Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Service, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-791.,04-791.
• Parties: Lance R. CRAVEN, Appellant v. FULTON SANITATION SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Sun Ray Services, Inc., d/b/a USA Waste of Arkansas, Inc., and Kendale Lloyd Toney, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

206 S.W.3d 842

Lance R. CRAVEN, Appellant v. FULTON SANITATION SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Sun Ray Services, Inc., d/b/a USA Waste of Arkansas, Inc., and Kendale Lloyd Toney, Appellees.

No. 04-791.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 14, 2005.

Nolan, Caddell & Reynolds, P.A., by: Fred L. Caddell, Fort Smith, for appellant.

Ledbetter, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, L.L.P., by: E. Diane Graham, Fort Smith, for appellees.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Lance R. Craven filed a negligence suit in the Sebastian County Circuit Court against Appellees Fulton Sanitation Service, Inc., d/b/a Sun Ray Services, Inc., d/b/a USA Waste of Arkansas, Inc. ("Fulton"), and Kendale Lloyd Toney. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees on the ground that an adverse decision from the Workers' Compensation Commission barred Appellant's suit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellant contends that the trial court's ruling is erroneous because it violates his constitutional right to a trial by jury and his right to bring suit against a third party under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-410(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2002). The Arkansas Court of Appeals certified this case to us as presenting an issue of first impression as to whether a judgment by an administrative agency may be given preclusive effect in such cases where the litigant has the right to a jury trial. Our jurisdiction is thus pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1). We reverse the order of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings in this matter.

The relevant facts are not in dispute, and the parties agree that this appeal presents only questions of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Brown v. Pine Bluff Nursing Home, 359 Ark. 471, 199 S.W.3d 45 (2004); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 182 S.W.3d 112 (2004). Suffice it to say that Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on March 10, 1999, wherein the vehicle he was driving was struck from behind by one of Fulton's trucks that was driven by Toney. Because Appellant was on the job at the time of the accident, he filed a claim against his employer, Cockram Concrete, alleging that he sustained compensable injuries to his neck, upper back, and lower back. His employer accepted the compensability of his neck and upper-back injuries; however, it questioned whether his lower-back injuries had been caused by the accident. The Commission's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant had failed to prove a causal relationship between his lower-back injuries and the automobile accident. The ALJ's decision was affirmed by the Commission. Appellant appealed to the court of appeals; however, he abandoned the appeal when he failed to lodge the record with the appellate court.

Appellant filed the instant suit against Appellees in August 2001, seeking damages for his lower-back injuries.¹ Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the ALJ's determination of the issue of causation precluded Appellant from relitigating it. Appellant argued that giving preclusive effect to the Commission's judgment on the issue of causation would deprive him of his constitutional right to have that factual issue determined by a jury. He also argued that section 11-9-410(a)(1)(A) specifically provides that the making of a claim for workers' compensation shall not affect the employee's right to maintain an action in court against a third party. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Appellant appealed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to a final judgment of the Workers' Compensation Commission so as to bar the employee's constitutional right to a jury trial against a third-party tortfeasor. The concept of the doctrine of res judicata has two facets: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Barclay v. Waters, 357 Ark. 386, 182 S.W.3d 91 (2004); Searcy v. Davenport, 352 Ark. 307, 100 S.W.3d 711 (2003); John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc. v. Pinson, 313 Ark. 632, 855 S.W.2d 941 (1993). Claim preclusion forecloses further litigation on a cause of action, while issue preclusion forecloses further litigation in connection with a certain issue. Id. Issue preclusion is the type of res judicata involved in this case.

Issue preclusion, better known in this state as collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues of law or fact previously litigated, provided that the party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question and that the issue was essential to the judgment. Beaver v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, 355 Ark. 359, 138 S.W.3d 664 (2003); Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 985 S.W.2d 737 (1999). To apply collateral estoppel, the following elements must be present: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. Id. Collateral estoppel may be asserted by a stranger to the first judgment, but the party against whom it is asserted must have been a party to the earlier action and must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in that first proceeding. State Office of Child Support Enforcem't v. Willis, 347 Ark. 6, 59 S.W.3d 438 (2001); Coleman's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 55 Ark.App. 275, 935 S.W.2d 289 (1996).

