Granado v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 05 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1354-14-1 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ELISEO GRANADO, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Decker and AtLee
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
UPON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Kathleen A. Ortiz, Public Defender, for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Eliseo Granado, Jr., appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the United States Constitution. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
In the early morning hours of December 25, 2012, Officer B.D. Keys of the Chesapeake Police Department received a dispatched call for service about a disorderly male "who had been asked to leave a gathering at 1901 Kelly Run." As Officer Keys neared the reported location, agray Cadillac DeVille sedan passed him. Keys did not notice the car being driven in an illegal or improper manner.
Officer Keys then received an update from the dispatcher that the disorderly man "was intoxicated, possibly armed," and had left the original location in "a light-colored Cadillac DeVille sedan." Officer Keys changed his route in order to find the Cadillac DeVille that had passed him. A second officer joined Keys in the search for the vehicle. They spotted a gray Cadillac DeVille with its headlights on parked on a nearby road.
Both officers stopped their police cars. Officer Keys directed his spotlight at the Cadillac and saw the appellant in the driver's seat. As the officers approached the sedan, they ordered the appellant to show his hands, but he did not comply despite being told to do so several times. When the appellant appeared to reach forward, both officers drew their weapons and pointed them at him. Keys noticed that the car's engine was running. The appellant took the keys out of the ignition and threw them over his shoulder into the back seat of the car. Officer Keys approached the driver's side of the car and forced the appellant to get out. Both officers "physically directed" the appellant to the rear of the car, "took" him to the ground and placed him in handcuffs with his hands behind his back. The two officers then brought him to his feet and told him to stand at the rear driver's side of the Cadillac. Through the car windows, they saw keys in the back seat but did not see a weapon.
Officer Keys noticed that the appellant's eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The appellant appeared "disheveled" and had a strong odor of alcohol about his person. Officer Keys asked the appellant what he had been doing. The appellant responded, Keys then asked the appellant if he had "been drinking." The appellant replied, "It doesn't matter, I wasn't driving." The appellant's speech was slurred.
The officers asked the appellant if he had any weapons or threw any weapons in the back seat. He replied, Two empty handgun holsters were found in the back seat of the appellant's car.
Officer Keys told the appellant that he wanted to conduct field sobriety tests, but the appellant refused to participate. Keys offered the appellant a preliminary breath test, but he again refused. Keys arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The appellant was unsteady on his feet as he walked to the police car. The officer advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The appellant asked the trial court to suppress the statements that he made to Keys prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.2 He also requested that the trial court suppress evidence of all the events that occurred after the officers removed him from his car. He argued that the police kept him under detention even after the officers had dispelled the concern that he was armed. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
After hearing the evidence, the court convicted the appellant of driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail, with all time suspended.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his statements to police in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also contends that the court erred under the Fourth Amendment by not suppressing evidence obtained during his continued detention after police determined that he did not have a weapon and was not engaged in disorderly conduct.
"When challenging the denial of a motion to suppress evidence on appeal, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error occurred." Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 367, 786 S.E.2d 148, 151 (2016). Both of the assignments of error on appeal present mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995); McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 551, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2008). In ruling on the propriety of a circuit court's decision to deny the motion, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. E.g., Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560, 797 S.E.2d 794, 798 (2017). This Court also affords to the prevailing party the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence. Mason, 291 Va. at 367, 786 S.E.2d at 151. Further, we are "bound by the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them." Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 97, 101, 793 S.E.2d 811, 813 (2016) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc)). In addition, "we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Smith v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 288, 295, 777 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2015) (quoting McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261).
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements that he had "just parked [his] car and was going to sleep it off" and that the officers had not seen him driving. He contends that Officer Keys questioned him when he was in custody and had not yet received his Miranda warnings.
Pursuant to the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, "no 'person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'" Gibson v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 772, 778, 706 S.E.2d 541, 544 (2011) ). In order to protect this right,when law enforcement officers question a suspect who is in custody, they must first provide the suspect with appropriate warnings pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Commonwealth v. Quarles, 283 Va. 214, 220, 720 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2012). Those warnings include the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and the right to have that attorney present during questioning by the police. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70; Quarles, 283 Va. at 220, 720 S.E.2d at 87. "Statements obtained by law enforcement officers in violation of this rule generally will be subject to exclusion for most proof purposes in a criminal trial." Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 39, 613 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2005).
The determination of whether a suspect is in custody and consequently "entitled to Miranda warnings, presents a mixed question of law and fact." Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102. "[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 96, 712 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). An individual is "in custody" for Miranda purposes only when he has been formally arrested or the police restraint on his "freedom of movement" rises to the level "associated with a formal arrest." Tizon v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 1, 19, 723 S.E.2d 260, 269 (2012) (quoting Brooks, 282 Va. at 96, 712 S.E.2d at 467).
Resolution of the issue turns on "how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would have understood his circumstances." Hasan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 674, 679, 667 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2008) (quoting Dixon, 270 Va. at 40, 613 S.E.2d at 401). The determination of whether a suspect is in custody "requires an objective focus," rather than a subjective view. Dixon, 270 Va. at 40, 613 S.E.2d at 401. Thus, "if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood that he or she was under arrest," Miranda warnings "are required" beforequestioning. Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 618, 642, 606 S.E.2d 539, 551 (2004) (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 262 (1998)).
Generally, "a person temporarily detained pursuant to an 'ordinary traffic stop[]' is not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Harris, 27 Va. App. at 564, 500 S.E.2d at 262 (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). However, "a detained motorist will be entitled to the protections set forth in Miranda if he . . . 'thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes.'" Id. (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440). This is the focus of the analysis here—whether the appellant was essentially "in custody" rather than simply being held as part of an investigatory detention at the time he made the challenged statements.
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