Goulis v. Stone

• Decision Date: 22 June 1923
• Citation: 140 N.E. 294,246 Mass. 1
• Parties: GOULIS v. STONE, District Court Justice.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

246 Mass. 1

140 N.E. 294

GOULIS

v.STONE, District Court Justice.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 22, 1923.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petition by David Goulis for a writ of prohibition, directed to Arthur P. Stone, Justice of the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex, to prohibit him from transmitting the papers and records of a cause before him tothe United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Reported by a single justice, after an order that the writ issue, on the petition, answer, the amendment thereto, and an agreed statement of facts, for the determination of the full court. Petition dismissed.

A complaint had been made charging the petitioner with a violation of the Volstead Act. The respondent after a hearing found that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had violated such act and intended, unless restrained, to order the papers transmitted to the United States District Court, under Rev. St. U. S. § 1014 (U. S. Comp. St. § 1674), and had also ordered that certain liquors seized under a search warrant should be turned over to the United States government.Harold A. Leventhal, of Boston, for petitioner.

Harold Caverly, of Boston, for respondent.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondent, who is the justice of the Third district court of Eastern Middlesex. Complaint was made before said court on February 9, 1922, charging the present petitioner with keeping and exposing intoxicating liquor with intent to sell contrary to the laws of this commonwealth.On trial he was found not guilty and order was made to return to him liquor seized from him on search warrant and presented as evidence. Thereafter on February 24, 1922, complaint was made by a federal prohibition agent to the respondent, charging the petitioner with violation of section 25, title 2, of the Act of Congress of October 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, known as the National Prohibition Act, namely, the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, a crime under the laws of the United States, but not a crime under the laws of this commonwealth. A warrant issued on that complaint and the petitioner was brought before the respondent. Motion to dismiss the complaint was denied and after hearing the respondent found that there was probable cause to believe that the then defendant, the present petitioner, had violated the law of the United States as charged in the complaint, and held the defendant on bail for his appearance before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; but proceedings were stayed in order to enable the defendant, petitioner here, to pursue any remedy to test the validity of the acts of the respondent, who purposes unless otherwise ordered to prepare papers for transmittal to the said United States District Court.

The respondent assumed that he had jurisdiction to act by virtue of authority conferred upon him by section 1014, Rev. St. U. S. which is as follows:

‘For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any commissioner of a Circuit Court to take bail, or by any chancellor, judge of a Supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where he may be found, and agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case. And where any offender or witness is committed in any district other than that where the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for his removal to the district where the trial is to be had.’

That section is made applicable to the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act by its express terms in title 2, § 2.

The respondent does not contend that the laws of this commonwealth authorize the action taken by him. His position is that, being a judge of a district court of this commonwealth, he was clothed with authority to do that which he did by the section of the federal statute already quoted. That section was first enacted by St. 1789, c. 20, § 33 (1 Stat. U. S. p. 91), and has been in force continuously since then. Its scope and meaning are within the final jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The general subject has several times been considered by that tribunal. It was said by Mr. Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, at page 622 (10 L. Ed. 1060):

‘As to the authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still, on the point, in different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it, none is entertained by this court, that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.’

In United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519, 520, 3 Sup. Ct. 346, 351 (27 L. Ed. 1015), a case for the assessment of damages in a state court arising from a taking by the federal government in its exercise of the power of eminent domain, is found this statement:

‘That government [the United States of America] can create all the officers and tribunals required for the execution of its powers. * * * Yet from the time of its establishment that government has been in the habit of using, with the consent of the states, their officers, tribunals, and institutions as its agents. Their use has not been deemed violative of any principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign authority of the federal government, but as a matter of convenience and as tending to a great saving of expense.

‘The use of the courts of the states in applying the rules of naturalization prescribed by Congress, the exercise at one time by state justices of the peace of the power of committing magistrates for violations of federal law, and the use of state penitentiaries for the confinement of convicts under such laws, are instances of the employment of state tribunals and state institutions in the execution of powers of the general government. At different times various duties have been imposed by acts of Congress on state tribunals; they have been invested with jurisdiction in civil suits and over complaints and prosecutions for fines, penalties, and forfeitures arising under laws of the United States. I Kent, 400. And though the jurisdiction thus conferred could not be enforced against the consent of the states, yet, when its exercise was not incompatible with state duties, and the states made no objection to it, the decisions rendered by the state tribunals were upheld.’

There was involved in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715, the validity of a federal statute authorizing justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and deliver them on board their vessel. In upholding that statute it was said (165 U. S. at page 279, 17 Sup. Ct. at page 328 ) that:

‘Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of record; such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of the judicial power itself. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte Gist, 26 Alabama, 156, wherein the authority of justices of the peace and other such officers to arrest and commit for a violation of the criminal law of the United States was held to be no part of the Judicial power within the third article of the Constitution’ of the United States.

Although it was held that an arrest by the chief of police was illegal, because outside the scope of the federal statute, in Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U. S. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. 422, 49 L. Ed. 709, it was said (197 U. S. at page 174, 25 Sup. Ct. at page 424 ):

‘It has long been held that power may be conferred upon a state officer, as such, to execute a duty imposed under an act of Congress, and the officer may execute the same, unless its execution is prohibited by the Constitution or legislation of the state.’

The validity of said section 1014 stands on the same footing as naturalization laws of Congress, conferring jurisdiction over that subject upon state tribunals, which is firmly established. Gladhill, Petitioner, 8 Metc. 168;Stephens, Petitioner, 4 Gray, 559, 561;County of Hampden v. Morris, 207 Mass. 167, 93 N. E. 579, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 815;County of Berkshire v. Cande, 222 Mass. 87, 109 N. E. 838;Holmgren v. United States, 217 U. S. 509, 30 Sup. Ct. 588, 54 L. Ed. 861, 19 Ann. Cas. 778.

The validity of said section 1014 has been recognized in numerous decisions. McIntosh v. Bullard, 95 Ark. 227, 230, 129 S. W. 85;Levin v. United States, 63 C. C. A. 476, 480,128 Fed. 826;Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 206, 94 S. W. 388;Harris v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 15, 196 Pac. 895. So far as we are aware there are...