McRae v. Lindale Independent School Dist., 454

• Decision Date: 15 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 454,454
• Citation: 450 S.W.2d 118
• Parties: H. L. McRAE, Appellant, v. LINDALE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 118

450 S.W.2d 118

H. L. McRAE, Appellant, v. LINDALE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 454.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Tyler.

Jan. 15, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1970.

Ramey, Brelsford, Flock, Devereux & Hutchins, Jack W. Flock, Michael A. Hatchell, Tyler, for appellant.

Smith & Smith, Kelley Smith, Tyler, for appellee.

DUNAGAN, Chief Justice.

This lawsuit arises out of the dismissal of H. L. McRae as superintendent of the Lindale Independent Schools by the Board of Trustees of the Lindale Independent School District. Beginning in June, 1961, appellant was awarded consecutive one-year contracts as superintendent of the Lindale Independent School District for 1961--62 and 1962--63, twelve-month terms beginning July 1st and ending June 30th, respectively. On March 11, 1963, the school board orally agreed to retain the appellant as superintendent for the 1963--64 term conditioned that there should be some improvement shown in his operation and control of the school before the school year ended that year, and his employment for that school term would continue as long as he was doing a good and satisfactory job. The appellant was so advised of the board's action. The thing which prompted the conditional nature of the contract in question was the trustees' concern over a certain amount of discord between principals, teachers, and other employees in the school system. Appellant was discharged on August 12, 1963. Appellant H. L. McRae appealed to the State Commissioner of Education who conducted a hearing and rendered a decision holding that the charges against appellant did not justify termination of the contract by the summary dismissal of appellant on August 12, 1963, without giving him a fair and reasonable time to comply with certain terms and conditions of the contract and ordered that he be paid by appellee the salary at the contracted rate, $700.00 per month, for the months of September, October, November and December, 1963. The State Board of Education affirmed the commissioner's ruling, and the school district timely carried the matter to court.

Appellee-plaintiff instituted this suit in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas, against the appellant, H. L. McRae, seeking to enjoin the appellant from asserting any claim against the appellee for the amount ordered paid by the State Commissioner of Education and from instituting any action at law or in equity against the appellee for recovery of any amount by reason of the matters involved in this action.

Appellant-defendant went to trial on his first amended original answer which consisted of special exceptions, a general denial and a counter plea seeking an affirmance of the order of the State Board of Education and the findings of the Commissioner of Education; to recover the amount of $2,800.00, with legal interest thereon from August 12, 1963, and a writ of mandamus to compel the Lindale Independent School District to pay the appellant the amount ordered by the commissioner.

Though appellee denominated its original petition as a suit for declaration of rights and for an injunction, this is, in fact, a suit to nullify an administrative order of the State Board of Education. The Substantial Evidence Rule is applicable to this case and the case was tried before the trial court under such rule. No new or original evidence was introduced at the trial. The parties stipulated that the transcript of testimony, excluding arguments of counsel before the Commissioner of Education, would be received as evidence. This transcript of the testimony plus the decision of the State Commissioner of Education and the order of the State Board of Education sustaining that decision constitute all the evidence in the case.

Upon a hearing before the court without a jury, judgment was rendered that appellant take nothing by any claim based upon the administrative orders in question, and denied the relief sought by appellant in his counter plea. Appellant, H. L. McRae, (defendant below), has perfected his appeal to this court.

Pursuant to appellant's request, the court made and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The appellant asserts in his first 3 points of error that (1) 'The trial court erred in denying Defendant relief in accordance with the decision of the Commissioner of Education, as sustained by the State Board of Education, because the subject matter of those orders was within the administrative agency's jurisdiction, the orders were valid, and they were supported by substantial evidence.'; (2) 'The trial court erred in failing to hold that the facts found by the Commissioner of Education in his decision, as sustained by the State Board of Education, were supported by substantial evidence.', and (3) 'The trial court erred in concluding, contrary to the Commissioner's findings supported by substantial evidence, that there was any good and sufficient reason for terminating Defendant's contract and that Defendant could be terminated under the same at will without fair and reasonable opportunity to perform.'

Determining contract disputes between a school district and its employees unquestionably is a matter delegated by Statute ¹ to the various state administrative bodies concerned with the administration of public schools and school laws. Gragg v. Hill, 58 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1933, writ. ref.); Blair v. Board of Trustees, Trinity Independent School District, 161 S.W.2d 1030, 1032--1033 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston, 1942, n.w.h.). Certainly such a contract dispute must be submitted for administrative determination and decision before any suit thereon can be filed in court. Bear v. Donna Independent School District, 74 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1934, writ ref.); Hinojosa v. San Isidro Independent School District, 273 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1954, n.w.h.); James v. Board of Trustees of Eagle Pass Independent School District, 376 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1964, n.w.h.).

Any appeal from or attack upon an administrative order of the Commissioner of Education or the State Board of Education is governed by the Substantial Evidence Rule. Alton Independent School District v. Central Education Agency, 259 S.W.2d 737, 740--741 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1953, n.w.h.); Blair v. Board of Trustees, Trinity Independent School District, supra; 44 Texas Law Review 1309, 1325--Note 130 (1966).

While a precise definition of what constitutes 'substantial evidence' has not been formulated in this jurisdiction, we are guided by our Supreme Court's statement that, '* * * If the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action, then the order must be set aside'. Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1030 (1942); Griffin, 'The Growing Substantial Evidence Rule'; 21 Texas Bar Journal 721, 744 (1958).

As to the quantum of evidence necessary to constitute substantial evidence, it is recognized that more than a 'scintilla' is required. On the other hand substantial evidence does not require the same amount of evidence necessary to sustain a verdict attacked as being against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or, as the Supreme Court said in Thomas v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 145 Tex. 270, 198 S.W.2d 420 (1946):

'A proceeding of this nature is not comparable to a proceeding in an ordinary civil suit in which the fact findings of a jury are attacked on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain them. In that proceeding trial courts and courts of civil appeals are clothed with the authority, not possessed by this court, to set aside such findings if they are thought to be against the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. But those courts are not clothed with authority to set aside fact findings of an administrative agency made within the scope of its statutory powers on that ground. The Legislature has clothed administrative agencies with special powers to perform special functions and in reviewing fact findings of such agencies no question of the preponderance of the evidence is involved. * * *' (198 S.W.2d 421)

In City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission, 407 S.W.2d 752, 756 (1966) the Supreme Court stated:

'* * * Under the substantial evidence rule the issue to be decided and on which evidence is to be heard is the Reasonableness of the Commission's order; this is a question of law and an appellate court cannot render its decision based upon facts found by a trial court because the legal test of the Reasonableness of an order of the Commission is whether it is reasonably supported by substantial evidence and not whether it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, trial of fact issues by a judge or jury is avoided; it is the Commission's fact finding that is before the trial and appellate courts. * * * As was stated in Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 74, 131 S.W.2d 73, 82 (1939):

'* * * the court does not act as an administrative body to determine whether or not it would have reached the same fact conclusion that the Commission reached, but will consider only whether the action of the Commission in its determination of the facts is reasonably supported by substantial evidence." Also see Blair v. Board of Trustees, Trinity Independent School District, supra; Alton Independent School District v. Central Education Agency, 259 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1953, n.w.h.).

Apparently the trial court undertook to independently find the facts which it considered to be based upon substantial evidence. The trial court's findings of fact began: 'In response to the request of Defendant, H. L. McRae, * * * I make and file the following as FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW based upon substantial evidence adduced from the record.' The trial court...