Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña
| Decision Date | 20 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–0450.,13–0450. |
| Citation | 442 S.W.3d 261 |
| Parties | GRAHAM CENTRAL STATION, INC., Petitioner, v. Jesus PEÑA, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Joshua Kinsey Davis, Pannal Alan Sanders, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.
Fernando G. Mancias, Law Office of Fernando G. Mancias PLLC, Edinburg, TX, for Respondent.
In this negligence case involving a nightclub patron's injuries sustained during an altercation outside the club, the trial court rendered judgment against the club's purported owner, Graham Central Station, Inc. (GCS). Because no evidence supports the finding that GCS owned the club, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of GCS.
Jesus Peña was assaulted by other patrons of the Graham Central Station nightclub (the Nightclub) in Pharr, Texas. Peña sued GCS, alleging that GCS owned the Nightclub and failed to provide adequate security to protect Peña from his assailants. GCS filed a verified denial stating that it was not a proper party to the suit, did not control the relevant premises, and had no connection with the Nightclub. In written discovery responses, GCS identified Roger Gearhart as its President. GCS also disclosed that Pharr Entertainment Complex, L.L.C. d/b/a Graham Central Station in Pharr, Texas (Pharr Entertainment) owned and operated the Nightclub, and was the tenant-in-possession of the premises where the Nightclub was located. The disclosure included Pharr Entertainment's address and phone number.
Notwithstanding this disclosure, Peña never amended his petition to add Pharr Entertainment as a defendant, and the case against GCS was tried to the bench. At trial, the parties presented evidence regarding the ownership of the Nightclub and Peña's injuries. The trial court rendered judgment for Peña, awarding him $450,000 for pain and suffering as well as mental anguish, together with prejudgment interest and court costs. GCS requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the record does not reflect that the trial court ever filed them. GCS appealed, arguing that Peña sued the wrong party and that the trial evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's damages award.
The court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that GCS owned the Nightclub. 442 S.W.3d 261. The court modified the judgment by remittitur, reducing Peña's damages to $249,000, and otherwise affirmed. GCS filed a petition for review in this Court, maintaining that no evidence shows it owned the Nightclub.
As an initial matter, GCS complains that the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law despite GCS's timely filing both a request and a notice of past due findings with that court. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 297. Any error in this regard was harmless, as it did not prevent GCS from properly presenting its case to the court of appeals or this Court. Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex.1996) (per curiam). Accordingly, we imply a finding by the trial court that GCS owned the Nightclub, which GCS has properly challenged on legal sufficiency grounds. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.2002) ; Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990).
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports the adverse finding. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983). We will sustain a legal sufficiency challenge if “ ‘the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla.’ ” Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat'l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tex.2009) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997) ). In conducting our review, “we credit evidence that supports the verdict if reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not have done so.” Id. “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005).
Peña's negligence claim against GCS stems from its failure to protect him from being assaulted by third parties at the Nightclub. Generally, “a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.” Timberwalk Apartments v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “one who controls ... premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The exception includes an owner that “retains control over the security and safety of the premises.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). GCS does not dispute whether the Nightclub's owner controlled the security of the premises or owed Peña a duty under Timberwalk, but it does dispute whether GCS was that owner.
In holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that GCS owned the Nightclub, the court of appeals relied largely on the following testimony by Gearhart:
Gearhart further testified that “he” provided security at the Nightclub, and that the club's security was “in-house.”
The court of appeals held that because Pharr Entertainment is a limited liability company and GCS is a corporation, Gearhart must have been referring to GCS, and not Pharr...
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