa that the family court's conclusions may be gleaned from the "Analysis" section of its order.
Shaun also takes issue with the fact the family court adopted the entirety of Anissa's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and rejected his. Again, while this is not the better practice, Kentucky courts have permitted this procedure with certain considerations.
Our concern . . . is that the trial court does not abdicate its fact-finding and decision-making responsibility under CR 52.01. However, the delegation of the clerical task of drafting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law under the proper circumstances does not violate the trial court's responsibility.
Bingham v. Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ky. 1982).
In Bingham, the court "prudently examined the proposed findings and conclusions and made several additions and corrections to reflect [its] decision in the case." Id. Here, although the proposed findings and conclusions were adopted verbatim by the family court, there is no evidence that such adoption was "mechanical." Id. For reasons discussed herein, the family court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it correctly applied the law to the facts, and it did not abuse its discretion in awarding maintenance. Like Bingham:
[t]here has been no showing that the decision-making process was not under the control of the trial judge, nor that these findings and conclusions were not the productof the deliberations of the trial judge's mind. The evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the findings of fact and conclusions of law announced by the court and in the absence of a showing that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion and delegated his decision-making responsibility under CR 52.01, they are not to be easily rejected.
Id. at 629-30. Thus, Shaun has failed to offer sufficient reason for us to reverse the trial court on this issue.
Shaun's second complaint concerns maintenance. Here, he takes a shotgun approach in maintaining that the family court's award of maintenance was an abuse of discretion and not supported by the evidence.
An award of maintenance comes within the sound discretion of the trial court; however, a reviewing court will not uphold the award if it finds that the trial court abused its discretion or based its decision upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Ky. 1992). Additionally, an award of maintenance must satisfy the statutory provisions of KRS3 403.200, which provides:
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