Grafitti-Valenzuela v. City of Phoenix

• Decision Date: 27 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 06-0557.,1 CA-CV 06-0557.
• Citation: 167 P.3d 711,216 Ariz. 454
• Parties: Tiana Marie GRAFITTI-VALENZUELA, by and through her parent and legal guardian, Marie GRAFITTI, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

167 P.3d 711

216 Ariz. 454

Tiana Marie GRAFITTI-VALENZUELA, by and through her parent and legal guardian, Marie GRAFITTI, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 06-0557.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

September 27, 2007.

Rake & Catanese P.C. By David J. Catanese, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli PLC By Georgia A. Staton, Eileen Dennis GilBride, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.

OPINION

BARKER, Judge.

¶ 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Tiana Marie Grafitti-Valenzuela, by and through her parent and legal guardian Marie Grafitti, appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Phoenix on Tiana's claim for negligence arising out of injuries Tiana sustained when she was abducted from a City bus stop. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History¹

¶ 2 At approximately 7 a.m. on January 6, 2003, eleven-year-old Tiana was waiting for a City bus at a City bus stop located at 35th Avenue and Acoma in Phoenix, Arizona (the "Bus Stop"). John Mathews, II, abducted Tiana from the Bus Stop and held her in his home for twenty-four hours while he repeatedly sexually assaulted her.

¶ 3 On September 29, 2004, Tiana filed a complaint against the City alleging that the City had negligently designed and constructed the Bus Stop, otherwise failed to make the Bus Stop safe, and failed to protect and warn Tiana against the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties at the Bus Stop. The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that Tiana could not establish (1) that the City owed Tiana any duty of care, (2) that the City had breached any alleged duty of care it owed Tiana, and (3) that any alleged breach of duty caused Tiana's injuries. The trial court granted the City's motion, ruling that there was no question of material fact for the jury on the issues of duty and breach because Tiana's abduction and sexual assault were unforeseeable as a matter of law. The court also ruled that Mathews' criminal acts were an intervening, superseding cause of Tiana's injuries.

¶ 4 Tiana timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(B) (2003).

Discussion

¶ 5 On appeal, Tiana asserts that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City because the City had a duty to remedy and/or warn Tiana regarding the Bus Stop's dangerous condition and because Mathews' criminal acts were not an intervening, superseding cause of Tiana's injuries. In addition, Tiana argues that a material question of fact exists regarding whether the City breached the duty of care it owed to Tiana.

¶ 6 To establish the City's negligence, Tiana was required to prove: (1) the existence of a duty recognized by law requiring the City to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) the City's breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983) (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed.1971)); Piccola By and Through Piccola v. Woodall, 186 Ariz. 307, 309, 921 P.2d 710, 712 (App.1996). Tiana argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City because, as a matter of law, the City had a duty to keep the Bus Stop reasonably safe for users such as Tiana and to warn her and her mother about the dangerous condition of the Bus Stop. She argues that material questions of fact exist regarding whether the City breached that duty of care. In addition, Tiana asserts that the City's breach of its duty was the proximate cause of Tiana's injuries and that Mathews' criminal acts were not a superseding cause.

¶ 7 A court may grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Summary judgment should be granted, "if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense." Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). Consequently, a "scintilla" of evidence or evidence creating the "slightest doubt" about the facts may still be insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id. For a claim or defense to withstand a motion for summary judgment and be presented to a jury, the proponent of the claim or defense must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, directly or by inference, that the probabilities favor the proponent. Id. at 310, 802 P.2d at 1009. If the evidence would allow a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper. United Bank of Ariz. v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 195, 805 P.2d 1012, 1016 (App.1990).

A. Duty

¶ 8 Whether a duty is owed is a legal question decided by the court. Public policy may support the recognition of a duty of care. Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 145, ¶ 23, 150 P.3d 228, 232 (2007). And, a duty of care may arise from special relationships based on contract, family relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant. Id. at ¶ 18; see also Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352, 356, 706 P.2d 364, 368 (1985), superseded on other grounds by statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551 (2000), as recognized in Wringer v. United States, 790 F.Supp. 210, 212 (D.Ariz.1992); Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 52, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1984) (stating the concept of "duty" applies to a "relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other") (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed.1984)). A duty exists if the "relationship of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff." Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356, 706 P.2d at 368.

¶ 9 It is well established under Arizona law that a municipality, such as the City, has a duty to keep its sidewalks and streets reasonably safe for users. Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. 601, 602, 667 P.2d 1316, 1317 (1983) (stating defendant city owed a duty to "keep its streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel by the public") (internal citation omitted); Coburn, 143 Ariz. at 52, 691 P.2d at 1080 (stating that a municipality is "under an obligation for the benefit of those who use the public streets" and holding that the defendant city had a duty to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel); Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 191 Ariz. 128, 130, ¶ 10, 953 P.2d 168, 170 (1998) (stating, "a municipality owes a duty to the public to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition"). We see no reason that this same standard of care should not govern the City's conduct with respect to City bus stops and therefore hold that it does.

¶ 10 Nevertheless, the City maintains, and the trial court held, that the City had no duty to take any action to prevent Mathews' attack on Tiana because there had been no prior crimes at the Bus Stop, and Mathews' crime was therefore unforeseeable as a matter of law, thus relieving the City of any duty to protect Tiana from Mathews. The Arizona Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument, clarifying that under Arizona law, "foreseeability is not a factor to be considered by courts when making determinations of duty." Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 15, 150 P.3d at 231.

¶ 11 Accordingly, we determine as a matter of law that the City owed Tiana, as a user of the Bus Stop, a duty to keep the Bus Stop reasonably safe for Tiana's use.

B. Breach

¶ 12 The existence of a duty must not be confused with the details of the conduct required to satisfy the duty. Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 355, 706 P.2d at 367. While the duty the City owed Tiana remained constant, the acts necessary to fulfill it vary depending upon the circumstances. Beach, 136 Ariz. at 603, 667 P.2d at 1319. The question in this case is whether the City's conduct, as a matter of law, was reasonable and thus adequate to satisfy its duty to Tiana. The City contends that, as a matter of law, the jury could not have found that the City breached any duty it owed to Tiana because there was no evidence of any previous criminal activity at the Bus Stop and therefore the harm Tiana complains about came from an unforeseeable event. Tiana asserts, however, that the City was aware that crimes had occurred at bus stops throughout the City and that whether this knowledge required the City to do more to keep her safe from crime at the Bus Stop was a question of fact for the jury.

¶ 13 Whether a defendant has exercised the care required to satisfy its duty is generally a question of fact for the jury. Walker v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 20 Ariz.App. 255, 258, 511 P.2d 699, 702 (1973). However, we may rule as a matter of law when "no reasonable juror could conclude that the standard of care was breached or that the damages were proximately caused by the defendant's conduct." Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; see also Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357-58, 706 P.2d at 369-70; Coburn, 143 Ariz. at 53, 691 P.2d at 1081; Rogers By and Through Standley v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 399, 403, 825 P.2d 20, 23 (App.1991) (noting that, "in approaching the question of negligence or unreasonable risk, `the courts set outer limits. A jury will not be permitted to require a party to take a precaution that is clearly unreasonable . . . .'" (quoting 3 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 15.3, at 355-57 (2d ed.1986))).

¶ 14 The scope and nature of the conduct required to satisfy a duty to keep premises reasonably safe is limited to keeping them safe from those harms...