Grace Line v. Panama Canal Company

• Decision Date: 08 April 1957
• Docket Number: Docket 24226.,No. 111,111
• Citation: 243 F.2d 844
• Parties: GRACE LINE, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and National Bulk Carriers, Inc., et al., Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PANAMA CANAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

243 F.2d 844 (1957)

GRACE LINE, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and National Bulk Carriers, Inc., et al., Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PANAMA CANAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 111, Docket 24226.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued November 13, 14, 1956.

Decided April 8, 1957.

C. Dickerman Williams, of Maclay, Morgan & Williams, New York City (J. Stewart Harrison, of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Cal., and William I. Stoddard, of Maclay, Morgan & Williams, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants and intervening plaintiffs-appellants.

George Cochran Doub, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Leavenworth Colby, Chief Admiralty & Shipping Section, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Paul A. Sweeney and Herman Marcuse, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Benjamin H. Berman, Atty. in Charge, Admiralty & Shipping Section, Dept. of Justice, New York City, on the brief), for Panama Canal Company, defendant-appellee.

Brief by James M. Estabrook, New York City, as amicus curiæ in support of plaintiffs-appellants.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and FRANK¹ and HINCKS, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Chief Judge.

This appeal concerns the power of a federal district court to compel the government corporation which operates the Panama Canal to set tolls according to the new formula established by Congress in 1950 and to repay canal users several million dollars damages for excess tolls charged. It raises interesting and important questions as to judicial responsibility and authority when administrative action is dilatory or lacking.

A class action by canal users seeking this relief ended in summary judgment for the defendant below, when Judge Walsh concluded that he lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and over an indispensable party. In brief, he interpreted the 1950 statute² as giving the defendant discretion to defer use of the new formula and denying judicial review of the defendant's decision. The history of toll regulation in the canal illuminates the conflicting interpretations of the most recent statute.

From 1912 to 1948 two different government bureaus operated commercial enterprises in the Canal Zone. Under 1902 legislation the President owned all the stock of Panama Railroad Company, a corporate ancestor of the present defendant which ran a railroad, a shipping line, and miscellaneous ventures. After 1912 there also existed The Panama Canal, an unincorporated agency headed by a governor whom the President appointed. This agency administered the civil government of the Canal Zone and operated the canal itself.

The President had statutory authority to fix canal tolls at his discretion between 75 cents and a dollar per laden ton, and a formula was worked out by the President, the Treasury Department, and the governor whereby tolls would be set high enough to cover operating expenses of the canal, "interest," and the cost of civil government in the Canal Zone. Canal users protested that the cost formula was unfair to them, and in later years tolls were set much lower than the formula would have required. As expenses rose, the toll rate required by the formula became greater than the statutory maximum of $1.00, while the toll remained constant at 90 cents a laden ton.

Meanwhile Panama Railroad Company, which bore very little of the burden of government in the Canal Zone, continued its highly profitable operations, returning a surplus to the Treasury. The corporation made no financial reports to Congress and was not supervised by the Bureau of the Budget or the General Accounting Office. In 1948 to obtain greater financial supervision Congress reorganized the defendant's predecessor under federal law as a government corporation,³ subjecting it to the requirements of the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945.⁴ Henceforth it was required to keep books in the fashion of a commercial business for annual submission to Congress after Presidential revision, and it was to be audited periodically by the General Accounting Office, which, in turn, reported to Congress.

The same year President Truman announced a rise in canal tolls to $1.00 per laden ton to meet continuing deficits from The Panama Canal. When the shipping industry responded with severe protests the increase was deferred pending study by congressional committees and the Bureau of the Budget. A three-cornered struggle developed. The railroads wanted to prevent what they considered a subsidy to shipping — operation of the canal below "cost." The Bureau of the Budget wanted increased revenue from the canal operation and better bookkeeping procedures. The shipping lines wanted revision of the formula for determining "costs" of the canal to enable the canal to be "self-sustaining" without greatly raising tolls.

