Grader v. City of Lynnwood
| Decision Date | 06 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 15130-4-I,15130-4-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | William E. GRADER, Respondent, v. CITY OF LYNNWOOD, a municipal corporation, Appellant. |
Patrick M. Curran, Riach, Gese, Seather, Watts & Curran, Lynnwood, for appellant City of Lynnwood.
James E. Deno, Cogdill, Deno, Millikan & Carter, Everett, for respondent William F. Grader.
The City of Lynnwood (City) appeals the trial court's determination that the City's interpretation of Lynnwood Municipal Code (LMC), § 20.14.040, is an unconstitutional exercise of the City's police power and violates William E. Grader's right to equal protection. We affirm the trial court's decision on the latter ground.
William E. Grader purchased 11 contiguous platted lots located within the City of Lynnwood in approximately 1962. Lots 12 and 13 of this plat were previously developed as a retail auto parts store and machine shop known as "Bill's Auto Parts" and lots 24 and 25 as a building and business known as "Stan's Auto Rebuild." Neither development meets existing City codes, but both contain valid nonconforming uses, having been in existence when the current codes were enacted.
In 1982, Grader decided to construct a warehouse and billiard lounge on the remaining contiguous vacant lots. He applied to the City for a permit to construct a development which would be entirely independent of both existing developments. Not only would the new building be constructed on different lots, it would have separate street access and parking facilities and would serve an entirely different purpose.
A conditional use permit was issued by the City on January 10, 1983, but it was conditioned on the abatement of the valid nonconforming uses on Grader's contiguous lots. This would require Grader to alter the size and location of a large sign, landscape the existing developments, paint stripe dividers in their parking areas, and generally comply with current developmental standards, all at substantial expense. The City based its determination on LMC § 20.14.040(c)(2) which provides that when major alterations are permitted on a nonconforming "site," the previously lawful nonconforming structures or uses on that "site" must be brought into compliance with existing code. The parties agree that Grader's proposed development constitutes a "major alteration" as defined in the ordinance and would conform to all existing code requirements. Their disagreement centers on whether the existing businesses and the proposed development constitute a single "site."
LMC § 20.14.040 defines "site" as follows:
"Site," for purposes of this chapter, means a lot or contiguous lots under one owner or single association of individuals within the same zone and with established mutual access, circulation and shared parking facilities.
The City's position is that LMC 20.14.040 defines a "site" as a lot or contiguous lots that are either (1) under one owner or (2) under a single association of individuals within the same zone and with established mutual access, circulation and shared parking facilities.
Grader, on the other hand, argues that LMC § 20.14.040 must be read as defining "site" as a lot or contiguous lots (1) under one owner or a single association of individuals within the same zone and (2) with established mutual access, circulation and shared parking facilities.
Grader appealed the City's determination to the Lynnwood Hearing Examiner who upheld the City's interpretation of the ordinance. Grader also contended that the City's interpretation would render the ordinance unconstitutional. The hearing examiner declined to resolve the constitutional issues raised, properly finding that these were matters only the courts could address. Yakima Cy. Clean Air Auth. v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 85 Wash.2d 255, 257, 534 P.2d 33 (1975).
After the Lynnwood City Council denied his appeal, Grader applied for a Writ of Certiorari in the Snohomish County Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the City's interpretation of the ordinance as applied to his proposed development. He claimed that it was first, violative of Grader's right to equal protection; second, constituted an improper use of the City's police power; and third, was unconstitutionally vague. The court reversed the hearing examiner concluding that the City's interpretation was unconstitutional and adopting Grader's proposed interpretation of the ordinance, thereby avoiding its invalidation. The City has appealed.
Pursuant to RCW 7.16.060, the superior court reviews only the administrative record below and takes no new evidence. Therefore, the trial court need enter no findings of fact or conclusions of law. King Cy. Water Dist. 54 v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wash.2d 536, 544, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976). Although the trial court did enter findings and conclusions herein, this does not in itself constitute grounds for reversal but is mere surplusage. See Spokane Cy. Fire Protec. Dist. 8 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 27 Wash.App. 491, 493, 618 P.2d 1326 (1980). The trial court adopted the proper standard of review to resolve the legal issues before it determining that the administrative action was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. Anderson v. Island Cy., 81 Wash.2d 312, 316-17, 501 P.2d 594 (1972). This court reviews the administrative record in rendering its decision and does not rely upon the trial court's findings and conclusions. Spokane Cy. Fire Protec. Dist. 8, 27 Wash.App. at 493, 618 P.2d 1326.
We recognize that as the enforcing agency herein, the City's interpretation of the ordinance is entitled to substantial weight. State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wash.2d 367, 371-72, 274 P.2d 852 (1954). Nevertheless, the ordinance must be interpreted so as to effectuate the objective or intent of the enacting body. Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wash.2d 241, 245, 501 P.2d 178 (1972). In addition, ordinances must be interpreted according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. Boss v. City of Spokane, 63 Wash.2d 305, 307, 387...
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