Commonwealth v. Quarles

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: Record No. 110775.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Virginia v. Jerrod Tyree QUARLES.

283 Va. 214

720 S.E.2d 84

COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

v.Jerrod Tyree QUARLES.

Record No. 110775.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 13, 2012.

Josephine F. Whalen, Assistant Attorney General II (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.

Catherine French, Supervising Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, and MIMS, JJ., and LACY and KOONTZ, S.JJ.

OPINION BY Justice WILLIAM C. MIMS.

In this appeal, we review the en banc judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the denial by the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond of a motion to suppress and held that the defendant's confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On October 21, 2008, Jerrod T. Quarles and then 11–year–old K.T. decided to “rob a white lady” near the area of Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond. The first person they encountered was Kimberly Johnson, who was walking home and talking on her cellular telephone. Quarles asked K.T. for his shirt, which Quarles used to wrap a brick. Quarles struck Johnson in the head with the brick. Johnson fell to her knees. K.T., wielding a knife that Quarles had provided him, demanded Johnson's phone, which Johnson gave to him. Johnson then chased Quarles and K.T. for six or seven blocks and later called police.

Hours later, Detective Michael Alston visited K.T.'s home and spoke with his mother and later with K.T. K.T. and his mother led police to Johnson's cellular telephone and to the knife that K.T. used during the robbery. K.T. provided an address where Quarles was located. Quarles was placed under custodial arrest and brought to the precinct.

At the precinct, Detective Alston took K.T. into his lieutenant's office for interrogation. Quarles remained in a larger, open office with Officer Darin Papeo. Detective Alston spoke with K.T. for 45 minutes to an hour and obtained a full confession. He then obtained a full confession from Quarles. Quarles was placed under arrest and subsequently indicted for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Code §§ 18.2–22 and 18.2–58.

Prior to trial, Quarles moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Detective Alston obtained the confession in violation of his Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. At the suppression hearing, Detective Alston testified that following his interview of K.T., he walked into the hallway and saw Officer Papeo and Quarles in the large open office. Officer Papeo approached Detective Alston with a waiver of rights form and stated that Quarles wished to talk to an attorney.¹ Quarles was sitting approximately 10 or 15 feet away. At this time, the evidence against Quarles consisted of Johnson's cellular telephone, the knife used in the robbery, and a full, detailed confession from K.T. Detective Alston also was aware of two independent witnesses with whom he had not yet spoken, as well as Johnson, the victim, who presumably could identify Quarles as her attacker.

Detective Alston testified that in response to Officer Papeo's statement, he said to Officer Papeo: “[T]hat's fine if he doesn't want to talk to me. I wasn't the person that robbed a white lady and hit her in the head with a brick.” He explained that at the time of that statement, he believed nothing remained to be done in the investigation of Quarles, and that “the case was made.” Quarles, upon hearing Detective Alston's statement, expressed a desire to speak with him. Detective Alston responded, “no, that's fine, you don't have to talk to me. I'm good.” Quarles persisted, and later made a full confession.

On cross-examination, Detective Alston was asked if he also said “If that's the story you want to tell the judge, that's fine.” He responded that he may have. He indicated that his recollection was limited since he had not recorded the conversation. He explained that he used the term “white lady” because K.T. had used that term and it was “in his head” from K.T.'s confession. He testified that while his statement was not part of the booking process, it was not out of the ordinary under the circumstances.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court made the following findings of fact:

I find that Detective Alston's statement to [Officer] Papeo, having learned that the defendant, Mr. Quarles, declined to be interviewed and asked for his attorney, the statement [“]that's fine. I'm not the person who robbed the white lady and hit her in the head with a brick[”] and the statement that may have followed that [“]if that's the story he wants to tell the judge, then, that's fine,[”] those statements were said by Detective Alston to [Officer] Papeo in response to what [Officer] Papeo had said to Detective Alston.

(Emphasis added.) The circuit court then found that the statements were not a re-initiation of interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation, and that Quarles' confession was initiated by Quarles. It denied Quarles' motion to suppress the confession.

Following a bench trial, the circuit court found Quarles guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Quarles appealed to the Court of Appeals. A divided panel of that court affirmed his convictions. See Quarles v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1988–09–2, 2010 WL 3119283 (Aug. 10, 2010). The Court of Appeals granted his petition for en banc review and reversed the judgment of the panel, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Quarles' motion to suppress. Quarles v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 13, 26, 707 S.E.2d 7, 13 (2011). The Court of Appeals also rejected the trial court's finding that Detective Alston used the pronoun “he” rather than “you” when suggesting that Quarles could maintain his innocence “to the judge.” Id. at 18 n. 1, 707 S.E.2d 7. We granted the Commonwealth's petition for appeal, and now reverse.

DISCUSSION

The Commonwealth assigns error to the Court of Appeals holding that the police impermissibly reinitiated communication with Quarles after he invoked his right to counsel in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that Quarles' subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights therefore was not voluntary.²

The question of whether Detective Alston's statement violated Quarles' Fifth Amendment rights is a mixed question of law and fact. See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94, 712 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2011). We review the circuit court's factual findings in denying a motion to suppress for clear error, but review its application of the law de novo. Id. at 94–95, 712 S.E.2d at 466; see also Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 327, 568 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2002) (“ ‘the determination of what [the defendant] actually said is a question of fact that we review only for clear error.... Whether those words are sufficient to invoke the right to counsel is a legal determination that we review de novo.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Uribe–Galindo, 990 F.2d 522, 523 (10th Cir.1993)).

The legal principles that govern the outcome of this case are familiar and largely not disputed by the parties. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” When police interrogate a suspect in their custody, they first must give a Miranda warning informing the suspect of the right to an attorney and the right to have that attorney present during the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If the suspect invokes the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation. ³ Redmond, 264 Va. at 328, 568 S.E.2d at 698 (applying Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)); see also Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 462, 352 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1987) (once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “further discussions between the police and the accused must [be] initiated by the accused.”).

The narrow question this case presents is whether Quarles reinitiated the interrogation or whether Detective Alston engaged Quarles in interrogation or its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The United States Supreme Court's holding in Innis controls the outcome of this case.

In Innis, the police, in the course of investigating a murder and a robbery committed by a man using a sawed-off shotgun, arrested Innis, who was unarmed. Id. at 293–94, 100 S.Ct. 1682. After being advised of his Miranda rights, and having asked to speak to a lawyer, Innis was placed in a “caged wagon” with three officers for transport to the police station. Id. at 294, 100 S.Ct. 1682.

While en route to the station, one of the officers said to another officer that because there was a school for handicapped children nearby, “ ‘there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.’ ” Id. at 294–95, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The other officer responded that “ ‘it would be too bad if the little ... girl [ ] would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.’ ” Id. at 295, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Innis then interrupted to show the officers the location of the shotgun. Id.

The Innis court observed that under Miranda, police need not engage in express questioning for the exchange to constitute interrogation. Id. at 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682. However, the Court noted that not all statements obtained by police after a person is taken into custody are the product of interrogation. Rather, “ ‘[i]nterrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Id. at 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682.

The Court...