The resulting compromise is the statute now before us. Ownership of the physical properties of the canal was transferred from the governor's agency to the defendant corporation, now rechristened Panama Canal Company, which was to be operated by its board of directors like a commercial business, dealing with other government agencies on a business footing and meeting its expenditure from its own income. The cost of civil government in the Canal Zone was to be borne by the defendant, in lieu of taxes; and this cost was to be apportioned among the various business enterprises equitably, thus relieving the former heavy burden on the canal operation. As part of the new scheme, toll-making authority was transferred from the President to the defendant, and the statutory maxima and minima were removed. Tolls were to be set to cover costs, which were defined by statute for the first time; and the new cost formula was made more favorable to canal users than the previous informal arrangement of the President, the Treasury Department, and the governor.⁵

Both Congress and the President retained some control over toll-fixing. The annual budget reports to Congress and the periodic GAO audits required under the Government Corporation Control Act would henceforth cover the operation of the canal, now that it, too, was run by the defendant. The President retained the power to appoint the members of the defendant's board of directors, and no change in tolls could be made without his approval.

For three years after passage of the Act the defendant submitted its annual budgets to Congress, reporting a profit from its combined operations, but not allocating the cost of interest or civil government among its various enterprises.⁶ No objections were taken to these budgets by Congress and no steps were taken by the defendant to change toll rates. The present controversy began in 1955 when the General Accounting Office completed its audit of the defendant and reported:

"* * * The Company, as a whole, has been self-sustaining. However, the Company did not have available for our examination an analysis to determine the financial results by activities. We have prepared such an analysis by allocating general corporate expenses (interest, net cost of Canal Zone Government and administrative and other general expenses) to the activity operating results reported by the Company. * * *

"The analysis of the Company, reported net income of $13,000,000 for 3 years since the reorganization shows that, contrary to the apparent expectation of the Congress, the canal activity had a net income of $28,000,000 and business activities had losses of $15,000,000. * * *

"* * * Thus the net income from the canal activity is being used to offset losses from business activities.

"* * * We interpret the legislation as precluding any losses sustained by the Panama Canal Company in the operation and maintenance of business facilities being included in the basis for determining tolls under section 412(b). Based on the financial results of the canal activity for the past 3 years, toll rates would have to be reduced substantially if hearings were held at this time."⁷

The GAO attributed the loss from other business activities to inefficient management, reapportionment of the burden of civil government, and a diminished market for the goods and services of these enterprises.⁸ The unexpected profit of the canal operation probably stems from the steady increase in foreign commercial volume since 1947.⁹ The General Accounting Office did not believe that existing legislation authorized the defendant to continue recovering business activity losses through canal tolls and unsuccessfully sought amendment of § 412(b) of the 1950 Act to accomplish that end.¹⁰

Judge Walsh rejected the General Accounting Office's construction of the 1950 amendments, which the plaintiffs support, and approved that of defendant Panama Canal Company. We turn first to this question of statutory interpretation.

I. Meaning of the 1950 Statute

A. Statutory Text. The old and new versions of §§ 411 and 412 are printed in the margin for comparison, since the first phase of argument concerns the significance of the changes in wording adopted in 1950.¹¹ The defendant views § 411 as controlling and finds great significance in the use of the verb "authorized," which it contrasts with the mandatory word "shall," found in other parts of the statute.¹² The plaintiffs reply that § 411 merely identifies the person delegated with toll-fixing power and prescribes the procedure, while the obligation to set tolls according to formula flows from § 412, where the mandatory language is found.

Defendant next points to the retention in § 411 of the words "prescribe and from time to time change" which were also used in the earlier version of the statute conferring discretionary power on the President. From this we are asked to infer that similar discretionary power is to be exercised by the new authority. Plaintiffs reply that the old scheme was only discretionary within statutory limits and that on occasion the President sought congressional approval even for changes within these limits.¹³...