Stamas v. Fanning
| Decision Date | 02 November 1962 |
| Citation | 185 N.E.2d 751,345 Mass. 73 |
| Parties | Peter STAMAS v. Robert J. FANNING. Henry KLOZA v. Robert J. FANNING. Donald LORD v. Robert J. FANNING. Esther STAMAS v. Robert J. FANNING. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
George P. Jeffreys and Charles P. Tsaffaras, Lowell, Mass., for plaintiffs.
George W. Stuart, Boston, Mass., for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ.
The evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs was as follows: On the day of the accident an automobile operated by the plaintiff Peter Stamas and owned by the plaintiff Esther Stamas was the fourth in a line of traffic headed easterly on Route 133 in Andover. The plaintiffs Henry Kloza and Donald Lord were passengers in the automobile. Route 133, a two-lane highway, was about thirty feet wide. 'The roadway was slippery and the weather was misty.' The Stamas automobile was approximately fifty feet behind the car ahead and the 'other vehicles in the line of traffic were about similar distances behind the car each was following.' The Stamas car and 'the entire line of traffic was travelling at a rate of about twenty-five miles per hour.' At a point near Wallace's Restaurant, the defendant, who was proceeding westerly on Route 133, without any signal and without stopping, made a sudden left turn and drove his automobile across the eastbound line of traffic into the parking area of the restaurant. When the defendant made the turn his vehicle was about thirty feet in front of the first car in the eastbound line. The first and second cars in that line 'slammed on their brakes and avoided collision, the second car coming within inches of hitting the first car.' The third car went off the road to the right. Stamas, the operator of the fourth car, applied his brakes 'which were in good condition, but skidded on the wet pavement and went off the roadway to the left into a telephone pole.' At no time was there any contact with the defendant's automobile. The three occupants of the Stamas car were injured and the car was damaged.
Following the introduction of the fore going evidence, the judge, upon being informed that this was in essence the plaintiffs' case, directed verdicts for the defendant, subject to the plaintiffs' exceptions. The judge, relying on the case of Conrey v. Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N.E.2d 203, was of opinion that, even though it could have been found that the defendant was negligent, his conduct was not the proximate cause of the accident since the Stamas automobile 'as the fourth car in a line of traffic was too remote from the defendant's conduct.'
We are of opinion that the jury could have found that the defendant was negligent. But 'negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.' Baggs v. Hirschfield, 293 Mass. 1, 3, 199 N.E. 136. And a contributing cause must be a proximate, not a remote, cause. The question, therefore, narrows down to whether it can be said, as matter of law, that the conduct of the defendant was not the proximate cause of the accident. If the case Conrey v. Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N.E.2d 203, on which the judge relied, is to be followed, the ruling must be upheld, for there is no difference of substance between that case and the case at bar.
In Conrey v. Abramson, the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile operated by one Davis. Davis was proceeding on a highway in Reading, consisting of four lanes of travel. Lanes 1 and 2 were used by vehicles coming from Boston, and lanes 3 and 4 by vehicles going toward Boston. Davis was traveling in lane 3. A vehicle driven by one Wing was traveling in lane 3 about fifteen or twenty feet ahead of Davis. Suddenly, Wing's automobile, without warning, came to an abrupt stop. Davis, to avoid colliding with Wing's car, turned to the left, but, seeing a bus coming in the opposite direction, turned back into lane 3 and in doing so skidded into Wing's automobile. There was evidence that Wing's sudden stop was due to the fact that the defendant, who was driving the automobile ahead of him, turned without warning to the left and Wing thought the defendant's 'automobile was going to pull across in front of him.' Wing's car had stopped about five or six feet behind the defendant's car at the time it was struck by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Graci v. Damon
...181 N.E.2d 580 (1962). See Smith v. Eagle Cornice & Skylight Works, 341 Mass. 139, 141-142, 167 N.E.2d 637 (1960); Stamas v. Fanning, 345 Mass. 73, 76, 185 N.E.2d 751 (1962). Lind further argues that "any conduct by Mr. Lind in leaving the doors to the box unsecured ceased to be a dangerous......
-
Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc.
...312, 320, 322, 771 N.E.2d 770 (2002) (scope of liability ["proximate cause"] determined on motion to dismiss); Stamas v. Fanning, 345 Mass. 73, 76, 185 N.E.2d 751 (1962) ("There are situations where it can be said, as matter of law, that a cause is remote rather than proximate").17 Cf. Posk......
-
Christopher v. Father's Huddle Cafe, Inc.
...and the breach or negligence must have been the proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. See Stamas v. Fanning, 345 Mass. 73, 75-76, 185 N.E.2d 751 (1962); Tobin v. Norwood Country Club, Inc., 422 Mass. 126, 141, 661 N.E.2d 627 (1996). We proceed to discuss the basis for our conc......
-
Zezuski v. Jenny Mfg. Co.
...Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 241 Mass. 400, 404, 135 N.E. 318. McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 217, 197 N.E. 879. Stamas v. Fanning, 345 Mass. 73, 76, 185 N.E.2d 751) to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Sullivan v. Hamacher, supra. On the issue of causation '(t)here must be ......