Graci v. Damon

• Citation: 374 N.E.2d 311,6 Mass.App.Ct. 160
• Decision Date: 27 March 1978
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 311

374 N.E.2d 311

6 Mass.App.Ct. 160

Gerald GRACI v. Robert G. DAMON et al. Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 15, 1977.

Decided March 27, 1978.

Edward W. Waystack, III, John P. Fitzgerald, Boston, with him for Robert G. Damon.

Joseph M. Cohen, Jacob Shair, Boston, with him for Maynard M. Lind.

Marcus E. Cohn, Boston, for plaintiff.

John Arthur Johnson, Jr., Boston, for Charles R. McCauley, Jr., trustee, submitted a brief.

Before HALE, C. J., and GOODMAN and GRANT, JJ. GOODMAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, Gerald Graci, brought this action to recover for injuries received as a result of an accident which took place on June 13, 1972, at the Wilmington Road Shopping Plaza in Burlington. On that date Graci suffered severe burns when he came in contact with live power terminals inside a box like structure which he was trying to nail shut at the shopping center. Graci at that time operated a dry cleaning establishment in the shopping center. The defendants are Charles R. McCauley, trustee of the Charles Realty Trust, owner of the shopping center, Robert G. Damon, doing business as Damon & Son Heating & Air Conditioning, a contractor engaged by McCauley to install air conditioning for another tenant in the shopping center, and Maynard M. Lind, doing business as Maynard M. Lind Co., hired by Damon to perform electrical work in connection with the air conditioning installation. The case was tried to a jury, who returned a special verdict (as required by G.L. c. 231, § 85, as appearing in St.1969, c. 761 ¹), finding Graci's damages to be $16,300, and apportioning the negligence as follows: Graci, 15%; McCauley, 40%; Lind, 40%; and Damon, 5%. The judge accordingly reduced the damages "in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made" (G.L. c. 231, § 85, as amended through St.1969, c. 761), and entered separate judgments for the plaintiff for $13,855.00 (85% Of $16,300) against each of the defendants. All three defendants appealed.

Lind and McCauley contend that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant submitting the case against them to the jury. Lind also contends that it was error to deny his motion for a new trial. Damon does not contest the finding of negligence against him but argues that, since his negligence was found by the jury to be less than that of the plaintiff, the 1969 statute (see fn. 1) absolves him from liability. We affirm the judgments.

We summarize the events leading up to the accident as the jury could have found them from the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff. Gelinas v. New England Power Co., 359 Mass. 119, 120, 268 N.E.2d 336 (1971). Donovan v. DiPaolo, --- Mass.App. ---, --- ^a, 355 N.E.2d 484 (1976). Damon and Lind began work on the installation of the air conditioning equipment late in May of 1972. At that time Graci, as McCauley had requested, gave them keys to a box like structure (sometimes referred to as the "electrical box") which housed the electrical equipment that it was Lind's job to work on. The structure was approximately eight feet high, eight feet wide, and two feet deep and was attached to the exterior wall of Graci's establishment about two feet off the ground. Access to the equipment in the electrical box was by two doors, each a panel of plywood about eight feet by four feet. When Lind first observed the doors they were locked securely by two padlocks, one at the top and one at the bottom, fitted through hasps and keepers, about two feet from the top of the structure and two feet from the bottom. McCauley had given Graci the keys sometime before he first moved into the shopping center so that they would be easily available.

When Graci gave Lind and Damon the keys to the electrical box, he requested that at the end of the day they lock the box and return the keys to him. He cautioned them that children frequented the area and were destructive and that there was vandalism in the area. That evening the keys were not returned to Graci, and the doors to the electrical box were wide open. Graci nailed them shut. The keys were never returned to him, and the electrical box remained unlocked. In the course of about two and one half weeks while the air conditioning was being installed, he spoke to Damon and Lind about the matter a number of times. A few days after Lind and Damon began work, Graci called McCauley and told him what had happened, that the electrical box was being left open, and that he had complained to Damon and Lind without any results. He also told McCauley that there were children in the area, that a dangerous situation was being created, and that he was nailing the electrical box shut. McCauley told Graci that he would speak to Damon and that "he would take care of it." However, the matter was never taken care of, though Graci spoke to McCauley about the condition twice more.

