Grady v. Comm'r of Corr.

Decision Date18 January 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–P–1871.,11–P–1871.
Citation981 N.E.2d 730,83 Mass.App.Ct. 126
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts
PartiesRobert L. GRADY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert L. Grady, pro se.

Deirdre Ann Hosler for the defendants.

Present: CYPHER, KATZMANN, & MILKEY, JJ.

KATZMANN, J.

Robert Grady, an inmate in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) and housed at the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC), filed a grievance complaining that he was not permitted to keep compact discs (CDs) containing legal documents in his cell. The principal issue in this appeal is whether inmate grievances are subject to judicial review in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, which requires that a complaint be filed within thirty days of the final action complained of, or subject to G.L. c. 249, § 4, which sets out a sixty-day limitation period. We conclude that G.L. c. 30A, § 14, governs, and we affirm the dismissal, by a judge of the Superior Court, of the complaint as untimely filed. We further determine that as pleaded, Grady has not put forth a proper request for declaratory relief.

Background. On October 21, 2009, Grady filed a grievance (no. 43530) pursuant to the inmate grievance procedure outlined in 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 491.09 (2001), contesting a decision preventing him from storing CDs containing legal documents and court transcripts in his prison cell.2He alleged that he needed the CDs to prepare legal documents in pending cases.

On November 6, 2009, in response to Grady's initial grievance, the institutional grievance officer at the MTC granted “partial approval” to Grady's request and wrote that Grady would be “allowed to retain twelve legal CDs at a time.”

Grady filed another grievance (no. 43746) on November 5, 2009, complaining that despite the institutional grievance officer's prior determination, other prison officers had prevented him from receiving a CD containing legal documents. Specifically, the Wareham Division of the District Court Department had sent Grady a CD of a previous hearing, and as a result of the delay in receiving the CD, Grady was unable to file a timely motion for reconsideration in connection with a case pending in that court. On December 30, 2009, the institutional grievance officer, in contradiction of his prior decision of November 6, denied this grievance. Citing 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10 (2001), the institutional grievance officer stated, “CD retention is not permitted within inmate living quarters due to the fact CDs are not authorized property items. In addition, only the Property Committee in conjunction with the Commissioner may approve supplementary property items, when requested in writing, in relation to security level.” 3 On January 11, 2010, Grady appealed the decision to the superintendent of the MTC (superintendent), who in turn denied the appeal on January 12. In his decision, the superintendent stated that [d]isks are contraband.”

On March 11, 2010, Grady filed a complaint for judicial review in the Superior Court, appealing from the superintendent's grievance decisions and seeking certiorari review pursuant to G.L. c. 249, § 4, and declaratory judgment pursuant to G.L. c. 231A. Grady sought judgment reversing the grievance decision and declaring that the actions complained of violated his rights under the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The defendants answered and filed the certified record of the administrative proceedings at issue. Grady and the defendants filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings on August 3, 2010, and September 9, 2010, respectively. Grady then filed a reply to the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and attached a revised grievance decision dated July 2, 2010, that was not part of the certified record filed by the defendants. In this grievance determination, the acting director of administrative resolution for the DOC stated that she was reversing the superintendent's decision only in so far as that Grady could now store his law-related CDs in the law library at the MTC rather than in long-term storage. Because he was still not permitted to keep the CDs in his prison cell, Grady continued to pursue his appeal. Grady claimed that he needed to keep the CDs in his cell to preserve the confidentiality of the information contained on the CDs and to prevent their loss or theft.

On July 13, 2011, a judge of the Superior Court held a hearing on the cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. The judge found that Grady had incorrectly appealed the grievance decision pursuantto G.L. c. 249, § 4, rather than G.L. c. 127, § 38H. He reasoned that this court is satisfied that Grady's action is a request for judicial review of various grievances and is governed by G.L. c. 127, § 38H.” The judge concluded that G.L. c. 127, § 38H, mandates that such grievances shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with G.L. c. 30A, § 14, which in turn provides for a thirty-day appeal period. Grady received notice of the superintendent's final decision as to his CD storage grievance on January 12, 2010. However, he did not file his complaint until March 11, 2010, well after the thirty-day filing period had passed.

