Gourdin v. Agin
Decision Date | 17 June 2010 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 09-16884-FJB.,BAP No. MB 09-070. |
Citation | 431 B.R. 885 |
Parties | David A. GOURDIN, Sr., Debtor.David A. Gourdin, Sr., Appellant,v.Warren E. Agin, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, First Circuit |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Norman Novinsky, Esq., on brief for Appellant.
Warren E. Agin, Esq., on brief for Appellee.
Before LAMOUTTE, VAUGHN, and KORNREICH, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.
David A. Gourdin, Sr., is the debtor in this case. Warren E. Agin, the chapter 7 trustee, objected to the debtor's claim of a homestead exemption in his former marital residence under Massachusetts law on grounds that the state probate court had divested the debtor of his interest in that property in a divorce action prior to bankruptcy. This appeal by the debtor is from the order of the bankruptcy court sustaining the trustee's objection. We AFFIRM.
The debtor and Michelle Gourdin were married in 1986 and purchased their marital residence in 1989.1 In 1994, the debtor declared their marital residence to be a homestead under Massachusetts law. In December, 2006, the debtor moved out of the residence and out of state. Michelle and their two minor children continued to occupy the marital residence. The debtor returned to Massachusetts in 2007, but he did not return to the residence. Divorce proceedings were commenced and fully litigated to a final disposition in the Massachusetts probate court. In the resulting “Judgment of Divorce Nisi” entered on April 30, 2008,2 the probate court awarded the residence to Michelle and ordered the debtor to “forthwith convey all right, title and interest” to her. She became obligated to sell the residence after their youngest child turned 18 or upon his graduation from high school, whichever occurred later. The judgment authorized Michelle to retain a specified amount of money from the net proceeds of sale to reimburse her for the liens for which the debtor was responsible and allowed her to keep a sum equal to unpaid child support due at the time of sale. The remaining proceeds were to be divided 75% to Michelle and 25% to the debtor. Under the scheme ordered by the probate court, the debtor was to retain no interest in the marital residence beyond a claim against Michelle for 25% of the net proceeds of sale.
The debtor failed to convey his interest in the residence to Michelle. She sought relief for this failure in the probate court. In an order entered on May 5, 2009, entitled “Appointment Pursuant to Rule 70” (the “divestment order”),3 the probate court divested the debtor of title and vested his title in a master “who shall have full power and authority to convey defendant's interest to [Michelle], as per the Judgment of Divorce dated April 30, 2008.” The master executed a deed conveying the marital residence to Michelle on June 18, 2009. She recorded the deed on August 5, 2009.
The debtor filed his chapter 7 petition on July 21, 2009, two weeks before Michelle recorded the deed. He listed a 25% interest in the marital residence on his schedule of real property and showed the net value of that interest to be $85,143.00, based upon a fair market value of $358,000.00 less a 5% broker's commission.4 He also claimed a homestead exemption under Massachusetts law.5
In a timely objection to the debtor's homestead exemption, the trustee argued that the debtor could not claim the residence to be exempt under Massachusetts law for two reasons: first, the probate court had transferred full title in the residence to Michelle prior to bankruptcy; and, second, the debtor had abandoned the residence. According to the trustee, the debtor's sole claim arising from the residence was a right to receive a portion of the proceeds of sale, a right that is not protected by the Massachusetts Homestead Act.
In the debtor's response to the trustee's objection, he admitted the entry of the divorce judgment after trial. He also admitted the essential content of that judgment without conceding its finality.6 The debtor also admitted the entry and content of the divestment order without challenging its finality. Yet, despite those admissions he insisted that his interest in the residence had not been terminated by the probate court because his “title was not transferred until after bankruptcy.” According to the debtor's reckoning, as the holder of record title, he was entitled to exempt his claim to the proceeds of sale. The debtor also asserted that the transfer of title and post-bankruptcy recording of the deed by Michelle were violations of the automatic stay.7
The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection and disallowed the debtor's homestead exemption, following a hearing, in a minute order stating:
This appeal followed.
A bankruptcy appellate panel may hear appeals from “final judgments, orders and decrees [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) ] or with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) ].” Fleet Data Processing Corp. v. Branch (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 218 B.R. 643, 645 (1st Cir. BAP 1998). “A decision is final if it ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Id. at 646 (citations omitted). An order granting or denying a claimed exemption is a final, appealable order. Aroesty v. Bankowski (In re Aroesty), 385 B.R. 1, 3 (1st Cir. BAP 2008); Hildebrandt v. Collins (In re Hildebrandt), 320 B.R. 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. BAP 2005).
A bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. School Dist., 592 F.3d 267, 269 (1st Cir.2010). Our review of this matter is de novo because the facts are undisputed. U.S. v. Rogers, 521 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir.2008). We may affirm a decision of the bankruptcy court on any basis apparent in the record. See Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2010).
Two assertions of error are raised by the debtor on appeal: first, that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the trustee had met his burden of proof on his objection to the homestead exemption claim; and, second, that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the divorce judgment and divestment order had terminated the debtor's homestead interest in the marital residence. We begin our analysis with an overview of the applicable bankruptcy law.
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).8 A bankruptcy estate is comprised of all legal and equitable interests of a debtor in property as of the commencement of the case with limited exceptions.9See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Pasquina v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham), 513 F.3d 318, 323 (1st Cir.2008). “ Section 541 is construed broadly to bring in any and all of the debtor's property rights within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and the umbrella of protections granted by the Bankruptcy Code, and to promote the goal of equality of distribution.” Abboud v. The Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 335 B.R. 253, 259 (1st Cir. BAP 2005) (citing U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983)) aff'd, 482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2007). Federal law will determine whether an interest in property is property of the estate, but state law will determine what constitutes a legal or equitable...
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