Gourley v. Crossett Public Schools

Decision Date07 May 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-974,97-974
Citation968 S.W.2d 56,333 Ark. 178
Parties, 13 IER Cases 1747 Carolyn GOURLEY, Appellant, v. CROSSETT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Max Pope, Barbara Gates, Barbara Cantley, David Barnes, Ben Walsh, Robert Cornelius, Bill Rogers, and Michael Simms; Individually And In Their Official Capacities as Former and Present Members of The Board of Directors of The Crossett Public Schools, Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Richard W. Roachell, Little Rock, for Appellant.

Dan F. Bufford, Brian Allen Brown, Little Rock, Thomas S. Streetman, Crossett, for Appellee.

THORNTON, Justice.

Appellant Carolyn Gourley appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees, who are the Crossett Public Schools and former and current members of the District's Board of Directors (the District). The trial court ruled that Ms. Gourley's claim for the intentional tort of outrage is barred by the doctrine of election of remedies because she had previously accepted benefits from the Workers' Compensation Commission. We agree and affirm.

At the time of her complaint for workers' compensation benefits, Ms. Gourley was a seventh grade mathematics teacher at Daniel Middle School in the Crossett Public School District. In 1989, the school installed a new heating and air conditioning system, damaging the roof in the process. As a result of the installation, leaks developed causing mold to grow in the school's classrooms. The mold aggravated Ms. Gourley's pre-existing allergies, which in turn, led to persistent sinus infections. In the ensuing years, she made numerous visits to her doctors and underwent several surgical procedures as a result of her allergy to mold and sinus complications.

Ms. Gourley filed a claim with the workers' compensation commission in January, 1993. After the administrative law judge ruled in her favor, the District appealed to the full Commission, which affirmed the decision in favor of Ms. Gourley in 1995. The District then appealed to the court of appeals, which concluded that Ms. Gourley's exposure to mold with resulting sinus difficulties was a compensable-compensation claim. See Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Gourley, 50 Ark.App. 1, 899 S.W.2d 482 (1995). Ms. Gourley subsequently collected workers' compensation benefits.

Ms. Gourley filed the current suit against the District, arguing that the District acted with deliberate intent to cause her job-related injuries. In her November, 1995 amended complaint, Ms. Gourley asserted that this action falls within the intentional-tort exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. She claimed that the District's acts amounted to the tort of outrage when (1) Superintendent Barbara Gates, knowing of Ms. Gourley's delicate physical and emotional health, failed to correct the mold problem at Daniel Middle School; (2) Superintendent Gates transferred Ms. Gourley to Hastings Elementary School in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim; (3) Principal Daniel Barnes committed various acts of harassment, including telling Ms. Gourley that she could not use mold trays to support her workers' compensation claim and warned her not to talk to anyone about the mold problem at Daniel Middle School.

The District moved for summary judgment, contending that Ms. Gourley's claim was barred by the exclusive-remedy doctrine of the Workers' Compensation Act, and was further barred by the common-law election of remedies doctrine. Without reaching the issue of the tort of outrage, the trial court granted the District's motion as a matter of law, concluding that the doctrine of election of remedies precludes a subsequent tort claim arising from the same set of facts.

We first mention Ms. Gourley's argument that the Worker's Compensation Act does not bar her tort of outrage claim against the District. Ms. Gourley contends that the District's acts and omissions were done intentionally to cause her personal injury, thereby coming within the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision.

Generally, an employer who carries workers' compensation insurance is immune from liability for damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee. Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical Med. Ctr., 317 Ark. 5, 8, 875 S.W.2d 507, 509 (1994); Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 230, 812 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1991). This rule, known as the exclusivity doctrine, arises from Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105 (Supp.1996), which provides that "[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee...."

Ms. Gourley relies on certain court-defined narrow exceptions to this general rule. We have noted several times that an employer who willfully and intentionally injures an employee is not immune from a common-law tort action. See Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993); Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1...

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    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • September 4, 2015
    ...benefits without waiving the right to sue the employer. Or.Rev.Stat.§ 656.156(2); W. Va.Code§ 23–4–2(c).9 Gourley v. Crossett Pub. Sch.,333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56, 58 (1998); Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc.,932 So.2d 1100, 1106–07 (Fla.2006); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co.,81 Ill.2d 229,......
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    ...from filing a tort action against an employer for the infliction of intentional or willful injuries. See, e.g., Gourley v. Crossett Pub. Sch., 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56 (1998); Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297 1. These findings by the ALJ were thereafter adopted by the Full......
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    ...compensation insurance is immune from liability for damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee. Gourley v. Crossett Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56 (1998). This rule, known as the exclusivity doctrine, arises from Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–105(a) (Repl.2012),......
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