Grady filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. This appeal ensued.4

Discussion. 1. Statutory analysis. The central question in this case is whether G.L. c. 127, § 38H,5 requires judicial review of inmate grievances pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14,6 or whether, despite the explicit language of G.L. c. 127, § 38H, such appeals must be brought pursuant to G.L. c. 249, § 4.7

We note at the outset that largely because of the way issues have been presented, prior unpublished decisions have not been uniform in their application of the relevant statutes governing the appeals of inmate grievances and inmate disciplinary proceedings. We write to provide clarity on the subject of inmate grievance appeals and to emphasize that only G.L. c. 30A, § 14, shall apply to such cases.

The Legislature has determined that inmate grievance appeals and inmate disciplinary appeals are to be governed by different statutes. An inmate grievance involves a challenge to a DOC regulation or policy and appeals from such decisions are governed by G.L. c. 127, § 38H. On the other hand, an inmate disciplinary appeal involves a challenge to a DOC determination in an official disciplinary proceeding, and appeals are governed by the certiorari statute, G.L. c. 249, § 4. A critical difference between these two statutes is the time period in which an inmate must file an appeal from an adverse decision. Under G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1), [p]roceedings from judicial review ... shall ... be commenced in the court within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency....” In contrast, under G.L. c. 249, § 4, [a] civil action in the nature of certiorari shall be commenced within sixty days next after the proceeding complained of.”

General Laws c. 30A, the State Administrative Procedure Act, “was enacted in part to establish minimum procedural standards for the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings as defined in the statute, while permitting those State administrative agencies covered by the act to develop and adopt additional procedural requirements. See Cella, Administrative Law and Practice § 501 (1986).” Rinaldi v. State Bldg.Code Appeals Bd., 56 Mass.App.Ct. 668, 672, 779 N.E.2d 688 (2002). General Laws c. 127, § 38H, expressly provides that [a] final decision with respect to [an inmate] grievance shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with [G.L. c. 30A, § 14].”

Despite the clarity of that directive, Grady challenges the application of G.L. c. 30A, § 14, to inmate grievance appeals because G.L. c. 30A, § 1A, inserted by St. 1972, c. 777, § 3, provides that [t]he department of correction shall be subject to sections one through eight [of c. 30A], inclusive, and shall not otherwise be subject to this chapter, notwithstanding the exclusion of said department from the definition of the word ‘agency’ in section one.”

In considering the apparent tension between G.L. c. 127, § 38H, and G.L. c. 30A, § 1A, we note that “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one.” Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 520, 744 N.E.2d 39 (2001), citing Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 582–583, 631 N.E.2d 555 (1994). Statutes dealing with the same subject should be interpreted harmoniously to effectuate a consistent body of law, and the more specific statute should control over the more general one, so long as the Legislature did not draft the more general statute to provide comprehensive coverage of the subject area. See Boston Hous. Authy. v. Labor Relations Commn., 398 Mass. 715, 718, 500 N.E.2d 802 (1986). Similarly, where two statutes conflict, the later statute governs. Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. at 521, 744 N.E.2d 39. In this case, we presume that when the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 127, § 38H, in 1999, it knew of the potentiallyconflicting language in G.L. c. 30A, § 1A, which it had previously enacted in 1972. See Longval v. Superior Ct. Dept. of the Trial Ct., 434 Mass. 718, 718–719, 752 N.E.2d 674 (2001) (“In November, 1999, the Legislature enacted a series of statutes designed partially to stem ‘frivolous' civil litigation by prisoners. In particular, the Legislature created G.L. c. 127, §§ 38E–38H ... [establishing grievance procedure for inmate complaints]).

From the plain language of the State Administrative Procedure Act, it is apparent that the Legislature intended generally to protect the DOC from suits under G.L. c. 30A, § 14. Nevertheless, the Legislature subsequently decided that the provisions of c. 30A, § 14, including the thirty-day appeal period, should apply in the specific case of an inmate...

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