Gragg v. Hill, 1286.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1933
• Docket Number: No. 1286.,1286.
• Citation: 58 S.W.2d 150
• Parties: GRAGG v. HILL et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

58 S.W.2d 150

GRAGG v. HILL et al.

No. 1286.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

February 16, 1933.

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Coryell County; Joe H. Eidson, Judge.

Suit for mandamus and other relief by Donald B. Gragg against B. W. D. Hill and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and rendered.

J. A. Rauhut, Ben H. Powell, and Homer C. De Wolfe, all of Austin, for appellant.

T. R. Mears, of Gatesville, for appellees.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

In August, 1928, appellant made a contract with the trustees of the State Juvenile Training School to teach in that institution for a period of eleven months, beginning September 10, 1928, for $100 per month and his board and laundry. He taught under said contract and received his salary therefor until the 11th of February, 1929, at which time he was discharged by the board of trustees for reasons which they deem sufficient. He appealed to the state superintendent. The state superintendent had a hearing and filed his finding of fact and conclusions and in all things upheld the action of the trustees in discharging appellant. Appellant then appealed to the state board of education, and on August 10, 1929, it passed the following order: "In the case of Donald Gragg v. Board of Trustees State Juvenile Training School, Gatesville, the board voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the state superintendent and to order the salary due paid to Mr. Gragg." Appellant then applied to the trustees of the Juvenile Training School for his salary for six months at $100 per month and for the alleged value of his board and laundry at $35 per month or a total of $810. Said trustees refused to pay said claim, and appellant on the 13th day of December, 1929, filed this suit in the district court of Coryell county against said school district and the trustees thereof to recover the amount of said unpaid salary, with legal interest thereon. and for a writ of mandamus to compel said trustees to pay said sum of money. The defendants filed a plea in abatement and sought to have the suit abated because said suit was in its nature a suit against the state of Texas and plaintiff had not secured the consent of the Legislature to file said suit. In addition, the defendants filed a general demurrer and certain special exceptions and alleged, among other things, that the order of the state board of education was too indefinite to constitute a judgment and did not order the payment to plaintiff of any definite sum of money and that the plaintiff had failed to appeal from the order of the state superintendent discharging him and that said order had become final. The defendants further alleged that they had appealed and were by their answer therein appealing from the alleged order of the state board of education to the district court of Coryell county and that as a matter of fact plaintiff had breached his contract and was incompetent and was not a suitable person to discharge the duties as a teacher of said institution and had properly been discharged as such, and they prayed for a trial de novo on the issue of whether or not the plaintiff had been properly discharged as such teacher. The plaintiff filed exceptions to the answer of the defendants.

A trial was had before the court without a jury. The court overruled the plea in abatement and all exceptions, and after hearing all of the facts entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed.

We must first determine what effect should be given to the decision of the state board of education. The controversy between the trustees of the training school and appellant arose over the manner in which appellant was performing his duties as a teacher. There was no dispute about his having been employed nor as to the terms of his contract. The board of trustees, in the hearing before the state superintendent, charged, among other things, that the appellant was a poor disciplinarian and failed to keep order in school; that he used unwholesome language in the presence of the pupils; and that on one occasion he left the school and remained away a day or two without obtaining the permission of his superior officers. Consequently, he was discharged. Whether or not the appellant was properly discharging his duties as a teacher, and whether or not he should have been discharged, were matters that pertained particularly to the efficient management of the school. Revised Statutes 1925, article 2656, provides: "The State Superintendent shall be charged with the administration of the school laws and a general superintendency of the business relating to the public schools of the State. * * * He shall hear and determine all appeals from the rulings and decisions of subordinate school officers, and all such officers and teachers shall conform to his decisions. Appeal shall always be from his rulings to the State Board. * * *" The question which was before the state board of education was one of fact, and not of law, relating to the internal affairs of the school and the efficient management thereof, and came within the purview of the matters committed by the Legislature to such board for its determination and was therefore within the jurisdiction of such board. Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S. W. 1120; Brazoria Ind. School Dist. v. Weems (Tex. Civ. App.) 295 S. W. 268, par. 3; McCollum v. Adams (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 526. The decision of the state board that appellant had been improperly discharged and should be reinstated was final on that issue.

By the provisions of the above statute the Legislature has committed to the state superintendent, as one specially trained and experienced in school matters, the responsibility of...