Ordinarily, the doctrine of res judicata, either in the form of claim preclusion or issue preclusion, is applied based on a final judgment issued by a court. However, the doctrine has been applied in this state to issues determined by final judgment or decree of an administrative agency. Significantly, both this court and the court of appeals have held that the doctrine is applicable to decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission. See Beaver, 355 Ark. 359, 138 S.W.3d 664; Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 259 Ark. 728, 536 S.W.2d 126 (1976); Andrews v. Gross & Janes Tie Co., 214 Ark. 210, 216 S.W.2d 386 (1948); Perry v. Leisure Lodges, Inc., 19 Ark.App. 143, 718 S.W.2d 114 (1986); Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 18 Ark.App. 210, 711 S.W.2d 840 (1986); Gwin v. R.D. Hall Tank Co., 10 Ark.App. 12, 660 S.W.2d 947 (1983). In Andrews, this court explained:

While the compensation commission is not a court, it exercises quasi-judicial functions in its investigations and determinations and its awards are in the nature of judgments. The doctrine of res judicata which forbids the reopening of matters once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to decisions of a commission or board administering workmen's compensation acts as to judgments of courts having general judicial powers. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 690. The rule generally followed is stated in 71 C.J., p. 1195, as follows: "The award in compensation proceedings has the force and effect of the verdict of a jury. Being in the nature of a judgment, it finally and conclusively determines the rights of the parties under the workmen's compensation acts unless set aside in a proper manner, and is as binding as a judgment of a court and entitled to the same faith and credit as such a judgment." See, also, Anno. 122 A.L.R. 550.

214 Ark. at 214-15, 216 S.W.2d at 388.

None of the foregoing cases involved the issue of the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases. Notwithstanding, Appellees contend that the statement in Andrews that the award in compensation proceedings has the force and effect of a jury verdict implies that the issue has been decided. Appellees also point to the statement by the court of appeals that application of the doctrine of res judicata to administrative actions "is especially appropriate to bar new proceedings when an agency has conducted a trial-type hearing, made findings, and applied the law." Brandon v. Arkansas Western Gas Co., 76 Ark.App. 201, 210-11, 61 S.W.3d 193, 200 (2001) (citing Fuchs v. Moore, 589 N.W.2d 902 (N.D.1999)). We do not view these holdings as being dispositive of the issue at hand, and we conclude that the doctrine may not be applied to bar an employee from having a jury determine factual issues in an action at law against a third party.

Article 2, Section 7, of the Arkansas Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy[.]" The right to jury trial under this provision is a fundamental right. Walker v. First Commercial Bank, N.A., 317 Ark. 617, 880 S.W.2d 316 (1994); Bussey v. Bank of Malvern, 270 Ark. 37, 603 S.W.2d 426 (Ark.App.1980). It extends to all cases that were triable by a jury at common law. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997); McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988). In other words, the constitutional right to trial by jury extends only to the trial of issues of fact in civil and criminal causes. Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 590 S.W.2d 6 (1979). Tort cases, such as the negligence suit present in this case, are civil cases that were triable by juries at common law. See McClanahan, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889.

Under our current Workers' Compensation Act, an employee gives up the right to a jury trial in an action against the employer for unintentional work-related injuries. That right was vanquished with the passage of Amendment 26 to the Arkansas Constitution, now found in Article 5, Section 32, which gave the legislature the power to provide the means, method, and forum for adjudicating claims arising under the workers' compensation law. See Grimmett v. Digby, 267 Ark. 192, 589 S.W.2d 579 (1979) (superseded by statute on other grounds). In exchange for giving up that right, the employee gains a certain and quick resolution of his or her claim against the employer. Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-101(b) (Repl.2002) provides that one of...