Amburn v. Daly

• Citation: 501 P.2d 178,81 Wn.2d 241
• Decision Date: 21 September 1972
• Docket Number: No. 42383,42383
• Parties: Myrna AMBURN et al., Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. Maxine E. DALY, Commissioner of The Employment Security Department of the State of Washington, Appellant and Cross-Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

Page 241

81 Wn.2d 241

501 P.2d 178

Myrna AMBURN et al., Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. Maxine E. DALY, Commissioner of The Employment Security

Department of the State of Washington, Appellant

and Cross-Respondent.

No. 42383.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Sept. 21, 1972.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Joseph M. Littlemore, Olympia, for appellant.

Stephen M. Randels and John Gant, Legal Services Center, Seattle, Kent Millikan, Northwest Washington Legal Services, Everett, for respondents.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the King County Superior Court, entered April 18, 1972, reversing a decision of the Employment Security Department of the State of Washington which had denied unemployment compensation benefits to nine petitioners who were included among some 3,000 claimants similarly denied benefits.

The record shows that each of the petitioners (respondents and cross-appellants) filed applications prior to April 5, 1970, with the Employment Security Department for unemployment compensation benefits. Each applicant thereafter received an initial determination of entitlement to benefits computed on reportable wages earned during the 'base year' which was defined at that time under RCW 50.04.020, as 'the last calendar year preceding the first day of the benefit year.' 'Benefit year' was formerly defined under RCW 50.04.030, as 'the period beginning with the first full calendar week in July and ending the following calendar year with the last calendar week beginning in June.' At the time the petitioners filed their initial applications for benefits, their base year in each case was the calendar year of 1968, and their benefit year was the period beginning with the first full calendar week in July 1969, and ending July 4, 1970. The petitioners received weekly benefit payments in accordance therewith through April 4, 1970, when their benefits were terminated.

By Laws of 1970, 1st Ex.Ses., ch. 2, the Washington state legislature amended the Employment Security Act, RCW Title 50. These amendments changed eligibility and entitlement criteria and increased the amount of payable benefits. As a result, 'base year' and 'benefit year' were redefined in RCW 50.04.020 and RCW 50.04.030 as follows:

'Base year' with respect to each individual, shall mean the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the individual's benefit year.

RCW 50.04.020.

'Benefit year' with respect to each individual, means the fifty-two consecutive week period beginning with the first day of the calendar week with respect to which the individual files an application for an initial determination and thereafter the fifty-two consecutive week period beginning with the first day of the calendar week with respect to which the individual next files an application for an initial determination after the termination of his last preceding benefit year: Provided, however, That an individual's benefit year is not established unless the determination shows the applicant to have met the wage and employment conditions fixed by law as the minimum for the receipt of benefits: Provided further, That an individual's benefit year shall be extended to be fifty-three weeks when at the expiration of fifty-two weeks the establishment of a new benefit year would result in the use of a quarter of wages in the new base year that had been included in the individual's prior base year.

RCW 50.04.030. When the legislation was initially introduced for consideration by the legislature, the amendments provided for an effective date of July 6, 1970, which date would have coincided with the end of the benefit year applicable under the previously existing law; however, the effective date was moved up to April 5, 1970, prior to enactment by the legislature.

The defendant (appellant and cross-respondent), Maxine Daly, Commissioner of the Employment Security Department (hereafter referred to as Commissioner), interpreted the 1970 amendments to the act as terminating all entitlements to benefits which existed under the act prior to April 5, 1970, and all claimants who were receiving benefits prior to April 5, 1970, were required to reapply for benefits under the amended act if they wished to continue to receive benefits. The notice sent out by the department to this effect, read as follows:

STATE OF WASHINGTON--EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT IMPORTANT NOTICE

The Washington Unemployment Compensation Law has been amended to be effective April 5, 1970. Such amendments result in the automatic expiration of the current benefit year on April 4, 1970, rather than on July 4, 1970. If you are unemployed and wish to claim benefits after April 4, 1970, it will be necessary for you to file a new application to requalify. Under the new Law you may establish a valid claim if you worked in Washington during the 1969 calendar year and earned at least $1,050.

