Goulis v. Judge of Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex

• Decision Date: 20 June 1923
• Citation: 246 Mass. 1
• Parties: DAVID GOULIS v. JUDGE OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN MIDDLESEX.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

246 Mass. 1

DAVID GOULIS v. JUDGE OF THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN MIDDLESEX.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 20, 1923

November 20, 1922.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, & PIERCE, JJ.

Intoxicating Liquor. Jurisdiction. District Court. Writ of Prohibition.

Under the U.S. Rev Sts. Section 1014, and Title II, Section 2 of the national prohibition act, 41 U.S. Sts. at Large, 308, a judge of a district court of this Commonwealth at his option has jurisdiction to act as a magistrate committing for hearing before the United States

District Court of the District of Massachusetts one charged with the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors in violation of Title II,

Section 25 of the act. Such exercise of jurisdiction by a judge of a district court of the

Commonwealth is not contrary to any provision of the Constitution or of any statute of the Commonwealth, is not contrary to public policy and is within the scope of art. 18 of the Amendments to the Federal

Constitution.

The words of U.S Rev. Sts. Section 1014, as applied to a judge of a district court of this Commonwealth exereising his option to assume jurisdiction within its terms, do not mean that the judge must make an arrest in person, but their requirement is that in exercising such jurisdiction, he shall cause the arrest to be made according to the usual forms of proeedure and methods employed in this Commonwealth, under which his functions are the issuance of a warrant upon complaint duly made and the conducting of a hearing to determine whether there is just cause for holding the accused for trial before the federal court.

The District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts is the federal court to which one held by a judge of a district court of the Commonwealth under U.S. Rev. Sts. Section 1014 for a violation of the federal prohibition act should be committed for trial.

A judge of a district court of this Commonwealth, who has heard a complaint against one charged with keeping and exposing intoxicating liquors for sale unlawfully and has ordered returned certain liquors, whose seizure upon a search warrant formed the basis of the charge against the defendant, has jurisdiction, upon a complaint being made before him by a federal prohibition agent for violation of the federal prohibition act and upon such agent's application that the liquors be held for the federal government, to change his mind and to revoke his former order of return; and the correctness of such final decree is not open on a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent him from carrying it out.

The writ of prohibition does not issue for the correction of erroneous decisions by a court acting within its jurisdiction, but only to restrain excess of jurisdiction.

PETITION, filed on March 3, 1922, for a writ of probihition prohibiting and enjoining the justice of the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex from removing beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this Commonwealth an application for a warrant for violation of the federal prohibition act and from transmitting the papers and records of that cause to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and directing the revocation of an order of that judge that certain liquor be held for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and that the judge "be prohibited and enjoined from taking any further action in the premises . . . until a determination shall be made by this court of his jurisdiction to act in the same premises."

The petition was heard by Carroll, J., upon an agreed statement of facts. Material facts are described in the opinion. The single justice ordered the writ to issue as prayed for and reported the case for determination by the full court.

The case was submitted on briefs. H. A. Leventhal, for the petitioner.

H. Caverly, for the respondent.

RUGG, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondent who is the justice of the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex. Complaint was made before said court on February 9, 1922, charging the present petitioner with keeping and exposing intoxicating liquor with intent to sell contrary to the laws of this Commonwealth.

On trial he was found not guilty and order was made to return to him liquor seized from him on search warrant and presented as evidence. Thereafter on February 24, 1922, complaint was made by a federal prohibition agent to the respondent charging the petitioner with violation of Section 25, Title II, of the Act of Congress of October 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 U.S. Sts. at Large, 315, known as the national prohibition act, namely, the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, a crime under the laws of the United States but not a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth. A warrant issued on that complaint and the petitioner was brought before the respondent. Motion to dismiss the complaint was denied and, after hearing, the respondent found that there was probable cause to believe that the then defendant, the present petitioner, had violated the law of the United States as charged in the complaint, and held the defendant on bail for his appearance before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; but proceedings were stayed in order to enable the defendant, petitioner here, to pursue any remedy to test the validity of the acts of the respondent, who purposes unless otherwise ordered to prepare papers for transmittal to the said United States District Court.

The respondent assumed that he had jurisdiction to act by virtue of authority conferred upon him by U.S. Rev. Sts. Section 1014, which is as follows: "For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any commissioner of a circuit court to take bail, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any State where he may be found, and agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case. And where any offender or witness is committed in any district other than that where the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for his removal to the district where the trial is to be had." That section is made applicable to the enforcement of the national prohibition act by its express terms in Title II, Section 2, 41 U.S. Sts. at Large, 308.

The respondent does not contend that the laws of this Commonwealth authorize the action taken by him. His position is that, being a judge of a district court of this Commonwealth, he was clothed with authority to do that which he did by the section of the federal statute already quoted. That section was first enacted by U.S. St. 1789, c. 20, Section 33, and has been in force continuously since then. Its scope and meaning are within the final jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The general subject has several times been considered by that tribunal. It was said by Mr. Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, at page 622: "As to the authority so conferred upon State magistrates, while a difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different States, whether State magistrates are bound to act under it, none is entertained by this Court that State magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by State legislation." In United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519, 520, a case for the assessment of damages in a State court arising from a taking by the federal government in its exercise of the power of eminent domain, is found this statement: "That government [the United States of America] can create all the officers and tribunals required for the execution of its powers. . . . Yet from the time of its establishment that government has been in the habit of using, with the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and institutions as its agents. Their use had not been deemed violative of any principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign authority of the federal government; but as a matter of convenience and as tending to a great saving of expense.

"The use of the courts of the States in applying the rules of naturalization prescribed by Congress, the exercise at one time by the State justices of the peace of the power of committing magistrates for violations of federal law, and the use of State penitentiaries for the confinement of convicts under such laws, are instances of the employment of State tribunals and State institutions in the execution of powers of the general government. At different times various duties have been imposed by acts of Congress on State tribunals they have been invested with jurisdiction in civil suits and over complaints and prosecutions for fines, penalties, and forfeitures arising under laws of the United States. 1 Kent, 400. And though the jurisdiction thus conferred could not be enforced against the consent of the States, yet, when its exercise was not incompatible with State duties, and the States made no objection to it, the decisions rendered by the...