Lind left the job unfinished on June 2 because of the press of other work. At that time two live terminals were exposed in the electrical box. Damon continued working on the air conditioning installation but had no occasion to be at the electrical box until the morning of June 13. The previous evening, June 12, Graci had nailed the electrical box shut with three staging nails, one at the top, one in the middle, and one at the bottom. Late in the morning of June 13, he saw Damon at the electrical box, which was then open. At about 2:00 P.M. Graci discovered that the doors to the electrical box were open. There were children in the area, and he proceeded once again to nail the doors. While doing so he slipped; his hammer made contract with the exposed live terminals, and he received a severe shock and burns to his hands and arms.

Lind's Liability. The jury could have found on June 2, 1972, when Lind left the unfinished job, he left the electrical box open and did not return the keys to Graci. This obviously created a danger, known to Lind, from the live terminals in the electrical box and was inconsistent with the high degree of care required in dealing with electricity. Gelinas v. New England Power Co., 359 Mass. at 124, 268 N.E.2d 336. Leavitt v. Glick Realty Corp., 362 Mass. 370, 376, 285 N.E.2d 786 (1972). The issue is, therefore, whether Lind's negligence in these respects was an operative factor in causing Graci's injuries. This is a question of proximate cause which it was for the jury to determine. We cannot say that it was impermissible as a matter of law for the jury to have found that the danger from the live terminals created by Lind's negligence persisted despite the intervening tinkering with the doors by Graci and Damon, negligent though it was. Burke v. Hodge, 217 Mass. 182, 184-185, 104 N.E. 450 (1914); Leahy v. Standard Oil Co., 224 Mass. 352, 359-364, 112 N.E. 950 (1916); Robinson v. Weber Duck Inn Co., 294 Mass. 75, 79-80, 1 N.E.2d 27 (1936); Tritsch v. Boston Edison Co., 363 Mass. 179, 181-182, 293 N.E.2d 264 (1973). Compare Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, 139-140; Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 49-50, 191 N.E. 133 (1934); Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Corp., 290 Mass. 340, 343-344, 195 N.E. 328 (1935); Martin v. Reis, 344 Mass. 32, 36, 181 N.E.2d 580 (1962). See Smith v. Eagle Cornice & Skylight Works, 341 Mass. 139, 141-142, 167 N.E.2d 637 (1960); Stamas v. Fanning, 345 Mass. 73, 76, 185 N.E.2d 751 (1962).

Lind further argues that "any conduct by Mr. Lind in leaving the doors to the box unsecured ceased to be a dangerous force as of the moment when on June 12, Mr. Graci secured the doors . . .." But the jury could have found that Graci's nailing the electrical box was not the equivalent of padlocking it. See McMenimon v. Snow, 219 Mass. 231, 233, 106 N.E. 863 (1914); Lynch v. C. J. Larivee Lumber Co., 223 Mass. 335, 340, 111 N.E. 861 (1916). The jury could have found that the nailing was a makeshift, inadequate to stop tampering with the box, and indeed that the June 12 nailing was a response to such tampering, since neither Lind nor Damon was at the box between June 2, when Graci had nailed the box, and June 12, when he again nailed it. Further, the jury could have believed that on June 13 Damon nailed the box before he left at about 10:00 A.M. but that by 2:00 P.M. Graci found it open. Indeed, Lind testified that when he came to inspect the burned terminals, the day after the accident, he nailed the doors shut with the three staging nails and went to buy two padlocks. When he returned in about an hour, he found the doors open, though neither Graci nor Damon had opened them and neither had any knowledge how the doors had come to be open. See Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre of North Attleboro, Inc., 305 Mass. 265, 266, 25 N.E.2d 749 (1940); Saldi v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., 344 Mass. 89, 97, 181 N.E.2d 687 (1962).

[2,3] Lind's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was properly denied. The affidavit which asserts the basis for the motion (no oral evidence appears to have been taken) contains nothing on which the trial judge could have made the threshold finding that the evidence, claimed to be newly discovered, "was not available to . . . (Lind) for introduction at the original trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . ." DeLuca v. Boston Elevated Ry., 312 Mass. 495, 497, 45 N.E.2d 463, 464 (1942), quoted in Spiller v. Metropolitan Transit Authy.,348 Mass. 576, 579 n.3, 204 N.E.2d 913 (1965); Nicholas v. Lewis Furniture Co., 292 Mass. 500, 505-507, 198 N.E. 753 (1935). ² In any event we cannot say on the record in this case that the judge was required to find that the additional evidence (the materiality of which Lind contends was the main issue raised by his requests for rulings) was "important evidence of such a nature as to be likely to affect the result." DeLuca v. Boston Elevated Ry., 312 Mass. at 497-500, 45 N.E.2d at 464. Spiller v. Metropolitan Transit Authy., ...