Of the claimants who were eligible for and were receiving benefits during the weeks prior to April 5, 1970, there were approximately 3,000 claimants, including the petitioners, who were ineligible for benefits after April 5, 1970, by reason of the Commissioner's interpretation of the 1970 amendments.

Each of the nine petitioners received an appealable determination of denial of benefits effective April 5, 1970; each appealed and received a hearing followed by an appeals decision denying benefits; each petitioned the Commissioner for a review of that decision; and each was issued a Commissioner's decision pursuant to RCW 34.04.130, denying benefits. The matters were consolidated for hearing, submitted on agreed facts and heard in the Superior Court for King County, on July 23, 1971.

The trial court entered a judgment on April 8, 1972, reversing the decision of the Commissioner and holding that the defendant Commissioner improperly applied Laws of 1970, 1st, Ex.Ses., ch. 2, to the claims of the petitioners and, in doing so, exceeded her authority. The court ordered the Employment Security Department to pay the petitioners the benefits to which they were entitled from April 5, 1970, through July 6, 1970. The petitioners' motion, pursuant to CR 52(b), for an order adjudging the action to be a class action and applicable to all 3,000 affected claimants, was denied. The Commissioner now appeals the decision of the trial court, and the petitioners cross-appeal the denial of their motion for a class action which limited the relief granted to the named petitioners.

The main issue presented in this appeal is whether the Commissioner properly construed and applied Laws of 1970, 1st Ex.Ses., ch. 2, in determining the rights of the petitioners to unemployment benefits on and after April 5, 1970. The Commissioner contends that she applied the law as amended in 1970 in direct compliance with the terms of the act. She argues that the rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by the employment security laws are not vested and are subject to the power of the legislature to amend or repeal all or any part of the title; that the 1970 amendments created a radically altered system of unemployment compensation which was intended to supplant the former program as of April 5, 1970, by repealing the statutes formerly defining base and benefit year, the computation of benefits criteria and the former eligibility criteria; and that since there was no savings clause in the 1970 amendments, the new definitions were applicable in determining the unemployment benefits of the petitioners as of April 5, 1970.

We do not agree with the Commissioner that the 1970 amendments may be applied in such a manner so as to extinguish, on April 5, 1970, the outstanding claims of the persons receiving unemployment compensation benefits prior to that date. Our resolution of the issues in the instant case is premised upon certain basic rules of statutory construction.

The underlying purpose inherent in the function of judicial interpretation of statutory enactments is to effectuate the objective or intent of the legislature. Murphy v. Campbell Inv. Co., 79 Wash.2d 417, 486 P.2d 1080 (1971); State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970); State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wash.2d 152, 470 P.2d 172 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1000, 91 S.Ct. 2175, 29 L.Ed.2d 166 (1971); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).

In construing revised statutes and connected acts of amendment and repeal, it is necessary to observe great caution to avoid giving an effect to these acts which was not contemplated by the legislature. See State ex rel. Duvall v. City Council of Seattle, 71 Wash.2d 462, 429 P.2d 235 (1967).

The courts, in pursuance of the general object of giving effect to the intention of the legislature, are not controlled by the literal meaning of the language of the statute, but the spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter thereof, and no construction should be given to a statute which leads to gross injustice or absurdity. Wilson v. Lund, 74 Wash.2d 945, 447 P.2d 718 (1968); In re Horse Heaven Irr. Dist., 11 Wash.2d 218, 118 P.2d 972 (1941).

Legislative intent, will, or purpose, is to be ascertained from the statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the act. Guinness v. State, 40 Wash.2d 677, 246 P.2d 433 (1952); Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wash.2d 326, 142 P.2d 488 (1943); In re Horse Heaven Irr. Dist., Supra.

In placing a judicial construction upon a legislative enactment, the entire sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter should be considered. Connick v. Chehalis, 53 Wash.2d 288, 333 P.2d 647 (1958); State ex rel. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. Bellingham, 183 Wash. 415, 48 P.2d 609 (1935).

An original act and an amendment to it should be read and construed as one law passed at the same time. Bradley v. Department of Labor & Indus.,52 Wash.2d 780, 329 P.2d 196 (1958); McClure v. United States, ...