Grand Jury Investigation by Alexander, In re, 13188

• Decision Date: 12 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13188,13188
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION by Judge John M. ALEXANDER.

Page 49

540 A.2d 49

207 Conn. 98

In re GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION by Judge John M. ALEXANDER.

No. 13188.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 1, 1988.

Decided April 12, 1988.

Dominic J. Squatrito, with whom, on the brief, were Nancy Jeanne Johnson and Barry D. Guliano, Manchester, for appellant (petitioner Journal Pub. Co., Inc.).

Paul F. Thomas, with whom, on the brief, was Jacob D. Zeldes, Bridgeport, for appellee (intervenor Neil Ellis).

A. Susan Peck, with whom, on the brief, was Hubert J. Santos, Hartford, for appellee (intervenor Leonard Seader).

John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John J Kelly, State's Atty., and Roseanne Wagner, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The sole issue in this case is whether, despite intervening legislative changes in grand jury procedures, the statute that was in effect at the time when an investigatory grand jury was authorized governs a subsequent request for disclosure of the grand jury's report. The petitioner, the Journal Publishing Company, Inc., filed a motion for the public disclosure of the grand jury report, associated transcripts and evidentiary documentation that had been filed with the Hartford Superior Court by Judge John M. Alexander. The trial court permitted a number of interested parties to intervene, both in support of and in opposition to the motion for disclosure. ¹ After a hearing, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. The petitioner has appealed. We find error and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant facts are undisputed. On July 18, 1985, Judge Stoughton ordered a grand jury inquiry to determine pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 54-47, ² whether there was probable cause to believe that crimes had been committed in Enfield. Judge Shaughnessy was initially appointed to serve as grand juror, but was subsequently replaced by Judge Alexander. The grand jury filed its final report with Judge Barall in Hartford Superior Court on November 24, 1986.

Before this grand jury investigation was completed, the General Assembly enacted far-reaching reforms in the procedures governing the investigatory grand jury system. Effective October 1, 1985, § 54-47 was repealed and its provisions replaced by Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611, codified as General Statutes §§ 54-47a through 54-47h. ³ In 1986, the General Assembly enacted clarifying legislation to ensure that the authority of investigatory grand juries duly designated prior to October 1, 1985, pursuant to the repealed § 54-47, would continue "until the conclusion of such inquiry and a final report has been filed with the court pursuant to said section." Public Acts 1986, No. 86-317, § 1(a). This court accordingly held, in State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 543, 522 A.2d 753 (1987), that the legislature had manifested its intention not to revoke the authority of, nor to alter the procedures governing, investigatory grand juries that had been properly authorized before October 1, 1985.

Although the Alexander grand jury had been duly authorized before October 1, 1985, the trial court, Byrne, J., concluded that the petition for disclosure was governed by the provisions of Public Acts 1985, No. 85-611, § 4. General Statutes § 54-47e. The court drew a distinction between the proceedings of the grand jury itself, and proceedings that involved questions arising after the grand jury had completed its assignment by filing its report. As to the former, the governing statute continued to be the repealed § 54-47, but, as to the latter, the court determined that the new act should govern. Since the disclosure petition was filed subsequent to the filing of the grand jury report, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to act, because under § 54-47e only a panel of judges is authorized to decide "when ... disclosure ... is deemed ... to be in the public interest." Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

The petitioner's appeal asks us to resolve two specific issues: (1) did the trial court have jurisdiction to decide the motion for disclosure; and (2) what is the standard by which such a motion for disclosure should be decided? In our view, these issues must be resolved in accordance with the governing provisions of the old § 54-47, rather than the new § 54-47e. Accordingly, the trial court was in error in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the petition for disclosure, and should have required the petitioner to make the showing of particularized need that this court articulated as the proper standard in In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, 197 Conn. 698, 709-12, 501 A.2d 377 (1985).

It is common ground among the parties that the Alexander grand jury, duly constituted before October 1, 1985, was obligated to conduct its proceedings and prepare its report in accordance with the provisions of the repealed § 54-47. State v. Blasko, supra. The dispositive question presented by this appeal is whether the legislature intended a different statute to govern public access to the report, transcript and other documentation that this grand jury filed with the Hartford Superior Court. We are persuaded that no such bifurcation was intended. As a matter of principle, this conclusion follows from our holding in In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, supra, at 709, 501 A.2d 377, that public disclosure of grand jury proceedings must be regulated with an eye to "the recognized importance of secrecy in the proper functioning of the grand jury system." As a matter of practicality, it is unlikely that the legislature would have intended to have a three judge panel authorize the disclosure of a report of a grand jury proceeding when no three judge panel had had any prior contact with the origins and scope of the grand jury investigation. Indeed, the cross-references in § 54-47e to §§ 54-47c and 54-47d underscore that the legislature understood the panel that determines disclosure to have had prior oversight responsibility for all aspects of the investigatory grand jury process.

Once it is decided that the repealed § 54-47 governs all proceedings relating to the Alexander grand jury, including disclosure, the specific issues raised by the petitioner's appeal need little further discussion. Under the old § 54-47, a single judge of the Superior Court must determine whether to order disclosure of all or part of the grand jury's report, transcripts, or other documentation. In arriving at its determination, the court must apply the standard of particularized need that we articulated in In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, supra, at 711-12, 501 A.2d 377. See also Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, 204 Conn. 609, 624-26, 529 A.2d 692 (1987). The petitioner suggests that a different standard applies because, in a footnote in In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, supra, at 713 n. 10, 501 A.2d 377, we indicated that a petition for disclosure must be decided "according to the statute that was in effect at the time that the trial court was asked to rule" on the petitions. We have, however, determined that "the statute that was in effect" for this grand jury, when the trial court ruled on this petition, was the repealed § 54-47. Accordingly, any person seeking disclosure of any record of these proceedings must meet the standard of particularized need. ⁴

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other Justices concurred.

1 The Hartford Courant Company and the Manchester Herald were permitted to intervene to join the moving petitioner in seeking public disclosure. William Boudah, John Castle, Neil Ellis, Paul Fox, Edward T. Lynch, Leonard Seader, and an unidentified witness who had testified before the grand jury were permitted to intervene to oppose public disclosure.

2 "[General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) ] Sec. 54-47. INVESTIGATIONS INTO COMMISSION OF CRIME. (a) Whenever it appears to the superior court for any judicial district that the administration of justice requires an investigation to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that a crime or crimes have been committed within the judicial district, said court may order an inquiry to be made into the matter, to be conducted before any judge, state referee, or any three judges of said court designated by it.

"(b) The chief state's attorney and the deputy chief state's attorney may also apply to the chief court administrator for an order that an inquiry be made to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that a crime or crimes have been committed. If the chief court administrator is satisfied from the application and any other papers or evidence submitted in support thereof that the administration of justice requires such an inquiry, he shall order that it be made and shall appoint a judge, a state referee or any three judges of the superior court to conduct the inquiry, with the assistance of the chief state's attorney, deputy chief state's attorney or any state's attorney or assistant state's attorney.

"(c) Such inquiries shall be conducted in public or private as said court or chief court administrator orders.

"(d) The attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at such inquiries may be compelled by subpoena, signed by any official authorized to issue such process.

"(e) If any witness properly summoned fails to appear or to produce any documents included in the subpoena, or if he fails to answer any proper question, the judge, referee or judges conducting the inquiry may report the matter to the state's attorney for the judicial district wherein the...